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ABSTRACT
Writing Not Writing: Transdisciplinary Poetics, Institutional Critique
by
Miriam Atkin

ADVISOR: Joan Richardson

To quote from the title of a 2021 talk by the poet Lyn Hejinian, we are living in a “time
against thinking.”1 Hejinian maintains a belief in poetry’s persistent capacity to interject effective
critical thinking practices at moments when everyday language has become calcified to the extent
that the formation of new, vital thought is inhibited. Her insistence that getting past language’s
givens is necessary for social and political action is part of a sustained institutional critique that she
has expressed for decades alongside her co-collaborator and fellow poet Leslie Scalapino. Through
their co-authored poetry collections and participant-observer dispatches from the university
departments in which they’ve worked, Hejinian and Scalapino articulate a shared interest in
becoming sensitized to the political and economic forces that propel cultural institutions and are
embedded in the forms of language circulated therein. In aspiring toward a heightened sensitization,
their collaborative and solo writings cross into the terrain of whatever genre or discipline offers the
best tools for sensory attunement from one moment to the next.
This commitment to transdisciplinary creative practice is shared among the crossgenerational selection of artists that I bring together in my dissertation. I conduct extended close
readings of works by Robert Kocik, Eleni Stecopoulos, Zora Neale Hurston, Jimmie Durham, Leslie

1

“The Poetics Event: Critical Thinking in a Time against Thinking” (presentation, Poetics & the University in Crisis
conference sponsored by Chant de la Sirène—Journal of Poetics & the Hybrid Arts, online, March 5–7, 2021).
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Scalapino and Lyn Hejinian, while allowing my analysis to touch on adjacent works by others in an
expanding web of associations. The artworks that I have chosen as my primary focus employ multiple
mediums and fields of discourse to address the presumptions and exclusions that are structurally
integral to the institutions that house them. Durham coins the term “architexture” to indicate the
reliance of institutions upon a combination of careful spatial design and targeted language to
proliferate and reinforce their core ideologies. This creates a political-aesthetic monoculture that
galleries, museums and academic departments cultivate as a survival strategy within an economy that
urges brand consistency and streamlined messaging. The artists I examine enact “architextural”
interventions through their use of forms that move between the page and three dimensional space,
incorporating architecture, sculpture, drawing, painting, film, performance, poetry and prose. These
works relate to the notion of “field”—denoting both geographic expanse and area of study—as
something to be traversed and continually redrawn. It is a coupling of the role of artist with that of
engineer or builder; an endeavor to re-compose human spaces.
My work aims at a renewed understanding of critique as such, and therefore—though the
artists I bring together work in many mediums—I focus heavily on works of writing, the art form that
is generally regarded as the most suitable means of articulating critical positions. In
acknowledgement of the pedagogical indispensability of writing in its many critical and scholarly
applications, my investigation contains an underlying questioning of conventional approaches to
teaching writing. It is not my aim to suggest new, better ways. Rather, I provide an array of examples
demonstrating the inventive and transdisciplinary shapes that critical writing may take—essaying into
new lands and as-yet-untried methodologies—as a way of encouraging a self-guided inquiry into which
experimental compositional modes fit one’s own particular critical or analytical aims.
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I theorize the possibility of an art practice undertaken as a means to perceive more acutely
both the unseen ideologies of our institutions—those that aren’t written into mission statements—
and the fears, blockages and omissions that structure one’s own thinking at the most basic level.
Alongside the exemplary works of art and experimental writing that I bring in to help elaborate this
proposition, I weave together philosophical, pedagogical and psychological perspectives from a host
of thinkers including William James, Hannah Arendt, Deborah Britzman, Eli Clare, Michael
Taussig, Alfonso Lingis, Theodor Adorno and others. Especially pivotal will be Adorno’s rendering
of a poetically-inflected critical thinking that has the capacity to disrupt the authoritarian impulses
of contemporary culture, and Britzman’s account of how the anxieties triggered by the act of writing
signal an acute, embodied awareness of the mechanisms of institutional power.

vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The perspectives presented in this work were formulated collaboratively, through
conversations with the artists in my orbit: friends who are also mentors and teammates in the
ongoing perilous adventure of life in New York City. Their artworks and their various,
personalized ethics, have served as scholarly resources for this dissertation. Through Robert Kocik
I have glimpsed an emphatically shape-shifting practice of thinking and making; an intellectual
attunement that is as manifold, irreducible and elastic as the world with which it converses.
Melanie Maar has shown me an impeccable example of art-as-life, applying, unwaveringly, the
painstaking visceral attention required by dance-making to the art of living a life and being a
friend. I have learned through Daniel Carter that genuine kindness is achieved first and foremost
as an extension of uncompromising intellectual autonomy—the capacity to differ unselfishly, and
without fear. And, through my friend Veronika Shear, I have accessed with pleasure the art of
“mongrel discourse”—sculptural speech—which crossbreeds thesis with antithesis, symbol with
referent, past with future, locutor with interlocutor. Öykü Tekten has been an unconditional ally
and supportive companion in my life between worlds; both in and not in academia, aspiring with
me toward abundant knowledge and happy, post-rational oblivion.
I am indebted to the patient souls who, on top of being friends and mentors, have also
been readers of this dissertation throughout its slow and fitful emergence. Iemanjá Brown and
Conor Tomás Reed have both attended to my writing with a seriousness and care that has helped
me see myself as an honest-to-goodness thinker. Their responses have always been oriented far
beyond academia, toward pressing sociopolitical realities, encouraging and modelling a critical

vii

practice that is based in urgent necessity as well as in love. Likewise, Ammiel Alcalay’s long-time
support of my work has helped to place it in dialogue with real people and real events,
transcending the exigencies of academic deadlines, qualifications, and professional objectives.
Through the world of intellectuals and artists that his poetry, criticism and personality help to
build—and which has subsequently become a reliable source of friendship and creative
collaboration in my life—I’ve accessed the indispensable forms of scholarship that happen in
everyday spaces. Wayne Koestenbaum’s presence as audience is an enduring atmosphere to my
work, one that I can import into my composition process where and whenever it happens, reactivating the breadth of that receptive landscape into which I first entered my writing almost ten
years ago as a student in his course “Desire to Write.” I saw back then that the time and space of
his thinking is smooth and vast, and I’m grateful for the calm it has afforded me as I dwell in it yet.
Joan Richardson has, from the very beginning of my time at CUNY, helped me embrace the
potentially cosmic reach of scholarship as such. She has demonstrated for me, through her own
writing and being, that perception of world always corresponds to perception of self, and both are
an endless process. In Joan’s conversation and in her art, she makes clear that the impossible work
of trying to articulate the farthest reaches of thought and sensation is not only doable but worth
the risk.
I dedicate this work to Steve Cannon and his gathering of the tribes.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Illustrations….…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….x
Introduction | Trailing a Lineage…………………………………………………………………………………………..1
Chapter I | Eleni Stecopoulos and Robert Kocik: Sick Writing, Spastic Assembly…………………….19
Chapter II | Voicing the Vaguely Felt in Zora Neale Hurston’s Reports from the Field……………..46
Chapter III | “An Honorable and Important Profession”: Jimmie Durham’s Indecorous Craft….79
Chapter IV | Seeing and Hearing with Lyn Hejinian and Leslie Scalapino…………………………….103
Conclusion | Critical Byways…………………………………………………………………………………………….118
Illustrations..……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………131
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….145

ix

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Introduction
Figure 1

Thoreau, Henry David, Gowing’s Swamp, drawing on paper, 1860.

Figure 2

Thoreau, Henry David, Great Waiters, drawing on paper, 1860.

Chapter I
Figure 1.1.

Kocik, Robert, Physiology for Poets, drawing on paper.

Figure 1.2.

Kocik, Robert, libretto from E-V-E-R-Y-O-N-E, 2013.

Chapter II
Figure 2.1.

Hurston, Zora Neale, field work footage still, 1940.

Figure 2.2.

Hurston, Zora Neale, field work footage still, 1928.

Figure 2.3.

Hurston, Zora Neale, field work footage still, 1928.

Figure 2.4.

Hurston, Zora Neale, field work footage still, 1928.

Figure 2.5.

Taussig, Michael, drawing on paper.

Figure 2.6.

Goya, Francisco, Yo lo vi, etching and aquatint, 1810-20.

Figure 2.7.

Goya, Francisco, Nada. (Ello dira), etching and aquatint, 1863.

Figure 2.8.

Whitten, Jack, Black Monolith II (For Ralph Ellison), acrylic, molasses, copper, salt,
coal, ash, chocolate, onion, herbs, rust, eggshell, razor blade on canvas, 1994.

Figure 2.9.

Whitten, Jack, Black Monolith, X (The Birth of Muhammad Ali), acrylic on canvas,
2016.

Figure 2.10.

Meade, Margaret, field work footage still, 1953-54.

Figure 2.11.

Hurston, Zora Neale, field work footage still, 1928.

Figure 2.12.

Hurston, Zora Neale, field work footage still, 1928.

Chapter III
Figure 3.1.

Durham, Jimmie, Mushroom from the Grunewald Forest, mushroom, acrylic paint, ink
on two wood boards, 2006.

Figure 3.2.

Durham, Jimmie, “The Center of the World or How to get at Chalma,” installation
view, 1997.

x

Figure 3.3.

Durham, Jimmie, “The Center of the World or How to get at Chalma,” installation
view, 1997.

Figure 3.4.

Durham, Jimmie, Smashing, film still from performance.

Figure 3.5.

Durham, Jimmie, Articles 2 & 3 from the 1986 Pinkerton’s Agency Manual, mahogany,
ink on wood panel, 1986.

Figure 3.6.

European Press Photo Agency, digital image, 2016.

xi

Introduction | Trailing a Lineage

On January 6th 2021 the US capitol building in Washington DC was stormed by outraged
citizens who believed themselves to be victims of a sham presidential election. Many grabbed or
smashed symbolic items. In the summer of 2020, following the May 25th police killing of an unarmed
man named George Floyd, citizens flooded the streets of cities across the country in protest, some
breaching and damaging police headquarters, banks, and other structures. I find myself living at a
moment when there is a massive public perception that the institutions whose alleged reason for
being is to make a good life possible actually impinge upon the freedom and safety of citizens. For
the most part, I tend to agree. My own long-time struggle as an artist and writer to secure the basics
for the life I want has entailed an extended process of disentanglement from the network of illusions
perpetuated by the cultural systems on which I rely. I have learned over time that the academic and
art institutions that hold the power to determine whether or not I will contribute my skills, ideas
and creations to a broad public sphere are beholden to ideologies that aren’t written into their
mission statements, and that oftentimes directly contradict them. Institutions are propelled by
political and economic forces that are difficult to see. It’s outside the scope of my writing to specify
exactly what those powers are and where they come from. But I would like to propose a possible
alternative to the frustration of not being able to see.
I find myself drawn to a particular strain of the American avant-garde that treats the cognitive
and perceptual freedoms afforded by art-making as a means of institutional critique. The artists in
the tradition that I wish to draw out recognize the objects that structure society—our tools,
technologies, buildings, infrastructure and artworks—as avatars for ideas that have become concealed
beneath layers of familiarity. In shaping new objects to add to the world, these artists converse with
1

existing material, spatial and civic structures: the ones that a growing portion of the contemporary
US population regards as symbolic or actual expressions of exploitation from above. It is a coupling
of the role of artist with that of engineer or builder; an endeavor to re-compose human spaces.
I want to arrive at a renewed understanding of critique as such, and therefore my main focus
will be works of writing, the art form that is generally regarded as the most suitable means of
articulating critical positions. The artists I bring together in this study all utilize writing as a
representational tool that is multimodal, polyglot and radically individualized, in contrast to the
linguistic and ideological monoculture that galleries, museums and academic departments cultivate
as a survival strategy within an economy that urges brand consistency and streamlined messaging.
They are all multimedia artists and transdisciplinarians, and thus my account of their writing
practices will be in conversation with their use of other forms.
In acknowledgement of the pedagogical indispensability of writing in its many critical and
scholarly applications, my work here contains an underlying questioning of conventional approaches
to teaching writing. It is not my aim to suggest new, better ways. Rather, I provide an array of
examples demonstrating the inventive shapes that critical writing may take as a way of encouraging
a self-guided inquiry into which experimental compositional modes fit one’s own particular critical
or analytical aims. My personal pedagogical orientation is concerned not with “best practices” but
with helping students learn how to teach themselves.
Under conditions that encourage ideological consensus, artists that do this kind of work are
turned toward rather than armed against the conflict with difference, in all of its generative and
ground-shifting potential. The cognitive adjustments prompted by encountering difference will
always be vivifying, like the shedding of old skin, activating the possibility for the acquisition of

2

knowledge through intellectual boundary crossing and creative undisciplining. The work I am
interested in is composed in response to an intense need to see where one is. For such work, the
process of creation will be a process of feeling out and searching.
As a first step toward bringing to light the forms and methods of this lineage, I’ll begin with
an early example in the field diaries of Henry David Thoreau.1 Alternating between poetry and prose,
these daily writings recorded the author’s philosophical meditations on planetary life, accounts of
his interactions with friends and neighbors, and observations regarding the structure and movement
of objects in nature. Over time, the journals came to overwhelmingly focus on the latter concern,
and an abundance of small drawings punctuate his entries from the mid to late 1850s, attesting to
his increasingly close attention to the appearance of things in the woods around Concord,
Massachusetts where he lived.2 These hybrid writings—utilizing diverse representational modes in
order to document most accurately the complexities and vicissitudes of day-to-day experience—would
serve as the basis for Walden, or Life in the Woods, the revised and polished account of his two-year
experiment inhabiting a cabin he built with the aim to “live deliberately” and “front only the
essential facts of life.”3 The Walden project was just one iteration of an ongoing multidisciplinary
practice of artistic research that Thoreau undertook, enlisting philosophy, horticulture, land
surveying, cartography, architecture, drawing and poetry primarily as a means to understand his
place in the world and secondarily as a broad method of research and composition for his published
works. The research itself was his masterpiece—a durational performance featuring site-specific

1

I bring him in as a familiar touchstone, and an indicator that the history I aim to draw out is not new. Thoreau’s
work is widely known and read, and it won’t be a major focus of my research, which primarily engages with artists
who exist at the edges of the canon.
2
See figures 1 and 2.
3
Walden and Resistance to Civil Government, ed. William Rossi (New York: Norton, 1992), 61.
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architectural and agricultural installations—and the journals, or field notebooks, are the best
document we have of its inception, evolution and completion (he wrote his last entry in November
of 1861, just a few months before he died). The improvisational and playfully surrealistic style of the
journals reveal Thoreau to be just as much a psychedelic sculptor-poet as the monkish and often
didactic narrator of Walden.4 The distinction between Thoreau’s two writerly personae—the
improvising experimentalist and the didactic pedagogue—anticipates a key concern of the essays
collected here. Thoreau’s different authorial styles say something about his relationship to the
institutions that formed him.
He was both a graduate of Harvard University—reaping its elite privileges—and a critic of
formal schooling, advocating an unorthodox self-education through self-guided exploration and
manual work. When, in Walden, he rails against Harvard for training students only to play at life
rather than “earnestly live it from beginning to end,”5 his teacherly tone—positioning the reader as
student—contradicts his message that real education requires learners to “lay the foundation
themselves.”6 For, to tell is to teach, and in order for a writing practice to genuinely advocate
Thoreau’s vision of wild learning, it would need to abandon the impulse to tell. It is only through
his other voice—the unruly, playful, ambidextrous seeker who speaks in the journals—that we see the
behavior of his writing in step with its message.
It is worth noting that Thoreau’s didacticism in Walden largely accounts for why a sizable
contingent of contemporary readers despise him. Jedediah Britton-Purdy characterizes this response
in a 2017 article for The Nation where he recounts a class discussion with his students about Thoreau:

4

But the psychedelic Thoreau does appear there, too, most notably in the famous sand hill section of “Spring.”
Walden, 34.
6
Ibid.
5
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they found the author to be a self-righteous, carping moralist who was coddled by privilege. 7 In
2015 Kathryn Schulz wrote a piece for The New Yorker in which she called Thoreau “as parochial as
he was egotistical.”8 In response to such claims, Britton-Purdy attempts to point Thoreau’s detractors
toward additional complexities to contemplate in their assessment. He offers that Thoreau’s
misanthropy and self-righteousness were in fact corollaries of the very qualities for which socialjustice-minded contemporary readers might laud him: his willingness to sacrifice societal approval
for the sake of political conviction, as exemplified in his outspoken defense of the much maligned
abolitionist insurrectionist John Brown; his participation in the Underground Railroad, risking
charges of treason to help enslaved people escape northward.9 Should this political courage be
written off as more egotistical pedantry? What was the correlation between his capacity for vehement
political action and his “narcissism” (as Schulz characterized him)? Thoreau’s criticism of others was
always mingled with self-censure—his harshness belied persistent frailty and doubt. To Britton-Purdy,
this “painful struggle in thought and feeling” that is evident in Thoreau’s writing is what makes it
eminently interesting.10
The tension between what a writer says and what the saying masks or displaces will form a
major theme of my investigation here. This tension is significant both pedagogically and poetically.
The force with which a text tells its readers how to think and what to do will indicate the degree of
anxiety or desire—circling around some unnamed internal object—beneath the words. This means
that the drive to open readers’ eyes to a right way evidences some truth that the writing itself isn’t

7

“A Radical for All Seasons,” The Nation, June 1, 2017, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/thoreauradical-seasons/
8
“The Moral Judgments of Henry David Thoreau,” The New Yorker, October 12, 2015,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/10/19/pond-scum
9
Britton-Purdy, “Radical.”
10
Ibid.
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looking at. Like Thoreau, I myself am writing institutional critique, yet find that as critique, my
language—in its striving for clarity, consistency, and sound argumentation—affirms the very
institutional conventions that I am attempting to loosen. One is inescapably structured by the thing
one opposes. With that truth resounding, these essays will try to construct a positive case for an other
way, allowing transdisciplinary experimentalists from the US artistic tradition to lead by example in
performing the possibility for a writer to live in a space between teaching and learning, telling and
listening. Key to this exploration will be an insistence on the etymological meaning of the word
essay—from the French essayer, to try—viewing the art of critical writing as an attempt, a leap, a
voluntary floundering.
The interest in treating research and research writing as artistic rather than academic
activities found vociferous expression in the work of post-war poet Charles Olson. Informed by his
engagement with quantum mechanics and the development of “field theory” from Michael Faraday
through Alfred North Whitehead,11 Olson employed a practice of “composition by field.” He viewed
the poem as an organic object, fundamentally receptive to input from environing materials, and
always in a state of becoming, a notion that was heavily influenced by Whitehead’s “process
metaphysics.” Olson imagined a multisensory, multidisciplinary and multimedia approach to
making as the best possible path that thinking might take. The Maximus Poems, his magnum opus, is
as much a work of history, geology, anthropology and archaeology as it is a work of poetry, and the

11

For further reading on Olson’s poetic exploration of field theory, see Burt Kimmelman’s essay “’Equal, That is, to
the Real Itself’: The New Physics, Charles Olson, and Avant-Garde Poetics,” in Restoring the Mystery of the
Rainbow: Literature’s Refraction of Science (Brill/Rodopi, 2011). For an in-depth study of Olson’s engagement with
Whitehead, see Miriam Nichols’ “Charles Olson: Architect of Place,” in Radical Affections: Essays on the Poetics of
Outside (University of Alabama, 2010).
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process of composing it entailed dwelling, digging and “sounding”12 as did Thoreau’s Walden
project. Maximus is a multi-volume study of Gloucester, Massachusetts, conducted through
encounters with its people and spaces (Olson was a long-time resident of the town), through civic
engagement (incorporating Olson’s numerous letters to the Gloucester Daily Times), and through
excavating its ecological past (pieced together from historic maps and other archival materials). The
amalgam of methods and areas of study that Olson undertook to compose his sprawling work
represents an active dissolution of disciplinary categories. His research was an ongoing act of
“deschooling”—to invoke anarchist educator Ivan Illich’s term—and the place-based nature of his
practice echoes Thoreau’s notion of field as classroom. From the journals—
I sometimes walk across a field with unexpected expansion and long-missed content, as if
there were a field worthy of me. The usual daily boundaries of life are dispersed, and I see in
what field I stand.”13
This traversal of the field, leading to the dissolution of boundaries and an expanded view of space,
runs counter to the notion of field as discipline: the delineated area of expertise which rations what
is to be learned within a manageable parcel. Enclosure facilitates the possibility of mastery. As such,
discipline places value on outcomes, rendering education as a forward path directed by various
milestones—proficiency in the subject, degree conferral, publication, innovation in the field—and the
boundedness of the terrain makes all of these objectives visible and thus realizable. Olson’s
composition by field, reflected in the passage from Thoreau, is characterized by both
multidirectional, roving movement and concentrated stillness: it seeks out strangeness in new places
while also attending to the strange worlds-within-worlds that reside in every element of one’s

12

I borrow this term from Stephen Fredman’s essay “Finding Out for Oneself,” about Thoreau and Olson, in The
Grounding of American Poetry: Charles Olson and the Emersonian Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1993).
13
The Writings of Henry David Thoreau, ed. Bradford Torrey (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1906), 385.
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immediate locale. It creates a learning environment in which no one is expert, because doing the
work will initially engender defamiliarization—as in the intelligent floundering that precedes the
infant’s ability to walk—rather than adroitness and certainty.
Olson’s 1950 poetic manifesto, “Projective Verse”—an essay-poem that makes full use of line
breaks, white space and typescript as expressive tools—is an excellent demonstration of how his
poetics is not just about poetry but about philosophy and criticism and everything else, representing
a broad approach to writing-as-sensing, writing-as-processing and writing-as-essaying. Here, the
concept of composition by field is introduced:
From the moment [the poet] ventures into FIELD COMPOSITION—puts himself in the
open—he can go by no track other than the one the poem under hand declares, for itself.
Thus he has to behave, and be, instant by instant, aware of some several forces just now
beginning to be examined.14
This kind of writing will look like the footprints left by an act of exploratory cognition. Inherited
categories of thought and conventions of speech are the ever-present barriers to language effectively
receiving and processing the data that the world throws at it. To get at the knowledge around us,
Olson offers his idea of the “breath line,” a way of preceding through language that maintains the
body and its placement in an environment as consistent determinants of what can be said. When
the sound of a text is furnished by the writer’s breathing body, a reader can hear rhythm and meter
without the help of inherited metrical conventions.15 When writing is produced by the throat and
lungs in rhythmic relation to space through their cycle of inhale-exhale, and by “the push of the line

14

“Projective Verse” in Collected Prose, ed. Donald Allen and Benjamin Friedlander (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1997), 240.
15
Here we see Olson’s indebtedness to William Carlos Williams and his notion of the “variable foot,” an approach
to meter that viewed natural speech rhythms as the basis from which units of measure in contemporary poetry
ought to be drawn. Williams believed that inherited units of measure, as, for instance, from Shakespeare, were no
longer suitable for the expression of poetic feeling because they arose in response to a form of spoken English no
longer in use.
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under hand at the moment,” it will generate its own unprecedented and unrepeatable meter and
form. This will happen at a fever pitch, in tandem with the flow of incoming perception: “USE USE
USE the process at all points, in any given poem always, always one perception must must must
MOVE, INSTANTER, ON ANOTHER!”16
Olson shares a conviction with the artists featured in the chapters that follow in that they all
treat writing as the real-time processing of forces transmitted by a living environment. The artistic
tradition that this dissertation simultaneously traces and invents is also an epistemological tradition,
as in each case, the creation of an artwork is not an end in itself but part of an ongoing process of
knowing that the self undertakes in order to communicate more consciously, truthfully, and
effectively with its world and all beings therein. I see the compositional practice that is shared across
these various artists and works as a radical empiricist approach, participating in the exploratory form
of self-knowledge that proto-psychologist William James advocated in his numerous books on
psychology, epistemology and belief. James coined the term radical empiricism in his 1896 lecture,
“The Will to Believe,” and later explicitly defined it in his essay “A World of Pure Experience”
(1904):
To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is
not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced.
For such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be
experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as
any thing else in the system.17
The conception of how experiences relate to each other is what makes James’s approach radical, for
it ultimately eliminates the distinction between knower and known. It is an approach that objects to

16

Olson, “Projective Verse,” 240.
“World of Pure Experience” in Essays in Radical Empiricism, ed. Ralph Baron Perry (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1996), 20.
17
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the common sense view—informed by the Western rationalist tradition dating back to Plato—that
perception is an activity undertaken by a transcendent mind to detect and differentiate the materials
around it. Radical empiricism rejects this image of mind as air traffic control tower, where it is a of
a separate and removed substance from the data bits it processes: rather, James posits that “one
experience may function as the knower of another,”18 thus appearing to dissolve the concept of mind
altogether. He does away with the image of the transcendent knower hovering above a separate,
phenomenal world. Instead he claims that we are aware of experience from within experience.
Thinking is a physical exercise activated by a mutuality between bodies and channeled through the
senses. It is both embodied and emplaced; the activation of a field of feeling.
The transcendentalists who informed James as well as the pragmatists and radical empiricists
who followed him all share a recognition that creativity is an important criterion for good science; 19
accordingly, the lineage I trace is one that values artistic practice as a way of thinking that multiplies
the possible paths which scientific method can take. Art sees beyond the possible; it allows absurd,
fantastical, impossible hypotheses. Given the undeniable fact that our assumptions about what is
reasonable, possible and real are increasingly shaped by high-tech knowledge products that interrupt
the faculties of understanding we are born with, orienting toward the unreasonable, impossible and
unreal might help unveil the infinite stores of knowledge inherent in the object world around us.
Olson saw industrial and mass media technologies as presenting increasingly formidable barriers
between acts of perception and one’s physical environment. He recognized that tools of exchange
and understanding—including, most importantly, language itself—were being shaped by forces
beyond our control. The reach of a sentence uttered, its oratorical power, was being altered with the

18
19

Ibid., 23.
Particularly Alfred North Whitehead, John Dewey and Brian Massumi

10

rising intervention of global interests into the civic space, such that the relation of a body to its
environment became less immediate, less necessary. Now, there are “words, words, words/ all over
everything” with “no eyes or ears left/ to do their own doings.”20 It is not one's own eyes and ears
that collect material for speech; rather, we are ventriloquist's dummies, channeling opinions that
have been formed elsewhere.
The authors I bring together in the following chapters treat the essay as a space for
discovering rather than a vehicle for informing; and inevitably, a portion of what’s discovered in the
act will be some reflexive truth about the writer and the writing. My belief is that if, as writers, we
embrace this reflexive potential, using the act of composition to look inward at the why and how
underlying the affinity for this word or that, we’re less vulnerable to the ventriloquism effect: i.e.
saying things we don’t know we’re saying, advocating ideologies we haven’t truly chosen, or masking
unexamined insecurities with inherited recipes for writerly certainty. James and Olson stress the
importance of self-reflection for maximizing one’s capacity to receive empirical wisdom from the
world, believing that we can’t see or hear clearly until we’re able to feel how our desires shape our
perceptions. Essaying means playing with and around the imprint left on our words by both
sociopolitical forces and internal, psychical ones. Deborah Britzman, a psychoanalyst and teacher
who studied under the radical pedagogue Paulo Freire, details the essay’s capacity for psychical
revelation in a piece titled “The Untold Story of the Writing Block.” There, she observes: “However
refined writing becomes, between the lines the writer pens the force of her or his emotional situation
along with the wish to risk that fate and create something new from more than what has already
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happened.”21 Britzman notices that an essay always represents the product of a struggle to
manufacture a self. Details about that struggle— such as the particular internal realities that the
product aims to replace, or the external pressures that inform how the product is shaped— will be
written into the essay. In stressing that the anxieties attending writing form a “story” that the writing
both hides and shows, Britzman nudges us toward a clearer vision of how to truly say what we mean.
The vision is of a writing that tests its own anxieties, interruptions, and failures.
Britzman’s focus on academic writing suggests possibilities for an essay that in its very form
contends with the complex power tactics of the institution to which it appeals. She thereby advocates
an activism that moves through a phase of writing as self-excavation— “The writer has to take things
apart before they can be put back together.”22 As a Freirean, Britzman is always explicitly or implicitly
thinking toward social change. Freire insisted that revolutionary praxis entails a dialectic between
reflection and action. In Britzman’s exposition of the emotional situation that all writing traces, she
lingers on the reflective side of the dialectic; for, how easy it is to get caught up in the exalted belief
that one knows what one’s readers, students, or comrades need—or knows what oneself needs—and
spelling it out accordingly. Writing that purports to transmit its message to a reader like a self-driving
delivery truck has quietly accepted the convenience of readymade tools for delivery, regardless of
how those tools were manufactured and at whose expense. The contradiction between the method
and the tools will go unacknowledged. When a critical writer embarks on an act of composition in
an academic context, she exposes herself to “writing police, stop signs, go directly to jail cards, waiting
in line, traffic jams, accidents, expired permits, and assurance policies,”23 a labyrinth of institutional
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power that can only be navigated and conquered when one has mastered correct use of the tools
provided. Such work may culminate in the composition of a quite powerful message. And yet,
prioritization of the message as outcome has required the cessation of real-time reflection on the
tools of delivery.
As a psychoanalyst, Britzman maintains a deep interest in the words we use to express
thoughts about ourselves and the world. Likewise, this dissertation trains a focus on the substantial
content of form, as contrasted with the content promised by writing’s claim to clarity or transparency.
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, another psychoanalytic thinker, stresses the pedagogical importance of
reflecting on how things are said, in contrast to pedagogies that stress information transmission
above all else. In a letter to her friend and fellow philosopher Jerome Kohn, Young-Bruehl draws
terminology from Hannah Arendt to describe the educational value of the psychoanalytic approach
to language: “[…] I reflect in the way Hannah Arendt taught me, looking into the words, ‘unfreezing
the concepts,’ as she put it. E-ducere is to draw out. I draw my patients out (and they draw me out).”24
This commitment to keeping form within language’s attention, to making sure that we preserve a
capacity to notice what informs our linguistic choices, to “unfreezing the concepts” handed to us by
institutions whose influence is pervasive enough to become invisible, is motivated by a life-or-death
urgency. Both Britzman and Young-Bruehl are inheritors of 20th century intellectual traditions that
view the individual capacity for sustained critical thinking as directly connected to the decency or
cruelty of humanity at large. Their teachers Freire and Arendt were both imprisoned by fascist
regimes—the Brazilian military dictatorship and Hitler’s Third Reich respectively—and thus bore
witness to the unprecedented political atrocities of their century. Tasked with the responsibility to
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pass on those stories and fight, above all else, to prevent them from happening again, Britzman and
Young-Bruehl channel their pedagogical and clinical experiences toward instilling the capacity to
care for one’s own psychological wounds as a means to caring for the world. For, when we can’t
access an understanding of our private wounds, we tend to spread the pain instead of treating its
causes. Working to “unfreeze concepts” means working to break down the linguistic and conceptual
sedimentation that blocks us from seeing ourselves. The ability to pause language’s marching
procession toward meaning and look at the multitudinous historical and psychological contents of
an utterance with open-hearted interest and attention is of urgent political necessity.
Hannah Arendt, after spending weeks among the audience at the trial of Adolf Eichmann,
the logistic mastermind who had facilitated the mass deportation and extermination of Jews under
the Nazi regime, arrived at a diagnostic assessment of Western culture, noting a particularly
dangerous phenomenon. She believed that action—her term for the highest order of human activity
involving the imagination, communication, language, creativity, individuality, improvisation,
freedom and politics—was, on a large scale, being phased out and replaced by passive consumerism
and blind acquiescence to institutional messaging. Action is the ability think via play; to interact with
the singular components of one’s immediate environment at any given moment as a springboard for
“the capacity of beginning something anew.”25 Arendt observed that Eichmann’s inability to look
through the received ideological architecture of his environment in order to see what was really there
was reflected in his speech habits, which were characterized by the excessive use of cliché. In his
testimony, he apologized for his tendency to repetition, recounted by Arendt as follows:
Dimly aware of a defect that must have plagued him even in school - it amounted to a mild
case of aphasia - he apologized, saying, "Officialese [Amtssprache] is my only language." But
the point here is that officialese became his language because he was genuinely incapable of
25
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uttering a single sentence that was not a cliché […] Whether writing his memoirs in Argentina
or in Jerusalem, whether speaking to the police examiner or to the court, what he said was
always the same, expressed in the same words. The longer one listened to him, the more
obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely connected with an inability to think,
namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else.26
Eichmann’s officialese stands in stark contrast to the imagination, creativity, improvisation and play
that characterize the language of action which Arendt upholds as urgent, necessary and dangerously
at risk. His inability to think without employing the terms given by the disciplinary category in which
he has been placed, indicates an enclosed system of values barred from contact with the diverse
values of the larger human community, with little hope of ever achieving a broader vision.
In the chapters that follow, I analyze works of writing that shake off the perceptual and
intellectual constraints imposed by disciplined speech. Echoing the concerns of the above-named
educational theorists, my analysis emphasizes the interdependence of writing and thinking,
sketching an art history of figures who have used the former to free up the latter, thus breaching the
constraints of a world with “words, words, words/ all over everything” and “no eyes or ears left/ to
do their own doings.” Through the conscious disarrangement of disciplinary categories, the artists I
highlight all enact Arendt’s vision of human action, composing anomalous, unanticipated, and
open-ended works, the pieces and moments of an ongoing life-as-creative-practice. As
transdisciplinarians and American artists, they inherit a lineage of hybridity and experimentalism
that first emerged in the United States to accommodate the perceptual experience of contending
with an unknown, highly varied, and expansive geographic setting: the proliferation of
heterogeneous environmental data necessitated experimentation with diverse interpretive tools for
processing that data as art. Thoreau’s Walden project is perhaps the clearest early example of this
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manner of artistic investigation. Like Thoreau, the artists I bring together present an inquisitive and
unsettled relation to place, reflecting the image of vastness and heterogeneity that is central to US
national mythologies.
Chapter I introduces the possibility of a critical writing practice that traces what thinking
feels like—in the head, in the fingers, in the eyes, in the spine. This chapter addresses the work of
Eleni Stecopoulos and Robert Kocik, two contemporary poet-thinkers who activate the scholarly
essay toward an excavation of the entrenched conflict between the thinking, feeling, body and the
institutions that support it. I will read Stecopoulos’s Visceral Poetics—a book that evolved from a
doctoral dissertation—as an exposition of critical scholarship’s hidden auto-ethnographic impulse,
problematizing the academic demand for objectivity. Kocik’s vision of “overcoming fitness,” a term
he proposes in the wildly cross-disciplinary and multi-generic book, Supple Science, will serve as an
entry point to my case against the disciplinary branding that is transforming US cultural spaces.
Chapter II chronicles the multimodal research practice of the novelist-anthropologistfolklorist-playwright-actor-filmmaker Zora Neale Hurston. Via close readings of her little-known
ethnographic films—snapshots of Black communities in the Jim Crow South—this chapter highlights
Hurston’s ethics of thinking and knowing, examining her novel approach to the scientific study of
human beings. In rapidly, often feverishly oscillating between multiple interpretive modes, Hurston
innovated a form of research documentation that embraced complexity over exactitude, approaching
its subjects with the humility of bewilderment. Her unrestrained maximalism lent her novels the
ecstatic quality for which they became famous, yet it also guaranteed that she remain an outsider
with respect to an academic institutional landscape that equated truthfulness with certainty.

16

Chapter III is about language play in the work of multimedia artist Jimmie Durham, whose
word-heavy creative practice furnishes an ongoing commentary on the use of text in art spaces to sell
ideology and corral critical thinking. His sculptures, paintings, films, installations, poems and essays
share a trickster sensibility that amounts to a carefully constructed perspective on the professional
seriousness that cultural institutions demand as they rely on artists and audiences to master
trademarked aesthetic positions that function as institutional branding. In this chapter I will explore
Durham’s concept of “architexture”—the combined power that architecture and writing wield to
separate the thinking self from its sensory landscape—through analysis of his works in various
mediums.
In Chapter IV, I conduct a close reading of two collaborative books of poetry by Lyn Hejinian
and Leslie Scalapino. Sight (1999) and Hearing (2021) are dialogic texts that document a poetic field
work exercise in which the authors report and analyze visual and auditory data from their respective
daily environments. My reading of these books will take the form of an experiment: rather than
reflecting as a scholar who observes and speaks from a position external to her subject matter, I’ll
read and write along with Hejinian and Scalapino, charting my responses as they unfold, without
the constraint of a consistent critical position or argument. This will serve as a way to test my
hypotheses from previous chapters regarding the potential that experimental research-writing may
hold to help critical thinking see more than what its conventional forms of articulation allow.
The final chapter will make a case for the urgency of utilizing the capacities of writing in
order to sense keenly and distinctly the forces that press on the mind. Here I will invoke Theodore
Adorno’s proposed course of action for a poetically-inflected critical thinking that has the ability to
subvert the authoritarian impulses of contemporary culture. I will also return to Deborah Britzman,
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illustrating how the anxieties triggered by the act of writing signal an acute awareness of the
mechanisms of institutional power; in the way they hide and ambush our thinking, relying on our
work as an instrument of their dissemination and survival.
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Chapter I | Eleni Stecopoulos and Robert Kocik:
Sick Writing, Spastic Assembly

When I’m unwell, I can grasp neither letter nor sentence because the edges hurt, so my gut tells me to
move, albeit slowly. It tells me that grasping for the figures that lie out of my reach only makes things worse,
makes me despondent, useless, unfit. My body floats on, despite the hampering of critical acuity, of interpretive
consistency, of memory. My skin, muscles and joints comprehend with extra-sensitivity—to touch, to temperature—
and so I can take in more information than usual, which guides where I go next. Standing, undressing, eating,
peeing—all of it staggers me, each act manifesting such a particular and palpable result that it becomes its own
speaker, articulated. In this state my body finds many places to go, though I anticipate none of them. I’m neither
efficient nor blundering. With my tender faculties, I’m always ingesting a new condition, which in turn stages
another, and I inhabit each as a fully new person with little recollection of the last.

~
I wrote the above passage during a week-long bout of insomnia. Sleeplessness, for me, is what
happens when something troubling in my unconscious wants out. It often strikes me as a mysterious
affliction—an invasion, like a cancer— despite the fact that I’ve been studying the intricacies of how
it works for the whole of my adult life. Over the years, I’ve come to the conclusion that it’s a fitting
symptomology for someone like me, a writer, whose self-worth rests upon intellectual alertness: the
ever-present fear of losing my superpower causes me to lose my superpower. The dilemma is always
heightened when the end goal of my writing is to display mastery of a discipline.
In Visceral Poetics, a collection of essays by the Oakland-based poet Eleni Stecopoulos, I’ve
found an exposition of the way psychological, biological or spiritual symptomology (they are
ultimately all the same to me) can energize the work of writing, even while debilitating it. The book
19

is a meditation on the essay as form, originally composed as a doctoral dissertation which the author
undertook during the onset of a chronic illness. It performs the sick body’s resistance to working
within the formulae of academic argumentation, yet it is also a positive project that simultaneously
exercises and theorizes the possibility for a prose that attends to the whole body of its author, making
use of the body’s full range of feeling and motion. After the completion of her dissertation,
Stecopoulos continued her visceral poetic research in an extended correspondence with Robert
Kocik, a New York poet, performance director and architect. Kocik’s book Supple Science, which was
published in 2013, echoes Stecopoulos’ commitment to mobilizing the built-in tools of poetry in
order to craft an essay that makes room for the body where it has typically been excluded. His work
implies an intentional self-distancing from the conventions of critical writing in the academic
humanities akin to the objection explicitly stated in Stecopoulos’ book. Both authors view somatic
research as integral to the work of the writer—as the body in motion teaches one what needs to be
written as well as how to write it—and their correspondence participated in the formation, during
the late 2000s, of a bi-coastal community of poets, activists, dance artists and healers that posed an
alternative to mono-disciplinary academic enclaves.27
My investment in bringing their work to light lies in my wish to arrive at a writing practice
that both sustains my physical and psychical well-being and theorizes whether scholarship can
function as a venue for healing. The process of recovery necessitates discovery through listening:
attending to the self’s operation in order to bring to the surface what hurts, how it hurts and why it
hurts. I believe that this work of excavation closely parallels the work of scholarship. The final task
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of this essay, then, is to expose how Stecopoulos and Kocik’s poetics activate the healing functions
of writing and criticism. I embark on this study as a writing teacher who has observed repeatedly
how compositional standards menace students with rarefied prosodic conventions that seem to
function primarily to either corroborate their membership in an elite class or disable them from the
outset by ruling their native, intuitive language habits as an insurmountable barrier to critical
thinking. It is an immobilizing diagnosis that disregards the efficacy of trial-and-error and says
“accept my conclusions before feeling your way.” I take from Stecopoulos and Kocik the example of
a self-mobilized and self-mobilizing compositional practice that treats the essay—regardless of
discipline or topic—as a form of attention to how the structures we inhabit press upon our bodies
and our words. In order to get there, I’ll spend some time with the terms by which they engage the
relationship between poetics, somatic research and disability.

Autoethnography in Real Time
In Visceral Poetics, Stecopoulos reveals how illness becomes an interpretive and compositional
process in the following description of her symptoms:
At times I felt exquisite pain over almost my entire body, which seemed impossible. My skin
stung to the point where I assigned colors to the degrees of pain, a form of relief through
translation…Like my migratory and proliferating symptoms, I became increasingly
disorganized and lost my ability to concentrate on any one task or idea. I had always been
digressive, but now every detail had enormous significance; I was ruled by manic attention
to synchronicity and a compulsion to connect everything with which I came into contact. At
night I could not sleep; my mind’s eye zoomed over everything I had read, every conversation,
every symptom, every bit of self-mythology with which I was tantalized. The experience felt
like mania, yet somehow fascinating and wondrous—at once a disease and the very sign of
my power to find the way out of the labyrinth. My mania itself seemed to signify my ability
to excavate its origin and decipher its true pattern, eventually triumphing over it and its
effects on my body.28
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She describes a manic obsession with the significance of things, a condition in which all elements of
her environment became objects to be read. Behind this account of “disorganized,” “digressive”
synesthesia, I see implied the cognitive norm against which that state might be measured: while the
“sick” reader, directed by the will of an unsettled body, feels her way to meaning, the “healthy” reader
employs what she already knows, using precedent derived from training as means to a logical,
conclusive interpretation.
Criticism can act to diagnose a text, examining its body as an object whose proclivities can
be explained via acts of dissection. Instead of this, can I orient myself in a field of research such that
where I am, and what I become there, engulfs me? As a “sick” reader, Stecopoulos interprets with all
her sensing faculties, taking in more than is manageable. Her mode of criticism opposes any rationing
of information that would isolate which lines of thinking promise completion and allow her to digest
experience in manageable bites.
In the extended act of scholarship which my own writing documents, I find myself also
subject to the ebb and flow of an interpretive mania. Because my time is indefinitely and
overarchingly determined by this particular project of study realized as writing, all of my feelings and
states—whether awake or asleep, hungry or full, focused or scattered, strong or self-doubting, agile or
hampered, dreamy or calculating—inevitably become a part of it. Even when I’m not reading or
writing, I’m aware of what feelings or states make me disinclined to do so, because the project looms
as a general standard of measure by which I gauge the quality of my days. I attend to the needs of
my body always as a being-who-reads, such that bouts of unwellness produce their own forms of
studying attention and shifting interpretive modes or moods. This chapter’s epigraph elaborates one
such example: the hypersensitivity I experience during states of exhaustion is like a vivid, technicolor
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rendering of the ways my body responds to things in its environment. Normally these responses are
dampened and go unnoticed because in a well-rested state, my energized attention will have a greater
reach and will busy itself elsewhere.
Stecopoulos’s writing alternates between different forms of attention, using autoethnographic narrative (as in the above passage), literary scholarship (with an extended focus on the
poetics of Antonin Artaud and Paul Metcalf), and polemical engagement with theory (taking up
works by Michel de Certeau, Jacques Derrida, Eduard Glissant, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gilles
Deleuze, among others) to compose a self-reflective work of criticism that maintains a constant
questioning of what criticism is and how it functions. Her project is framed as a response to the
limitations of a US academic environment in which “the authority of literary criticism has typically
been predicated on repressing that bodies, not minds, write.”29 Her attention is externally focused
on the poets and philosophers with whom she feels a kinship, and internally focused on the bodily
sensations that attend the writing act, discovering a “a link between language and pain.”30 She finds
pain in the effort to corral thought and feeling in a legible sentence, and disablement in the act of
engaging with an intellectual tradition and thus entering a realm in which institutional metrics will
be used to judge whether or not she’s a deserving inheritor of that tradition. Her text thereby traces
its own limitations in harnessing the body’s resistance to textuality.
Visceral Poetics implements in a literary critical context the epistemologies engaged by the
array of movement practices and healing traditions Stecopoulos sought in order to alleviate her
illness. In her exploration of Ayurveda, kinesiology, Thought Field Therapy, electrotherapeutics and
a host of other healing modalities—which she approached not as a true believer, but as a suffering
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person willing to try anything—Stecopoulos learned to exert the range of what her body knows
through a willingness to make use of painful and allegedly pathological sensations:
[…] (R)ather than robbing people of their bodies, on the contrary, (illness) may be one of the
only ways they can actually experience the poetics of their bodies. This can act as a kind of
fieldwork, and is often present in such dialogic terms by the alternative healing community:
one “slows down” and “listens to the body,” for “your body is trying to tell you something.”31
I appreciate the sacrilege of this, as I know from my own extended battle with sleep medicine
practitioners, that conventional wisdom—as a reflection of Western biomedical practice— regards
disease and discomfort to be at cross-purposes with the sufferer; anathema rather than intelligent,
aberrant rather than endemic. Studies have correlated insomnia with diabetes, heart disease, stroke,
dementia and a general decrease in life expectancy, and therefore the medical priority is to fix it, not
to understand it. I accepted the logic of this for as long as I continued to believe that the fix could
work. When I eventually learned that mechanical interventions made the problem worse, not better,
I began reading the emergence of my symptoms as plot twists in an ever-unfolding story. I could trace
and re-trace the narrative in order to keep in mind what led to what and so learn the behavioral
tendencies of all its main actors. Any odd or unpredicted event added new layers to the plot, and I
was riveted.
I want to think along with Stecopoulos about how to elaborate a kind of personalized,
somatic literacy as the groundwork for critical writing. Interpreting moments of visceral unrest
against what I know of “feeling normal,” and studying the way my private pains interact with my
daily external conditions is the kind of attention that medication will always shut down. And it’s the
same practice I prohibit if I let a student believe that her way into the work of criticism and
composition is excessive or ill-suited. Stecopoulos writes: “Whether body fluids or vocables, disease
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or phatic gestures—to restore the full body to any aesthetic performance is to restore process.”32 There
is much value in attending to what hurts about the writing process, and, if teaching with a singular
focus on fixing the difficulties, the teacher will encourage an excision of the body from the
composition, and thus silence the very means by which writing may remain close to the actualities
that language purports to reflect. Just like her recognition that mania manifests a heightened
interpretive faculty that can aid in resolving the manic episode, Stecopoulos suggests that poetics
can work homeopathically, in line with medical models that see the articulation of an illness not as
something to be suppressed but as indication that the body is working to fight something off. The
itch, rash, spasm or sneeze that disrupts the illusory stasis of the healthy body is itself an expression
and verification of the healthy body. Such visceral adjustments are not disruptions at all. They are
part of how the body expresses itself as body, and also as text. The itch, rash, spasm and sneeze are
integral to the work of the essay just as they belong to the interpretive work of recovery. To define
what is a good argument based upon the achievement of an even procession—without any
hiccoughs—from initial premise to final conclusion, is perhaps to ignore those interjections from
outside that actually help verify the strength of what is said. Stecopoulos observes how the resonance
of bodily processes within a text help to tune it to material reality: “Sometimes the stutter is the plot.
Artaud stammered as a child; he was affected by facial tremors. Sometimes the stutter is the phatic
tuning that opens the channel to the other.”33 An essay that accommodates the body’s non-logical
verbal expressions—its reflexes, adjustments and phatic gestures—honors the fullness of how
discursive reasoning comes to be.
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Let us regard writing as a treatment for the discomfort of needing to work something out,
needing to know. Perhaps this need is experienced as grief or excitement: in what way can a text
vocalize the heartache or arousal that accompanies the activity of coming-to-know? It is when the
omissions demanded by convention sever one’s writing from the productive discomfort which
originated it, that we end up with an essay that talks about the body without using it, or talks about
failed systems without disrupting them, or talks about difference while endlessly producing more of
the disabling same.

Holistic Criticism
Both Stecopoulos and Kocik have their aesthetic vision fixed on what is omitted, in full
recognition that every aesthetic creation enacts its own omissions. They see how the strictures of
genre have historically been party to a form of cognitive chauvinism. Genre works as a tool for
diagnosis, a measure of ability. It creates its own rules and thus its own deficiencies. It is an equation
that says what cadences, vocabulary, topics and sentiments will ring deficient or pathological in a
given textual space. Against this, Stecopoulos offers her vision of a holistic criticism. Holistic
criticism treats what a text expresses not as indication of that writing’s genre or mappable type, but
as one phase in a continuous movement between wildly varied conditions. This flow is “the poem
of how the sympathies and antipathies of fragments play between artifice and organism.”34 Holistic
medicine treats the expression of discomfort or pain as one condition in a chain of intelligent
somatic responses. It is not certain states that are healthy, but the acceptance of an undeniably
evolving state, one that experiences both pleasure and pain. Likewise, both logical clarity and poetic
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opacity are instructive states of being within a written work. The health of the work is in the life of
these conditions responding one to the other.
Thus, against a literary criticism “predicated on repressing that bodies, not minds, write,” 35
holistic criticism “follows whatever radiates from a text.”36 It follows the body’s resistance to logosas-accounting, and follows as well the compromise between body and word, to which the existence
of the text testifies. It tracks the way that one’s physical state continually renews how the word works,
in accordance with visceral need.
In a self-directed challenge spoken in the contrarian voice of her internal critic, or perhaps
of the disciplined theorist nauseated by the task of reading another’s sick body, Stecopoulos writes:
…why would you insist so much on the way writing pervades your body if writing did not signify for you
disembodiment, solitude, distancing from other bodies…if writing criticism did not seem to distend your
head as an overseeing parasite, feeding off every contact…I insist on it because the feeling of
disembodiment can only be known viscerally; to be aware of, to be conscious of feeling
disembodied is already a response to the habitus. Writing embodies disembodiment.37
Literary criticism has regularly chosen not to see what it already knows: that it is overwhelmed by its
resistance to bodily states, and that the pressure they assert can be read behind its words.
Alternatively, holistic criticism recognizes that organs, muscles, bones and skin speak loudly in both
the poem intended to channel the body’s wishes and the essay that was composed to subdue its
voice. The moment when illness or disablement disrupts the habitual functioning of the body or the
easy formulation of a sentence, is a moment when new critical faculties enter the scene. Thus, for
Stecopoulous, sickness provides paradoxically a critical “edge”:
Hole, whole, heal…I feared I would no longer be able to write if I were not divided, if I were
“healthy”… there would no longer be any fissure or gap, no disturbance (no parasite) by
35
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which to mean, no jagged edge by which to enter. And what is an edge if not the critical, a
pick-axe with which to choose?38
In a 1965 essay on Nietzsche, Gilles Deleuze makes a similar observation, noting that Nietzsche,
having suffered years of disablement from a series of conditions including migraines, temporary
blindness, diphtheria, dysentery and syphilis, “saw in illness a point of view on heath; and in health a
point of view on illness.”39 Nietzsche viewed the disruption that his various illnesses caused as an
escape hatch from the unreflective complacency of equanimity and good health. Likewise,
Stecopoulos models a critical writing that grants the body a place both within the fluctuations of
pain and pleasure as realized in poetic word play, and within the negative presence of what the essay
denies as it perpetuates our longstanding history of wise men bent over books, with “distended
heads” like “overseeing parasites.” She sketches a “Theory as Vision,”40 one that actively looks
beyond the text and at the body, which is theory’s resident elephant in the room. The struggle to
incorporate the invisible body will give rise to its own set of pains and pleasures. The essay can
accommodate all of this.
In advocating for a writing that attends to the body of the writer, Stecopoulos makes a case
for incorporating into the book what is spatially outside of it. The cerebral practice of criticism will
be more truthful, she thinks, if the products of mind are recognized as products of a larger body, an
organic system which ought to show itself within the composition. Moreover, the resources that lie
outside of and should be folded into literary critical discourse include not just the body of the writer
but neighboring disciplines and genres that speak and make meaning in different ways.
Stecopoulos’s book and the dissertation from which it arose strive toward maximal inclusivity,
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drawing content from both daily life and a multitude of texts, and incorporating formal strategies
from a range of genres including poetry, autobiography and philosophy. This expansiveness aims to
resolve the problem of feeling unfit to write during states of diminished health. In grasping for other
forms, she reaches toward alternate representational environments where her thinking might find a
better fit. The combined pressure of discipline and enforced fitness is something Visceral Poetics
consciously struggles against, and it is a topic to which her friend and correspondent Robert Kocik
devotes extended critical attention in his own book Supple Science. There he elaborates a project of
“overcoming fitness,” an approach to creative and pedagogical labor that seeks to resolve the
apparent conflict between holism and genre.

Overcoming Fitness
Kocik’s writing is never easily categorizable, as his books always encompass poems, essays,
architectural plans, lecture transcripts, libretti, songs, drawings and other forms.41 Bookstores classify
it as poetry, though no single form ever dominates his work. For him, the poem always has an
immediate purpose, and the purpose should suggest the best form for its own articulation. This does
more than simply re-affirm the writing teacher’s insistence on “knowing your audience,” it is a
realization of poetics as a broad attention to all forms of making. The writer who listens broadly will
inevitably happen upon subject matter that calls her to build an altar, seed a garden, plan a meeting
or teach a class without ever putting a pen to paper, and any one of these would be an act of poetic
composition. Kocik practices poetry as a general meditation on making; not a hard science or a soft
science but a “sore” or “supple” one.
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This supra-generic poetics recognizes genre-affiliation as a tool of empire and exclusion, party
to the disabling structures of society which poetic making is positioned to redress. “Overcoming
Fitness,” an essay first published in 2001 that appears in Supple Science, teases out the many ways in
which educational, cultural and economic institutions originate both the categories of identification
by which fitness is measured, and the fitness morality that punishes distinctive bodies and artworks
as deficient. Fitness is a biased assessment tool that pre-determines which affect, voice, posture, gait,
vocation, earning potential, gender, ethnicity, sexuality and language will fail to pass as normal. As
the valorization of a “greater adaptedness over others in a common, tightly-knit niche,”42 fitness
pervades the everyday conditions that support our living. Labor—creative or otherwise—cannot be
quantified and paid if it doesn’t adapt to the qualifying habits of its proper niche or discipline. It is
difficult to imagine a world where every possible category of affect, voice, posture, gait, vocation,
earning potential, gender, ethnicity, sexuality and language does not already demand its own version
of propriety. We are disciplined by genre because without it our work would become de-standardized
and unintelligible. And the engineered spaces we inhabit dictate the shapes of our bodies just like
the genres, fields, niches and disciplines dictate the shape of our work. Reproducing the instructions
given by our conditions will always reproduce fitness and unfitness, ability and disability.
As writers and academics, we are all aware of this hindrance to our freedom of movement,
and we try to circumvent it by including as topics of our scholarship those perspectives that have
typically been ignored by our institutional disciplines. The establishment of women’s studies,
indigenous studies, African American studies, queer studies and disability studies departments attest
to crucial efforts at expansion. At the same time, they are unable to circumvent fitness, because what
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they ultimately accomplish is a persuasive case for the fitness of what has otherwise been judged to
be unfit. How do we overcome this?

The Non-Affinitive Bond
In a piece he wrote for a proposed anthology of essays on “poetics of disablement,” Kocik
brings his project of overcoming fitness into dialogue with the academic discipline of disability
studies. In that text, entitled “Without Suffering Succession,” he admits: “My commitment to
disability is disarmingly simple. I’ve vowed to help where I can, how I can, if I can, and especially if
I can’t (as the only way of overcoming being unable to do so).”43 In the same text, Kocik quotes
Stecopoulos: “Disability founds aesthetics44—for all persons, not just those with disabilities. If we
became conscious of that, perhaps we might start to see how all our conditions determine our forms
[…]”45 Artworks arise from the struggle to represent the unrepresentable, from the disablement
induced by the fact that given forms of signification have always been tailored for a world that
preceded this one in this moment, and for the people we were before we became what we are now.
The painting and the poem trace the strain of saying and doing what can’t be said or done. Kocik’s
work suggests a solution to the “discrepancy between activism and formal poetry innovation”46: in
allowing language a kind of stuttering play that relaxes the demand for transparency and easy
communication, poetic experiments suggest the garbled communication that will always occur amid
a diverse coalition of people who are trying to negotiate a shared path toward social change.
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Changing the disabling conditions we are in will require moving through a phase of inscrutability.
Innovating new relations to our conditions, mutually helping ourselves to the extremes of what is
available to thought and action—through constructing buildings that embrace a multiplicity of
bodies, or inaugurating experimental institutions, or structuring unprecedented political systems, or
communicating with those who speak a different language—will always be a process of productive
mutual misunderstanding. This is his poetics.
Such a vision necessitates a great leap. It would demand a turning toward what is
inconceivably distant. One of the fundamental poetic tasks Kocik undertakes is to discover the
contiguity of opposites through writing. In a discussion of genetic sequencing, he muses about the
inanimate chemicals comprising DNA that have given rise to humanity as such:
The immortal code responsible for life itself is inanimate. I find this fact utterly surprising—
worth reflecting on for millennia to come—that we arise from the inanimate, are borne by
the inanimate and ultimately return to the inanimate—and that our most profound
commonality is with the inanimate.47
This is what he calls the “non-affinitive” or “heterologous” bond; what makes it possible to identify
with what we are not and to do what we can’t do, allowing us to reach “extremes of accommodation.”
The importance of exerting this kind of practice cannot be overstated. Likeness and affinity do not
facilitate connectivity; they are rather what threaten it most, because they make it easy for the
dominion of fitness to swallow relationships into exclusive and commercially exploitable categories
of sameness.
Kocik wonders how a text can accommodate what feels most opposite it, wishing to go
further than the boundary pushing that has historically characterized avant-garde practice. Edginess—
which I’ll define as an aesthetic that embellishes the banal and palatable with small measures of
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strangeness (e.g. a hamburger with kimchi on top)—is a quality to which businesses and other
institutions aspire as they strive to articulate themselves in a competitive market. Advertising
habitually borrows from the avant garde, building branding campaigns out of forms with which
readers, viewers or buyers are familiar, yet with a twist, a small dose of defamiliarization, a hint of
exotic mystery. Spend a few minutes watching prime time TV commercials and you’ll notice visual
and sound motifs derived from contemporary art. The next logical aesthetic step away from where
we currently are—the “near side of the norm”—will always be captured within the industry’s purview.
Kocik’s writing exists in a wholly other realm, provoking an extreme defamiliarization that launches
far beyond edginess. He utilizes styles, tones, words and inflections that draw from spheres of culture
that, to his readers, will have none of the exotic mystery that otherwise lends avant garde art some
degree of consumer appeal. His vocabulary is a cornucopia of invented jargon collaged from
markedly non-edgy disciplines such as business, social work, medicine and urban planning, and his
stylistic mode alternates between taxonomizing, alliterating, punning and chanting. The result is a
textual assemblage that differs so wildly from one moment to the next that it would be impossible
to isolate some tasty visual or sonic morsel that could serve to represent what this writing is. It is
fundamentally resistant to branding.
The abnormality of Kocik’s art is in line with his imagining (simultaneously architectural and
poetic) of a place where norms are unstable, there is no common language and everyone flounders.
This would be a “disequilibrating” space of “radical facilitation.” 48 In 2008, the choreographer Daria
Faïn collaborated with Kocik to found the Commons Choir, a performance group comprised of
around thirty dancers, singers, actors, musicians and poets working together to conduct
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“choreoprosodic research,” the findings of which would be publicized by way of performance,
symposia and teach-ins.49 Combining Faïn’s expertise in Chinese Energetics with Kocik’s
investigations in poetic practice, the choir’s performance work utilized both movement and voice in
a group compositional dialectic between improvisation and resolute forms. In this process, everyone
played, using gestural and linguistic vocabularies that didn’t count on logical clarity for activating
useful exchange.50 Rather, a rollicking, spastic, glossolalic, echolalic negotiation unfolded:
“accumulation of all the vibrations of exchange” “things coming together and coming apart”
“polarities popping up.” Meaning, as an independent value pre-dating the play of words in action,
was dethroned, humanized, collectivized, localized to give its consumers a better sense of where
sustenance derives from and how it is cultivated. This is commoning, “a de-centralized, open-ended,
slow-paced, often inefficient form of collaborative listening in which people help each other speak.”51
In an “entrainment that includes the movement of bodies in space,”52 dance and speech become a
combined investigation of—to quote Stecopoulos once again—“how all our conditions determine our
forms.”
What I’ve always appreciated most about postmodern dance improvisation is the image it
offers of voluntary blundering. It makes the work of essaying into a form in itself, and under these
conditions failure doesn’t preclude grace. I have myself tried out various forms of collective somatic
research, having joined the Commons Choir for a brief time, and otherwise participated in Contact
Improvisation, Authentic Movement, Underscore and Soma workshops.

In movement

improvisation I learn about how infinitely particular and variable are the ways with which each body
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is equipped to register or say its meanings. Seeing how a slight variation in the angle of a joint or the
contraction of a muscle can pose a question to be answered by another body with its own inestimable
range of subtleties, opens a kind of expressivity that requires sensitivity more than eloquence for its
effective communication. I am struck most of all by the unique power to accommodate fear that
dance practice seems to wield. In group improvisation the fear of ineptitude, humiliation or isolation
will manifest on our bodies, either in how we give expression to our fear or in how we try to cover
it up.
The body is better trained than the text to register its response to other entities in its
environment, for words on a page have a built-in pretense to detached self-sufficiency. What
Stecopoulos and Kocik’s writing accomplishes for me is a rejection of this pretense and an activation
of the essay’s capacity to show its own vulnerability in the face of the very real world it addresses. It
allows writing to grope around where it isn’t certified to go, more phatic and haptic than confidently
correct.

The Story Illness Tells
When I made the decision to quit the recommended treatments for my sleeplessness, I had
to take what I didn’t like about how I felt as an irrefutable part of me, no longer separating it out as
a defect that could be wiped away by medicines prescribed by experts. Nobody had the means to
cure me because my symptoms were inextricable from the countless twists and turns of a thirty-plus
year history lived in this body. Practically speaking, it meant I was looking at a future in which I
would be contending daily with the discomfort of something that felt like illness instead of trying to
artificially dampen the symptoms when they arose.
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My purpose in recounting this has to do with how it ultimately bore upon my relationship
to reading and writing. At the time, my days presented a continued struggle to reconcile my longestablished identity as a writer with the fact that letting my body work out its own problems was
leaving me feeling cloudy, exhausted, forgetful and blank; it seemed impossible to welcome my
condition and also remain fit for intellectual exertion. But because I no longer believed in the
medicine, I had no choice, so I attempted the work, and it was mostly agonizing; a daily extended
reminder of my seemingly incurable defects. I thought that if I kept at it I could find a way through,
and I resolved to read William James’s writings on psychology, hoping that his introspective
philosophical style might serve the double purpose of satisfying my intellectual hunger while helping
me heal myself. As I dove into the 1400-plus-pages of The Principles of Psychology and his later writings
in Essays in Radical Empiricism, I found myself affected by the following passage, from the essay “Does
Consciousness Exist”:
If the reader will take his own experiences, he will see what I mean. Let him begin with a
perceptual experience, the ‘presentation,’ so called, of a physical object, his actual field of
vision, the room he sits in, with the book he is reading as its centre; and let him for the
present treat this complex object in the commonsense way as being ‘really’ what it seems to
be, namely, a collection of physical things cut out from an environing world of other physical
things with which these physical things have actual or potential relations. Now at the same
time it is just those self-same things which his mind, as we say, perceives; and the whole
philosophy of perception from Democritus’s time downwards has just been one long wrangle
over the paradox that what is evidently one reality should be in two places at once, both in outer
space and in a person’s mind.53
James’s resolution of this paradox invokes a concept that is key to his philosophy of pragmatism,
which theorizes “pure experience” as the constant interplay between physical encounter and
reflective process. Upon reading, I found that the teaching contained in this narrative moment was
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enacted in real time by the particular way in which I was affected by it. In experiencing a text look at
me in such a way—as the passage exactly described the literal situation of my body in space as I read
it—I began to see the book as a gesture of love, one that didn’t brandish its complexity before my
intellect like a prize I could possess only by means of an adequately athletic feat of reason, but
revealed its conceptual intricacies as the signposts of an unfolding struggle: that of the reader’s
bodymind encountering its own knots.
In the beginning of The Principles of Psychology, James makes a case for introspective
philosophy: “the looking into our own minds and reporting what we there discover”54 (Stecopoulos
reformulates this practice as “autoethnography in real time”). His writings formalize this work as
philosophical practice, while also maintaining that introspection and reflection are instinctual,
ongoing activities that define the very nature of what it is to be human. We are always aware of our
own thoughts, while awareness is often a sensation more than it is a cogitation. “The Stream of
Thought,” perhaps the most famous chapter in Principles, describes how one thought always senses
and crosses over into another, and thinking thus flows in a stream rather than in a succession of
discrete thoughts. To try to zero in on a moment of thinking will always require one to attend to
surrounding (preceding and ensuing) thoughts—James calls this the “fringe” of thinking—and thus
there will be no zeroing in, as one will be led on a search that meanders in every which way. The
more lively the thinker feels, the faster the stream will flow. But what happens when we are sick,
fatigued or depressed? James writes:
[…] in states of extreme brain-fag the horizon is narrowed almost to the passing word,—the
associative machinery, however, providing for the next word turning up in orderly sequence,
until at last the thinker is led to some kind of a conclusion. At certain moments he may find
himself doubting whether his thoughts have not come to a full stop; but the vague sense of
a plus ultra makes him ever struggle on towards a more definite expression of what it may be;
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whilst the slowness of his utterance shows how difficult, under such conditions, the labor of
thinking must be.55
When the mind is fresh, it sees more, looking far ahead of the present thought even while still
thinking it. The mind races toward the horizon which glows in the clarity of thought’s bright vision.
On the other hand, the weary mind sees not much more than what concerns it in the present,
rimmed with a dim halo. Under these circumstances, though its perspective may be diminished,
thinking is never arrested because it will always sense the arrival of the next thing. Maybe in states
of “extreme brain-fag” there is a special kind of consciousness that the spry mind will deactivate.
Maybe it is here where we are able to have the bare recognition of the thing just one step beyond,
because it is here more than anywhere else that we can see and feel the shape of it as it is—the plus
ultra—as if emerging from the blankness of an emptied-out self.
The complexity of James’ topics paired with the tenderness of his style has the effect of
affirming that all readers’ bodyminds are intricately knotted, and that to move through the concepts
with ease would be to understand nothing at all, as it would skirt the hard work of consciousness in
action reflecting on itself. This is the overall shape of the critical work that his writings do. Thinking’s
constant fight to find representation, to be written and read, is painstakingly narrated in an oeuvre
whose process of composition was to document the unfolding of that same struggle in the author.
The nonstop work of reading my own body, which became necessary once I realized that
diagnoses were not going to facilitate my recovery, needed the defects in order to understand and rebalance the whole. Noticing the context of each bout of cloudiness or confusion—what dietary
choices, levels of stress or physical activity, and emotional events in my social universe may have
prompted the state I was in—was my learning path, and I needed to dwell in and move through the
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cloudiness and confusion in order to approach my goal of informed self-help. The demonstration
of that very process is the raison d'être in much of James’s work. Any hitch I experienced in trying
to comprehend his flow of ideas was itself something that would help my comprehension as it
exemplified the kind of cognitive tangle that his writing strives to illuminate. The analytical powers
I discovered as a “sick reader” enabled a similar kind of readerly and writerly freedom to what
Stecopoulos describes in Visceral Poetics. It is an arduous freedom, in that the difficulty of doing
things—grasping things—that I would normally hand off to an expert, relinquishing myself to their
interpretation or diagnosis, becomes my own problem. Letting the fullness of my condition express
itself, I find my discomfort to be “at once a disease and the very sign of my power to find the way
out of the labyrinth.”56
I’d like to take a sharp turn here toward the writing of a very different thinker from James.
The following passage comes from the contemporary queer theorist and disability activist Eli Clare,
in his 2017 book Brilliant Imperfection:
Having shaky hands and shaky balance isn’t as awful as they imagine, even when I slip, totter,
descend stairs one slow step at a time. My relationship to gravity is ambivalent. On mountain
trails, I yearn to fly downhill, feet touching ground, pushing off, smooth and fluid. Instead
on steep stretches I drop down onto my butt and slide along using both my hands and feet,
for a moment becoming a four-legged animal. Only then do I see the swirl marks that glaciers
left in the granite, tiny orange newts climbing among the tree roots, otherworldly fungi
growing on rotten logs. My shaky balance gives me this intimacy with the mountain.57
Clare’s writing is invested in revealing the complicated personal and political questions one faces
when seeking to medically cure a bodily condition. As an activist, he wants better healthcare for
people with disabilities; at the same time he realizes that the cultural obsession with medically
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“fixing” the body is detrimental to his vision of a truly pluralistic world, one that spans a range of
bodily shapes and appearances without elevating one type as the best. The above passage represents
both a longing for capacities he doesn’t have and a love for the avenues of experience opened by the
particular way in which his body works. Like Stecopoulos’ “autoethnography in real time” and
Kocik’s “choreoprosodic research,” Clare’s mode of thinking and composing is an effort of intense
and ceaseless study of oneself in the world, in which the daily difficulties of being a body become
fascinating and instructive even while they are painful. They bring him in contact with other
languages, the sign systems of rocks and tree roots with the ancient stories they tell, and show him
that each perceived limit to how he moves, thinks, feels or creates is instead a new terrain to inhabit.
One can approach the threshold and feel around there, touching and testing the lay of the land at
the edges of what is tolerable. An investigative dwelling in the realm of what one can’t do as a way to
annul the imperative of fitness and debunk the hegemonic ideologies of which it is an expression.
Pressure to overcome one’s body is ubiquitous in the narratives perpetuated by the medical
industrial complex, to use Clare’s term. I quote him again here:
Overcoming bombards disabled people. It’s everywhere. I think of Whoopi Goldberg. In
airports and along freeways, I see her plastered on a billboard sponsored by the Foundation
for a Better Life (FBL). Head in hands, dreadlocks threaded through fingers, she furrows her
forehead in frustration. Or is it bemusement? She casts her eyes up, looking directly at her
viewers. The tagline reads, “Overcaem dyslexia,” coyly misspelling overcame. Underneath
those two words brimming with stereotypes sits a red box containing the phrase “HARD
WORK,” and below that, the command “Pass It On.” […]58
The message is clear: Goldberg traversed the difficult path to stardom and success despite her defect,
and her renown evidences a remarkable triumph over a cognitive quirk that should have kept her
among the ranks of other needy, defective, unknowns. On the contrary, Clare wonders if it was the
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othered idiosyncrasies of her body and mind as a disabled person—who also happened to be poor
and black—that enabled a wide range of “abnormal” perceptive strengths that shaped her comedic
talent.
The medical industrial complex renders as mighty heroes those who endure the therapies
and medicines—which are often disabling themselves—that promise a path to normalization under
its terms. It depicts the innate, brilliant imperfections of all bodies—our instructive coughs and
hiccoughs, and even our deaths—as defects to be conquered. On the contrary, Clare presses the point
that what may appear as an intellectual or physical shortcoming is often the very quality that
energizes and refines one’s processes of thought or action. This was indeed the case in my experience
of reading James, and reading the daily ups and downs of my own body amid the ongoing work of
recovery.
That work, without the intervention of external therapeutic mechanisms promising a “fix”
—pharmaceutical or otherwise—led to the discovery that my alleged defects were necessary for good reading
comprehension. Whenever my understanding butted up against a phrase in James that felt particularly
dense or opaque, I experienced this as a bit of physical pain, an acidic burn in my skull and a bracing
compaction of the vertebrae. It was my habitual policing of my own cognitive fitness that provoked
these panic symptoms, and in recognizing the effort I exerted to punish my own seeming limitations,
I realized that the defect was actually generated by my propensity to self-punishment. So I sat with
what was troubling to me about my somatic state as it contended with the abstraction of words on a
page, and it was then that the words resolved into meaning.
The medical preoccupation with fixing the body mirrors the pedagogical tradition of treating
the classroom as a place for molding minds. Scholars Rhiannon Firth and Andrew Robinson turn
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to the work of proto-anarchist Max Stirner in order to elaborate why implementing programs for
molding the development of students—however progressive the program might be—might actually
hinder the path to self-actualization.59 To Stirner, a person becomes self-actualized after two major
developmental shifts: first, the compulsory sacrifice of one’s inborn, singular, experiential
intelligence to the forms of thought encouraged by dominant social constructions; second, the
shedding of those imposed forms when one is finally able to uncover the buried corporeal self. 60
Firth and Robinson argue that when teachers are fixated on molding their students to exhibit
particular behaviors and thought patterns, the second key developmental shift will be inhibited; for
it is only after a student gains practice in allowing her embodied intelligence to discover on its own
which behaviors and thought patterns will be efficacious for her unique trajectory in life that she
may genuinely become a self.61
At the crux of this investigation is my belief that the finality of writing is at odds with the
shapeshifting condition of being a body in the world, a body whose chemistry, dimensions, mood
and climate are continuously overhauled by the influence of its environment. Any act of writing is
to some degree a straightjacketing of cognition and all its concomitant visceral processes. This
subjects the body’s consciousness to an experience of alienation, which can feel rather
uncomfortable. But one feels it in the body, and that pain brings the mind back home. To quote
Stecopoulos once again: writing embodies disembodiment.62 The pain of feeling straightjacketed is
perhaps a claustrophobic death-anxiety, where the incomprehensible inevitability of the body’s
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cessation can only be imagined as a kind of cramping enclosure. Visceral Poetics sees this truncation
of somatic experience as a necessary and instructive component of what the bodymind knows.
Critical writing cannot help but truncate critical thinking, and thus the analytical essay I
assign my students to write is wrong before it is written. Since no writing can perfectly “demonstrate”
the multi-directional breadth of critical thinking, perhaps the purpose of the essay is not to
demonstrate thinking at all but to carve out a space in which the author can consciously encounter
the various existential contradictions embedded in the lie which says the self is composed of a mind
governing the actions of a body. The essay has the capacity to reveal to the writer her own alienation,
to make her feel it in her body. Stecopoulos, Kocik and Clare all recognize that the widespread belief
in a detached mind that governs the body, functions as a tool for colonizing somatic intelligence.
And underlying the teacher’s wish to instill in a student the ability to correctly represent her thoughts
on paper, is the conviction that one ought to overcome the discomfort of feeling alienated within
the language one is given.
But perhaps alienation is itself educational. Perhaps the ill-adapted are the ones best
equipped to see their conditions acutely for what they are. Our social institutions have historically
pathologized the resistance effected by those who can’t or won’t be molded into shape. Eli Clare
cites examples of this, beginning with the writings of 19th century physician Samuel Cartwright, who
diagnosed the “problem” of enslaved Africans trying to escape bondage as a “disorder” called
drapetomania, and their persistent unwillingness to work, even under the whip, as dysaesthesia
aethiopica.63 60s era psychiatrists Walter Bromberg and Frank Simon saw “specific reactive psychoses”
in the members of Civil Rights and Black Nationalist movements, referring to the phenomenon
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using the general term “protest psychosis.”64 This tradition of viewing defiance as a medical disorder
is perpetuated in the practice of pathologizing and punishing the “inability” of students to perform
in the context of the institutions where they are educated. The so-called defect needs instead to be
read as a mark of conscious or unconscious resistance. If the resistance appears to lack intentionality
or specific aim, it is because power works hard to make itself invisible and one often doesn’t see the
constellation of forces that combine to cause a feeling of powerlessness. Perhaps the source is too
complex to be seen at all. But one must try. It is important for the critical writer to have the time
and space that is required in order to dwell attentively within his or her “defects.”
All acts of scholarship and writing manifest failed messages, trite formulations, ill-defended
points, missed points, misplaced or displaced dialects and maladroit grammars that may contain a
great deal of information about what authority the writer struggles against. What if these alleged
failures were consciously embraced within the work of composition? Though I concede that there
are practical and perhaps unavoidable reasons for the existence of our standards, I think that were
we to migrate much of the energy we put into correcting students, toward exploring compositional
practices that transcend ideologies of success and failure, ability and disability, it would aid a
reckoning with the systems of subordination that operate inside and over oneself; to me, this seems
to be the most urgent thing.
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Chapter II | Voicing the Vaguely Felt in Zora Neale Hurston’s Reports from the Field

An Academic Anomaly
Zora Neale Hurston’s wide-ranging, discipline-defying scholarly and creative output emerged
in the 1920s onto a cultural landscape that didn’t quite know what to do with it. Genre-wise, her
work was all over the place: she wrote novels that spun out into poetry and dramatic monologue;
she wrote essays and field reports that read like novels; she filmed ethnographic research footage
that looked like experimental cinema. Style-wise, she regularly tapped into the Southern Black65 oral
tradition for the inflections and phrasing in her writing, which induced critical responses ranging
from enchantment to moral objection. Alain Locke and Richard Wright—Hurston’s peers during
the fertile period of Black art-making that would come to be known as the Harlem Renaissance—
criticized her style for being too sensual and playful at a time when most Black authors in the US
were committed to tackling head-on the serious problem of racism. In academia, her mentors in
ethnography and anthropology viewed her writing as wildly undisciplined while lauding the
brilliance of the research upon which it was based.
Hurston was an oddball through and through, and adamantly protected her right to be so.
She was shaped by her upbringing, having been raised in an autonomous Black township in rural
Florida where she was free to creatively fashion an inner life and personality through lone adventures
in the verdant tropical wilds and community storytelling sessions on neighbors’ porches. If the
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unique approach she would take as an adult to writing, thinking and art-making registered to others
as doggedly resistant, it wasn’t because she was working from a place of defiance, but rather, it was
the result of scenes and disciplines butting up against an element in their midst that was unshakably
itself.
The clearest illustration of this dynamic unfolded when she began studying at Barnard
College on a full scholarship with the weighty distinction of being the institution’s first Black
student.66 She joined the anthropology department and embarked on a project to document Black
folklore. There she had the chance to formalize her love for the storytelling tradition she inherited
by assuming the work of analyzing its imagery, mythology, prosody and performance methods. Of
her time in higher education, Hurston writes: “It was only when I was off in college, away from my
native surroundings, that I could see myself like somebody else and stand off and look at my
garment”.67 The garment in question is the secret language of allusive irony that inhabitants of her
native Eatonville employed in their stories and which Hurston wore “like a tight chemise.”68
Academia helped her bring it into critical focus as a particular poetics, funding her expeditions down
South where she recorded the stories, hymns and work songs that would form the text of Mules and
Men, her famous folklore collection. Documents of these trips exist today in Hurston’s essays, books
and film footage. “Literary science”69 was the term she coined for her practice, an approach to
ethnography that employed the sensual energy of storytelling to represent subject matter, rather than
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the sober neutrality of scientific reporting. In her prose, the fourth wall that is typically implied by
the figure of the omniscient scientific narrator looking on his subjects always gives way as the imageladen musicality of Hurston’s own voice melds with the language of the stories she collected: the
narrator herself becomes a character to be looked at. This unorthodox approach to documentation
placed her at odds with the disciplines from which she drew her financial support. Throughout her
career as a social scientist, Hurston kept only a toe-hold on the institutional spaces that stamped her
work with cultural prestige, preferring a more wildly inclusive and open-ended form of study than
what the academy afforded. The field was where she did most of her learning—from the back roads
of South Florida, armed with a chrome-plated pistol, to the theaters and townhouse parties of
bohemian Harlem70—and she was aware of the paradox inherent in the notion that her responsibility
as an ethnographer was to capture and define all that wildness.
Conflicts with her mentors and benefactors were frequent. Her Rosenwald fellowship was
revoked when a patron, Edwin Embree, claimed distress over Hurston’s “lack of tendency to serious,
quiet scholarship.”71 As a flamboyant scenester frequenting Harlem clubs in sequins and feathers,
telling animated stories to rapt audiences and bringing home a rotating list of lovers, she was
anything but serious and quiet. In collecting folk materials down South, Hurston regularly joined
the singing and drumming herself, a practice which is well-documented in her footage from that
period: in one film, recorded at the Commandment Keeper Church in Beaufort, North Carolina,
Hurston is captured playing a big drum and singing her heart out alongside the worshipers.
I see Hurston’s alleged lack of seriousness as part of a deliberate epistemological stance that
informed all of the work she produced. Hurston conducted her Florida fieldwork under the

70
71

Ibid., 145.
Ibid., 270.

48

guidance of the renowned anthropologist Franz Boas. Due to aesthetic and methodological
differences, she would ultimately diverge from much of Boas’ teachings. I mention this early on
because their disagreement opens a way into understanding the distinctive approach to seeing and
knowing embodied in Hurston’s cinematographic practice and writing, which will form the main
concern of this chapter.
Hurston did not object to Boas’ work; she had immense respect for his guidance, ethical
commitments and life experience, all of which added up to an intellectual heterodoxy that no doubt
served as a model for her own unconventional career. Boas was a trailblazer in the burgeoning
discipline of anthropology, opposing the strict tradition of reading racial difference as an indicator
of biological inferiority or superiority, and arguing that the behaviors of a particular “race” are not
genetically ingrained but necessary learned responses to particular environmental conditions. Boas’
lifelong project was to scientifically document the richness of all cultural practice, debunking the
notion that the culture of “primitives” is underdeveloped. He wrote in 1912, “The old idea of
absolute stability of human types must … be given up, and with it the belief in the hereditary
superiority of certain types over others.”72 Boas was a Jew who came to the United States fleeing
antisemitism in his native Germany, and thus his project of challenging racism through science drew
from a personal need. Hurston sympathized with these motivations, and was thrilled to work under
his tutelage.
The two would maintain a mutual affection over the course of Hurston’s career, yet
Hurston’s methods and motivations differed from that of her mentor. The assignment for the
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Florida field trip as articulated by Boas, was to “penetrate through that affected demeanor by which
the Negro excludes the white observer effectively from participating in his true inner life.”73 Though
Hurston’s identity as “one of them”74 indeed allowed her special access, it is also what compelled her
to document in such a way that would challenge certain defining assumptions of her discipline—
assumptions that Boas had never challenged himself. Boas was determined to elevate the scientific
rigor of his discipline, concerned that his contemporaries were applying grand, sweeping and
ultimately unsupportable theories to the world before conducting adequate scientific study. He
believed that the solution to blind prejudice was methodical observation and exacting
documentation. In short, sharper science was the antidote to vision muddied by inherited ideology.
Though Hurston wrote admiringly of Boas’ “genius for pure objectivity”75 and his insistence that she
be “quite accurate,”76 she did not emulate his insistence on scientific exactitude. For her, the goal of
better vision with respect to one’s perception of scientific subjects could only be reached by
abandoning the notion that true vision can ever be exact.
Their difference was an epistemological one, which is demonstrated plainly in their divergent
techniques for the visual documentation of field data. Boas did extensive research with the Kwakiutl
people,77 an indigenous group from the US Pacific Northwest; his footage from this work was
compiled and released in 1930 under the title, The Kwakiutl of British Columbia. The film displays an
obsessive attention to the locomotive habits of its subjects, with long, repetitive depictions of
traditional dances. Boas studied dance in order to develop a more accurate understanding of the
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historical development of local physical habits as conditioned by geography. The scenes are filmed
in bare settings for the purpose of uncluttered viewing, and the subjects are mostly unadorned,
wearing their everyday clothing, which was a combination of mainstream North American and
Native American fashion.78 This project was an intentional corrective to a very different depiction
of the Kwakiutl: the 1914 docudrama, In the Land of the Head Hunters, filmed by the adventurer and
photographer-for-hire, Edward Curtis.

This movie was an elaborately staged, costumed and

choreographed tale set against sweeping landscapes and striking architecture—false fronts carved and
painted by a hired team of Kwakiutl craftsmen—intended for the purpose of public entertainment.79
Boas’ insistence on sober, meticulous, scientific accuracy indicated his heated objection to Curtis’
images, which Boas saw as a deceptive fantasy. He felt that the commingling of ethnography with
cinematic art was a recipe for miseducation.80 He was devoted to a form of documentation that was
as direct, transparent, unromantic and artless as possible.

Hurston’s Filmmaking Style
Hurston resisted drawing a strict line between cinematic art and expedient documentation.
In refusing the diagnostic distance of the scientific researcher, she never allowed herself a view of
things that was definite or resolved; for vision blurs as it gets closer to its object. During her
expeditions down South, Hurston filmed children’s games, church services, people at work and
scenes of nature, resulting in fifteen reels of footage. In many of these films her camera wanders into
the minutiae of an image, such that the “whole picture”—the schematic view—recedes, becoming
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indefinite, unresolved. One extended segment shows a stand of immense live oak trees on a windy
day.81 The camera lingers on the movement of Spanish moss as it drapes languidly from dense
boughs laced through with telephone wires. It is rhythmic and entrancing. When I watch it, I feel
myself stirred and changed. The vision is so viscerally stimulating that it turns my attention back on
myself, toward the effect it has on my body. I’m reminded of ASMR films—a 21st century trend in
the online video world revolving around the audiovisual phenomenon known as Autonomous
Sensory Meridian Response. Footage of repetitive activities accompanied by soft, rhythmic noises—
hands fingering shiny fabric, a potter smoothing the ridges of a wet clay pot as it spins on a wheel—
are said to provoke ASMR, sending a warm, tingling feeling throughout the body. Die-hard fans
hone a discriminating knowledge of what particular sorts of images and sounds “trigger” them.
When a thing one looks at instigates such palpable effects, one can’t help but consider the nature of
the looking.
Other footage in Hurston’s collection similarly compels a meta-investigation of visual stimuli.
One segment shows a smooth-faced young woman posing on a porch railing, then conversing
energetically with a friend, then drawing water from a well, then rocking in a chair with a small dog
sleeping at her feet.82 Hurston’s camera fixes on the rocking motion. The girl looks back, languorous,
and the lens zeroes in on her feet against the backdrop of the sleeping dog and rhythmic oscillation
of the rockers. Her look is both penetrating and self-enclosed; a push-pull that invokes the erotic
implications of our gaze and Hurston’s. These images don’t tell us much scientifically or
ethnographically speaking. There is no new intel that they reveal about their subjects. Rather, they
point to, heighten, and offer up for analysis the act of looking.
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Reverie is a state that opens the mind to reflect upon its own reflection. The swaying live oak
trees and the rhythm of the rocking chair feel intended both to depict and induce reverie, presenting
a kind of sensory experience in which to view the world becomes first and foremost to view one’s
viewing of it.
The films are all wildly different from each other, and alternate rapidly between styles and
perspectives. The footage that appears to ascribe most faithfully to ethnographic film convention is
Hurston’s recordings of children’s games. Anthropology at the time focused heavily on the physical
traits and locomotive habits of human cultures, seeking to determine whether or not different ethnic
groups had followed distinct evolutionary paths. Filming games and dances was a prevalent practice
in field anthropology, and it’s certain that Hurston was instructed to do this. There are two extensive
segments of children’s game footage in the archive. In both of these, the camera stands away from
its subjects, providing an overall view of the action so that the sequence of movements and
similarities between movers can be readable as a whole. The games are organized, synchronized,
practiced, performative. Yet both segments conclude with brief shots, lasting for only a few seconds,
in which the camera is handed over to the children and thereby switches gears from the analytical—
the survey of locomotive habits for taxonomical purposes—to the receptive. In those final shots what
we see is a chaos of moving limbs and faces, flickering light and shadow, studious eyes landing deeply
and curiously on the lens for a fleeting moment before returning to play.83 It’s a rapid shift from
looking to being looked at, and the camera can only capture a mottled, disarranged and unstable
image of the perspective provided by this set of inquisitive lookers. The analytic gaze is unseated,
unsettled and opened up into improvisational forms of inquiry: literary science.
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Hurston was a radical empiricist84—though she never herself used the term—who
apprehended the minute gradations of sound and color in her sensory terrain to the extent that
categories of definition, or identification, could not hold. Janie Crawford, the protagonist of Their
Eyes Were Watching God (who is widely acknowledged as a reflection of Hurston herself), displays this
same tendency:
Janie had spent most of the day under a blossoming pear tree in the back-yard…ever since
the first tiny bloom had opened. It had called her to come and gaze on a mystery. From
barren brown stems to glistening leaf-buds; from the leaf-buds to snowy virginity of bloom
…It connected itself with other vaguely felt matters that had struck her outside observation
and buried themselves in her flesh. Now they emerged and quested about her
consciousness.85
Here again, looking rouses the flesh, and the corresponding feelings become the source of
new knowledge. Attending close enough and long enough to the phases of change in a blossoming
tree helps vaguely felt matters rise to the surface of the bodymind so that they are available to
contemplation. It is the difference between gazing and observing: to gaze is to sit with the object of
sight as it radiates sensory messages felt in the skin and bones of the viewer; to observe is to expect,
with a particular investment in what happens. The indefinite vision versus the definite one. The
dappled colors of an impressionist landscape versus the crisp lines of a schematic architectural
drawing.
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Receptive Authorship in the Field
As a field ethnographer, Hurston’s task would have been to observe and report, constructing
a picture of a people and a place while adhering to impeccable standards of accuracy and detail. Yet,
in her writing, films and plays, there is an instinctual, corporeal interrogation of to what extent one
can and should “know into somebody else’s business.”86 This phrase, appearing in her introduction
to Mules and Men, the major work that formalized her vocation as an anthropologist, indicates her
struggle to gauge her own motivations and commitments in a discipline with which, to a certain
degree, she was ideologically at odds. The question of how to look at another person, when raised
by an anthropologist, necessarily invokes the Enlightenment’s long history of scientific hubris with
respect to the cultures it has deemed primitive. Hurston loved being a scientist, and appreciated the
knowledge produced by the Enlightenment while also recognizing its blind spots and abuses. Craving
a way to work happily and wholeheartedly within a tradition of study that aims to circumscribe the
unknown and unknowable, she sought out modes of looking that could accommodate the
irreducible fullness of other lives. This panned out as a lifelong project to combine exacting empirical
research with the capaciousness of aesthetic sensibility, defining an experience on the one hand and
submitting to the undefinable sensation of it on the other. Her recording techniques—writing,
filming, and dramatizing events—show a range of methods for preserving the enigmatic quality of
experience.
The contemporary anthropologist and philosopher Michael Taussig writes in his 2011 book
I Swear I Saw This, about his own use of sense-driven, polysemous documentation in the field.
Recounting his research in the Colombian city of Medellin, he contemplates an encounter with an
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object that seemed to defy words—a woman crouched in the corner of a busy freeway tunnel sewing
a man into a plastic bag—which he recorded with a sketchy pencil drawing,87 the only manner of
documentation that felt suitable to something so odd and uninterpretable.88 Taussig recalls that
when he whizzed by this scene in a cab, he asked the driver why people were huddled in the tunnel
and the driver responded “Because it’s warm.” This comment, and the event it describes, encapsulate
for Taussig the hornet’s nest of sociopolitical problems that plague Colombian society as well as the
dispassionate ordinariness of those problems to the people who live with them every day—
Looking at this drawing, which now surpasses the experience that gave rise to it, my eye
dwells on the mix of calm and desperation in making a shelter out of a nylon bag by the edge
of a stream of automobiles. I am carried away by the idea of making a home in the eye of the
hurricane, a home in a nation in which it is estimated that close to four million people or
one person in ten are now homeless due to paramilitaries often assisted by the Colombian
army driving peasants off the land.89
Yet the drawing cannot be reduced to a representation of injustice; its very form and process eschew
this kind of realism, preserving too much of the viewer’s selfhood and insisting too much on the
affective instance of encounter. It refrains from making any assured evaluation of sociopolitical
conditions, attending primarily to the sensory resonances of a meeting between seer and seen— it is
“the dialectic at a standstill,”90 a phrase Taussig borrows from Walter Benjamin. In returning to the
drawing, it is not recognition that Taussig feels, but overriding bewilderment. And he returns to it
again and again, holding himself within a protracted moment of non-knowing.
I Swear I Saw This is a tribute to that protracted moment. Here, as in Hurston’s writing and
films, there is an instinctual, corporeal self-interrogation of to what extent one can and should
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assume the task of decoding the actions of another being. Both Taussig and Hurston find the visual
sketch or snapshot to be a useful vehicle for the preservation of the unresolved because it feels closely
aligned with unconscious caprice: an after-image still vibrating with the sensations that were activated
by the first meeting with an unfamiliar object. The full, irreducible life of the thing seen seems held
within the image like a phantom. To characterize this phantasmal presence, Taussig borrows the
term “third meaning” from an essay by Roland Barthes that analyzes a group of stills from Sergei
Eisenstein’s films. Barthes draws a distinction between 1) the purely denotative meaning of an image,
2) the symbolic meaning,—both of which have been intentionally devised and placed by the director—
and 3) the “obtuse” third meaning, which is “evident, erratic, obstinate” and unintentional. 91 The
third meaning is intuited from the inexplicability of characters’ gestures when they are frozen in a
still image: the gestures look and feel excessive, an effect of the fact that we are aware of their artifice—
we know we’re watching something that’s staged—and yet we also sense the corporeal reality of the
actors captured in a moment of acting. The viewer experiences this as a “useless expenditure” that is
“indifferent to moral or aesthetic categories.”92 It is bare, artless, pre-rational physicality thrown into
relief by the opposing and concurrent reality of cinematic artifice. With respect to Taussig’s field
drawings, the third meaning isn’t apprehended in the actual encounter, only in the subsequent
representation of it; for the artifice that allows a moment to be cropped and freeze-framed—pulled
from the unstoppable rush of experience and shaped into a picture—naturally possesses the capacity
for presenting a certain ghostliness. The image that documents a particular time and place exudes a
strangeness in all that it cuts out: the beliefs, feelings and past experiences of the people in the
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picture; the ecological history of the place where it was taken; the methods and intentions of those
who made the objects that are depicted. These resonances are impossible to know in their fullness,
yet they exert a tangible force within the image, activating our desire to interpret while reminding
us of the impossibility of interpretation. The third meaning, Taussig writes, “is not really a meaning
at all, but a gap or hole or hermeneutic trap that interpretation itself causes while refusing to give up
the struggle.”93
The struggle for meaning that happens when art contends with lived fact plays out in a series
of 18th century Goya etchings, which can be viewed paradigmatically as a precursor to
photojournalism and documentary film. The series is popularly known as Disasters of War (Desastres
de la guerra), and was originally titled Fatal consequences of the bloody war against Bonaparte in Spain. And
other emphatic caprices. (Fatales consequencias de la sangrieta Guerra en Espana con Buonaparte. Y otros
caprichos enfaticos.)

Through this work, Goya chronicled the unspeakable brutalities of the

Napoleonic Wars, experimenting with a strikingly modern employment of drawing to create
something akin to a series of film stills depicting violent events. Throughout this project, the artist
maintains an ironic ambiguity about his role as an observer. The works announce themselves as
eyewitness accounts yet, as the critic Robert Hughes points out, there is sufficient cause to believe
that Goya did not actually see but only heard about many of the scenes. Hughes calls him “the artist
who invented a kind of illusion in the service of truth: the illusion of being there when dreadful
things happen.”94 For Goya, the act of seeing was not necessarily linked with truth or belief, and in
this way he differed from the epistemology inaugurated by Enlightenment science and still firmly in
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place today. An etching of villagers fleeing terrified from the advance of French soldiers (plate 44)95
is titled I saw it (Y lo vi): this pithy claim rests upon layers of irony about the inadequacy of the
scientific gaze in the face of grief, anguish and physical pain, which Taussig was, no doubt, also
invoking in the title of his book, I Swear I Saw This. One of those layers of irony gestures toward the
impossibility of reporting back accurately from events so unprecedented and existentially disruptive
that we do not have agreed-upon terms for representing them. There are places that experience takes
us—such as witnessing extreme violence, undergoing it, or being killed by it—from which we cannot
re-enter the old, trusted economy of signs and symbols. Plate 69 of the series shows a decomposing
body pulling itself from the earth while observed by a jumbled cluster of faces.96 The cadaver holds
a sheet of paper containing one word: Nothing (Nada). The piece is named accordingly, bearing the
title: Nothing. (He will Say) (Nada. [Ello dira]). This is one of Goya’s characteristic, grim, doublemeanings: either the corpse has nothing to say because it is dead, or it utters the word “nothing”
because it has passed through the gates and found nothing at all beyond them.
The single word framed on a page, isolated from its linguistic context, or the freeze-frame
image snipped from the unfolding action of a cinematic plot, is something that the impulse to define
and interpret is able to grab onto; and yet, the isolated image or word also attests to an impulse to
misunderstand, because one’s attraction to it is an attraction away from the irreducible complexity of
actual beings in time-space. An interesting paradox can be derived from this: in the struggle for
meaning, the presence of confusion is what indicates understanding. Confusion as understanding
is an activity that I strive to preserve productively in the organization of my own writing. In my
composition process, I find that the moments when my thoughts feel the clearest are transitional;
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the junctures when some conceptual destination is in view but my course toward it is unresolved,
and has momentum. Meanwhile, against this feeling of clarity, I experience a drive to present
thoughts that sound clear. My training, and the examples I derive from most other scholars, suggest
to me that I will sound clear only after I know what I’m thinking and I’m able to go back and look
upon it, formulating statements that stabilize what “it” is. And yet I choose to undertake
experimentally a writing that disregards the significant pressure to sound clear, instead allowing an
exploration of clarity as a feeling. Taking up William James’s conviction that “one experience
functions as the knower of another,” I structure my writing in such a way that tries to offer clarity as
a process and a feeling. I let my attention land on various works of art and literature, threading them
together, and I hope that in following my threads, the reader will discover her own sensation of
clarity. Perhaps she’ll leave the experience of reading with something new in her bloodstream, a
nutritive element that triggers some form of perceptual alteration. Or maybe she’ll come away with
a vague feeling of attraction to the passages and images I’ve arranged on the page, sensing that they’re
worth approaching.
For Hurston and Taussig, the capacity of images to intimate the presence of, without
presuming definitively to depict, the polychromatic and ever-changing assemblage that is the
experience belonging to another being, is a stimulating relational adventure that is opened up by
field anthropology. Both allow themselves to draw near to texts, artifacts, peoples, cultures, behaviors
and traditions with the humility of bewilderment, where the desire to study and explain them is
paralleled by an interest in understanding one’s own sensitivities, cognitive habits, blindnesses and
biases that are activated in the moment of contact. Their work asks a question that sounds quite
radical today: what if we all could give thorough, well-researched accounts of ourselves as readily as
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we volunteer our depictions of others? What happens to thinking when an interaction with the
world is paused by the acknowledgement: I have no idea what you are?

A Jumble of Small Things
In Hurston’s famous work of prose “How it Feels to Be Colored Me,” she likens people to
paper bags containing “jumble(s) of small things priceless and worthless.”97 This essay, similar to
Franz Fanon’s phenomenological narrative of being “overdetermined from without”98—society
forcefully imposing on him a “racial, epidermal schema”99 that displaces the vast complexity of his
private, lived experience—describes Hurston’s memory of “becoming colored” upon leaving her
Black-governed hometown of Eatonville and encountering the racially polarized wider American
landscape. With a full life of family, friendship, school, pets, heartbreak, grief and intellectual
adventure behind her, the discovery that people saw her simply as a type, as a racial caricature, hit
her hard. Social categories like race function to abridge the other into a one-word definition; against
this, Hurston insists that we can never know all there is to know about anyone.
The brilliance of “How it Feels to Be Colored Me” peaks when Hurston spills the contents
of the metaphorical paper bag in a moment of Homerian ekphrasis, unlocking a poem. The
metaphor goes wild. What we find within the bag is
a first-water diamond, an empty spool, bits of broken glass, lengths of string, a key to a door
long since crumbled away, a rusty knife-blade, old shoes saved for a road that never was and
never will be, a nail bent under the weight of things too heavy for any nail, a dried flower or
two still a little fragrant…100
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This pronounced flight into the pleasure of poetic invention, gaining momentum and materials like
a Dadaist sculpture, maintains that the contents of a person are ineffable even while describing them.
This is enabled by the sudden retreat from realism toward the imaginary. Hurston’s writing in
general contains significant quantities of imagination and imagism, but here is a moment when she
leaps entirely away from the otherwise consistent narrative space occupied by a woman (herself)
grappling with the psychological effects of racism, into a new space occupied by a “jumble of small
things.”101 Leaping away from a narrative sequence then landing on an extreme closeup is a stylistic
strategy that she employs in her films as well. Here, the leap effectively announces the following:
though I’ve told you about the existence of this bag and its mysteries, my description of what’s inside
stops at form and feeling; I don’t purport to give you the tenor of the metaphors borne by the
metaphorical bag, but in those images I do offer you a poetic instantiation of the pleasure I found
in imagining them. In alluding here to the act of trying to “know into another person’s business,”
Hurston shows, in the heightening of poetic style, how such an attempt in fact reveals the tastes,
dreams and fancies of one’s own business.
Taussig similarly troubles the assumption that observations of others can be free from the
formal proclivities of one’s own psychic world. He brings Barthes’ notion of the third meaning into
I Swear I Saw This in order to articulate how stylized, emotionally-inflected, and decidedly unrealistic
field drawings can represent a particular dimension of reality to which conventional field
documentation—naturalistic and purportedly objective—has no access. This part of reality that his
drawings and Hurston’s films have the ability to see is the “hermeneutic trap” in which the
observer/documenter/scientist becomes entangled when he or she reaches out to understand
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another. The kind of image that Taussig examines in his book is one that strongly invokes exactly
what it cannot capture: the amorphous heap of glass shards, doorless keys, unused shoes, defunct
nails and still-dying flowers that constitute the unknowable internal experience that belongs to
another being.
I can’t help but think of Jack Whitten’s artwork in connection with Hurston’s “brown bag
of miscellany,” her symbol of the infinitely varied contents of a person and personality. Whitten—a
20th century abstract painter and sculptor—wrote the following in his personal notebook, which was
published, unedited, shortly after his death in 2018:
…I now realize that my big mistake was trying to force a subjective image from the paint i.e.,
I wanted to see something that I could relate to mentally and most of the time these images
took the form of faces… The psychology of relating the vision of a face, projecting the vision
of a face into any pictorial disturbance meant a lot…Now I remain free to explore the pure
plastic significance of my material…one can stop using paint for artificial means—artificial
interpretation of objects.102
The face, a figure to which we regularly refer in art and life for information about another person—
their emotions, attitudes, age, ethnicity, gender—invokes, for Whitten, an important artistic
conundrum as well as a sociopolitical one: How to depict a person without confining them to lines,
shapes and demographic categories? How to glean knowledge about another being through
improvisational play and receptive engagement? How to model a practice of seeing that doesn’t
compulsively circumscribe and colonize the complex interiority of the thing seen?
Whitten often named his paintings and sculptures after people he wanted to honor. His
Black Monolith series is a group of paintings that pay tribute to figures from the Black cultural canon
such as Ralph Ellison, Barbara Jordan, Muhammad Ali and others.103 The pieces in the series are all
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composed of what Whitten calls “tesserae,”104 fragments of dried acrylic paint resembling mosaic
tiles that, when wet, were combined with various things—“molasses, copper, salt, coal, ash, chocolate,
onion, herbs, rust, eggshell”105 among many other elements—and hardened into discrete units that
could be arranged on the canvas. Each of these works constructs a summary of a person that is so
particular to Whitten’s private mode of vision and practice of relating to the world that for the
viewer, it describes nothing legible beyond the palpable sensuousness of its own materials. The series
as a whole only ever indicates the concept of face as a potential, a vestige or a loose suggestion because
the arresting materiality of each tessera—the basic unit of composition—interferes with the possibility
of digesting the painting via larger unifying concepts or shapes. In removing the face from the image
and encouraging a microscopic focus on materials, Whitten eliminates an obsessive conceptual
refrain that was keeping him from experiencing conceptualization as a process, an ongoing exchange
between dynamic mind and dynamic matter.
What happens when the “molasses, copper, salt, coal, ash, chocolate, onion, herbs, rust,
eggshell” in a painting, or alternatively, the skin, hair, eyes, bones, cartilage, teeth of a face, are
attended to individually and each in relation to the other with intense empirical focus? The face as
an idea, an organizing principle, recedes to the background and interaction with the presentness of
the person’s dynamic physicality generates a shifting series of new ideas and impressions.
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Narrating from the Porch
The Dadaist sculpture that Hurston builds at the denouement of her famous essay displays
an immense talent for poetic play. The ability to weave intricate tapestries of sound, image and
allusion in the space of a written sentence was not a matter of painstaking craft but an expression of
Hurston’s lived speaking habits. She wrote how she spoke, and her speech habits were shaped on
the porches of Eatonville, where mostly men and sometimes women “passed around the pictures of
their thoughts for the others to look at and see.”106 The porch was a stage for daily “lyin’ contests”—
storytelling marathons peppered with playful dares and insults. In Dust Tracks on a Road (Hurston’s
autobiography), Mules and Men and Their Eyes, Hurston repeatedly emphasizes her indebtedness to
this practice as a model for her to innovate a writing style inflected by improvised verbal play and
dialogic performance. I quote here a long passage from Dust Tracks on the significance Hurston
attaches to the figure of the porch:
For me, the store porch was the most interesting place that I could think of. I was
not allowed to sit around there, naturally. But, I could and did drag my feet going in and
out, whenever I was sent there for something, to allow whatever was being said to hang in
my ear. I would hear an occasional scrap of gossip in what to me was adult double talk, but
which I understood at times. There would be, for instance, sly references to the physical
condition of women, irregular love affairs, brags on male potency by the parties of the first
part, and the like. It did not take me long to know what was meant when a girl was spoken
of as “ruint” or “bigged.” For instance, somebody would remark, “Ada Dell is ruint, you
know.” “Yep, somebody was telling me. A pitcher can go to the well a long time, but its
bound to get broke sooner or later.” Or some woman or girl would come switching past the
store porch and some man would call to her, “Hey, Sugar! What’s on de rail for de lizard?”
[…]But what I really loved to hear was the menfolks holding a “lying” session. That
is, straining against each other in telling folks tales. God, Devil, Brer Rabbit, Brer Fox, Sis
Cat, Brer Bear, Lion, Tiger, Buzzard, and all the wood folk walked and talked like natural
men. The wives of the story-tellers might yell from backyards for them to come and tote some
water, or chop wood for the cook-stove and never get a move out of the men. The usual
rejoinder was, “Oh, she’s got enough to go on. No matter how much wood you chop, a
woman will burn it all up to get a meal. If she got a couple of pieces, she will make it do. If
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you chop up a whole boxful, she will burn every stick of it. Pay her no mind.” So the storytelling would go right on. I often hung around and listened while Mama waited on me for
the sugar or coffee to finish off dinner, until she lifted her voice over the tree tops in a way
to let me know that her patience was gone: “You Zora-a-a! If you don’t come here, you better!”
That had a promise of peach hickories in it, and I would have to leave.107
In her 1934 essay “Characteristics of Negro Expression,” Hurston provides a sociolinguistic
perspective on the use of image-heavy language and playful storytelling contests in Black Southern
communities. She writes:
Language is like money. In primitive communities actual goods, however bulky, are bartered
for what one wants. This finally evolves into coin, the coin being not real wealth but a symbol
of wealth. Still later, even coin is abandoned for legal tender, and still later cheques for
certain usages…Frequently the Negro, even with detached words in his vocabulary-not
evolved in him but transplanted on his tongue by contact-must add action to it to make it
do. […] So we have "chop-axe," "sitting-chair," "cook-pot" and the like because the speaker has
in his mind the picture of the object in use. Action. Everything illustrated.108
The particular kind of linguistic economy that she attributes to her Eatonville milieu is one where
words and expressions are valued based on how sensorially evocative they are, how capable they are
of viscerally conjuring their referents. In this context, words aren’t abstract symbols like coins, but
try to remain as close as possible to the ideas for which they are traded. The language community
Hurston describes, with “people passing around pictures of their thoughts,” is one in which a speaker
can’t help but feel how much she gives up in taking it upon herself to speak. The visceral fullness of
experience itself is indicated in words that work tirelessly to hold on to it yet concede that in the
end, words are fundamentally unequal to experience.
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In speaking, we give up being one with what we experience—relegating the possibility of
unmediated immersion as the sole provenance of our non-human neighbors—yet we can also venture
to make speech itself as unpredictable, sensorially rich, adaptive and participatory as experience is.
Hurston further observes:
Whatever the Negro does of his own volition he embellishes. His religious service is for the
greater part excellent prose poetry. Both prayers and sermons are tooled and polished until
they are true works of art. The supplication is forgotten in the frenzy of creation.109
To forget the supplication and prioritize the “frenzy of creation” is to disavow the form/content
distinction. The frenzy of creation becomes the supplication, becomes speech’s purpose. In doing
this it abandons interest in the notion that a word must remain unequivocally and consistently in
possession of its given referent and instead innovates word combinations, alters meanings in
accordance with new contexts and generally commits sacrilege against the dominion of literalist
orthodoxy. This is the sacrilege that Hurston commits in responding to her anthropological research
assignment by telling meandering, allusive autobiographical stories or creating dreamy,
impressionistic film tableaus. Why does Hurston choose to document her research in this way?
I searched for footage filmed by some of Hurston’s contemporaries, in an effort to better
distinguish her particular angle of vision. There’s not a lot to see: the bulk of her films were made
in 1927-28 and at such an early stage in the development of film as a documentary medium,
anthropologists and ethnographers were still figuring out how to employ it in their research. The
Boas footage that I was able to access consists of short clips recording the movement habits of
people—their gaits and dances—and the subjects were clearly responding to instructions by the
cameraman. No pretense to naturalism.
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A consistent characteristic of Hurston’s footage is her apparent fixation on particular scenes
and moments that seem to defy any strictly scientific purpose. By contrast, a clip from Margaret
Mead— another of Boas’ proteges who was a bit younger than Hurston—stands out in my mind as
exemplary of the anthropological conventions that Hurston’s films largely set aside. Footage from
Mead’s 1953 Admiralty Islands expedition captures the assessment of an infant’s motor skills based
upon the Gesell Developmental model. The child is depicted squirming atop a white sheet: a test of
whether he can roll onto his stomach unassisted.110 This segment is a characteristic example of
Mead’s visual documentation practice; the films in her collection all include an abundance of
scientific metrics. In all of the footage comprising Hurston’s archive, there is nothing like this. The
only indicator of metrics that I know of in the collection is a clip of children’s games in which the
camera periodically focuses on a child holding up a card. Due to the poor quality of the film, the
cards are unreadable, yet it is widely assumed that these are anthropometric devices with some form
of identifying information about the children.111 But even this is questionable. The scholar Autumn
Womack argues that “the white cards do not actually record identification data, but rather, they
contain production information.”112 She makes out the text on one of them to read “Reel 1.”
Hurston's films do not tell a complete story about anything, and they document no attempt
to quantify characteristics of group identity, which was the primary objective of her field at the time.
Favored objects of fixation regularly move to the foreground such that the context, background or
purpose becomes obscured. One of her 1928 Florida films depicts a group of men making wine in
an outdoor laboratory equipped with huge, steam-emitting barrels, long hoses and glass jugs fitted
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with cone filters. The operation is a demonstration for clusters of White onlookers, who appear to
be there in order to make purchases. The segment is narrative, providing a visual account of a
cultural activity and its context. Yet the narrative repeatedly halts, landing and dallying on some
granular image without warning or explanation. One such moment is particularly striking. It appears
that a sale is being conducted, and the White buyer hands a little parcel—probably containing cash—
to the Black winemaker. Inexplicably, the parcel is held between the fingers of the two men while
the winemaker speaks, apparently addressing both his client and the crowd of people watching.113
Hurston zooms in, providing an extreme closeup of their fingers. The image forms a discrete art
piece, isolated from the action, resembling a work of surrealist photography.
Likewise, in one of the children’s game films, there is a sudden, inexplicable jump to an
image of a tall, handsome man chopping at a log that rests on the ground. He swings a long-handled
ax in wide circles, masterfully, energetically, performatively, often looking back at the camera. We
then see him posed for a series of still portraits with slight costume alterations. In one
he’s bare-headed and bow-tied; in another he’s in a bowler hat and tie-less with his collar cavalierly
unbuttoned; and in a third the hat is readjusted to a jaunty side angle and the man stands in a sexy
contrapposto with his foot propped on a block.114 Why does the camera linger on these images? It is
an ineffable fixation, an emotional / aesthetic magnetism, an unhampered pursuit of miscellaneous
manifestations that alight on the viewer’s interest, a frenzy of creation.
Hurston’s artistic research constituted an ongoing quest to find as many ways to see and say
a thing as possible. This form of experimental signification is represented in the figure of the porch,
adding extra import to the footage of the young woman in a rocking chair. From the entire archive,
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that segment is the clearest illustration I saw of Hurston’s stylistic commitment to partial views and
“miscellany.” Its camerawork moves rather quickly from shot to shot, and interspersed with the shots
of the young woman are shots of objects: potted plants, a well, the pump on the well, a pile of
unidentifiable objects in a yard. Twice in this segment a single, disconnected frame jumps in: once,
an image of what looks like some old structures and fenceposts flashes up and disappears, and a few
seconds later, an isolated shot of tree branches interjects. The overall feeling is one of atomization,
of disparate parts, a paratactic collection of utterances.
The porch is a place of play, where images and words aren’t ordered to equate reality but
serve to make and multiply it. Hurston, in narrating from the porch, has chosen to dwell within the
sensory potentials of expression itself. Images pulse and oscillate in a trance-like suspension between
immediate experience and the mediation that signs introduce. Her work hangs within the ongoing
process of receiving stimuli, feeling stimuli, feeling oneself feeling them, and then translating that
whole process into something for others to see or read.
This fixation upon the sustained and simultaneous act of seeing and signifying decreases the
currency value of individual signifiers, whether word or image. To hark back to Hurston’s assertion
that “language is like money,” when a community of speakers mutually affirms a word’s equivalence
with a particular idea through repeatedly using the word in a prescribed way, the word’s value
inflates, the demand for it growing as speakers forget that they can purchase the idea it represents in
other ways. It acquires a monopoly over its idea.
Instead of this, Hurston offers us her “frenzy of creation,” her insatiable drive to render an
idea in multiple mediums, her energetic revisions. In “Characteristics,” the impulse to revise is
another quality Hurston attributes to “the American Negro” who “has made over a great part of the

70

(English) tongue to his liking.”115 Their Eyes Were Watching God can reasonably be read as a revision
of Mules and Men. She places herself as protagonist in both—explicitly in Mules and Men, and through
the figure of Janie in Their Eyes—and both books tell of a journey through Southern Florida in which
the landscapes encountered are mythical, folkloric ones, accessed through the voices of the
storytellers she meets, as much as they are geographic. The critic Elaine Charnov articulates this
correspondence well: “(Mules and Men and Their Eyes) are both testimony to Hurston’s
experimentation with the written form; in the former work she inserted a fictional quality into her
anthropology; in the later work she inserted a folkloric quality in her fiction.”116 This practice of
revising the representation of an idea or experience across a variety of aesthetic forms parallels the
linguistic innovation of new words that Hurston points to in “Characteristics” and elsewhere in her
writing as a common quality of Southern Black speech. A recurrent example is the practice of
“specifying,” wherein chains of elaborate insults are extemporized to deride someone’s character,
with each new image in the sequence increasingly refining the nature of the victim’s monstrousness
while better displaying the vehemence of the speaker’s ire:
It is an everyday affair to hear somebody called a mullet-headed, mule-eared, wall-eyed, hognosed, 'gator-faced, shad-mouthed, screw-necked, goat-bellied, puzzle-gutted, camel-backed,
butt-sprung, battle-hammed, knock-kneed, razor-legged, box-ankled, shovel-footed, unmated
so-and-so! Eyes looking like skint-ginny nuts, and mouth looking like a dishpan full of brokeup crockery!117
This example demonstrates the height of Hurston’s comic dexterity, yet her interest in this form of
maximalist, extemporized, and wildly heterogeneous signification indicates a larger, general ethos of
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representation that is grounded in deep sociopolitical convictions. Her embrace of action words
(signification that is improvised in tandem with direct experience) and rejection of cheque words
(abstract symbols that rely upon established usage and long-confirmed consensus) is a manifestation
of her philosophy about how the powers of representation that we grant to art and science can and
should be used.

Demography and the Object Without Insides
Hurston’s views on representation often put her violently at odds with her contemporaries.
Both Alain Locke and Richard Wright responded to the extraordinary success of Their Eyes Were
Watching God with harsh ethical objections. Locke lamented that Hurston’s “gift for poetic phrase”
kept her from the “sharp analysis” required in order to write powerful “social document fiction.” 118
Hurston’s use of Southern Black diction was, to him, akin to a minstrel show, with her characters
coming off as “entertaining pseudo-primitives,” a sentiment that would be echoed by Wright. As an
author who had prescribed an embrace of Marxist, socialist realism in an essay called “Blueprint for
Negro Writing,” Wright railed against Their Eyes for its sensuousness, writing in a 1937 review: “The
sensory sweep of her novel carries no theme, no message, no thought.” 119 Both of these critiques
seem to fault Hurston’s art for being too artistic: overly concerned with poetic, visceral impressions
(the “sensory sweep”) at the expense of sociocultural analysis and pedagogical utility (the “message”).
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Valerie Boyd notes the gendered undertone of these responses.120 I’m interested in their
epistemological implications.
Hurston rebutted the charges in a 1938 essay titled “Art and Such.” Here, using her
characteristic combination of conversational address with evocative imagery and goading irony, she
explains why she takes issue with what she sees as a decree that “the one subject for a Negro is the
Race and its sufferings”: it leads, she thinks, to a cultural vocabulary in which “no Negro exists as an
individual—he exists only as another tragic unit of the Race.”121 In Hurston’s estimation, the
prevalence of the “tragic pose”122 has crystallized into moral prerogative and hamstrung the potentials
of Black art practice. She feels that when writing by Black authors is reduced to sociocultural
diagnosis, a new caricature is created for White consumption. A later essay, “What White Publishers
Won’t Print,” published in 1950, offers a biting illustration of this problem. There Hurston argues
that the chronic detachment of mainstream America from the everyday intricacies of Black
experience means that images of servility and protest are perceived as two sides of the same coin: the
man “seated on a stump picking away on his banjo and singing and laughing” goes hand-in-hand
with “a most amoral character before a share-cropper’s shack mumbling about injustice.”123 The
latter, she believes, is what the genuinely “sharp analysis” and political commitments of her peers
get reduced to within a popular cultural taxonomy directed by the ruling classes and ensured by
publishers. The publishing houses happily embrace the profitability of Black writing about racial
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tension while viewing the critical thinking it contains as mimicry of White culture—“all on the
outside.”124
But it would be inaccurate to read these concerns as an all-out dismissal of the need to write
toward the aims prescribed by Locke and Wright. Hurston didn’t shy away from using her public
position to spread information about race-related violence, though she was indeed more interested
in transcendence than tragedy, lyric play than diagnosis. Her essay titled “The Ocoee Riot” provided
an account of the 1920 massacre of a Black community in Florida, correcting a widely circulated
story that depicted the mass killing as justifiable self-defense against the unruly behavior of
community members.125 Even Their Eyes dips into the realm of “social document fiction” when, after
the calamitous flood in Chapter 18, workers are instructed by their bosses to bury the White bodies
in coffins and the Black bodies in a mass grave. This account mirrors actual events that followed the
Lake Okeechobee hurricane of 1928;126 Hurston clearly wanted her readers to know about these
events.
The position she takes in essays like “Art as Such” and “What White Publishers Won’t Print”
is not a repudiation of particular aesthetic commitments but a stand against aesthetic dogma.
Whether Hurston’s heated counterargument aimed at Locke and Wright was an exercise in civil
debate or a defensive comeback in response to negative reviews of her book, her oeuvre bears out a
consistent theory of representation that was anomalous enough in her time and milieu to justify her
being regularly on the defensive.
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Hurston’s chosen representational strategies were largely informed by her immersion in
anthropological and ethnographic research. While the novelists and poets in her peer group
contended with the ethically-charged question of how to depict oneself and one’s community
through literary characterization on the page, Hurston took up the question both literarily and in
her contributions to social science through field work. I view her practice as a concerted way out of
an epistemology that deformed subjectivity through compulsive objectification, which she saw
expressed in the work of both anthropologists and the social realist artists in her peer group. In the
following passage she addresses anthropological discourse, represented in the figure of the American
Museum of Natural History, which, at the time, was directed by her Barnard mentor Franz Boas:
The answer lies in what we may call THE AMERICAN MUSEUM OF UNNATURAL
HISTORY. This is an intangible built on token belief. It is assumed that all non-Anglo
Saxons are uncomplicated stereotypes. Everybody knows all about them. They are lay figures
mounted in the museum where all may take them in at a glance. They are made of bent wires
without insides at all.127
In “Art and Such” she applies a similar characterization to “Race Men”—a thinly veiled invocation
of Locke and Wright:
To him no Negro exists as an individual—he exists only as another tragic unit of the Race.
This in spite of the obvious fact that Negroes love and hate and fight and play and strive and
travel and have a thousand and one interests in life like other humans.128
He doesn’t exist as an individual because he is relegated to serve either as an illustration of inferiority
or a symbol of resistance to that. Either way, he is an object “without insides.” Likewise, the
demographic analysis that is essential to the social sciences turns subjects into quantifiable objects.
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Hurston was assigned to measure heads during her field work, as anthropometry was a key practice
in her discipline, which had roots in the wish to determine once and for all whether or not race
dictated intellectual ability. I’d like to mention once again here that her teacher, Franz Boas, was in
fact a progressive outlier in the field. He devoted the latter half of his career to counteracting racism
in anthropology with newer, better theories. Yet, with her jab at the American Museum of Natural
History, she criticizes him, and not very subtly. There is something she objects to which antiracist
work can’t get at.
What I see operating in Hurston’s oeuvre, and most pronouncedly in her films, is a
representational strategy that aims to show the innerworkings of minds while remaining cognizant
of the fact that they can’t be shown, that the aim won’t capture its mark. Her resistance toward the
pressure to write “social document fiction” is more than an act of individualist rebellion—though
Hurston’s anti-conformist, individualist streak can’t be denied—but a pointed rejection of a
particularly suffocating epistemological trap: the demand either to perpetuate an inaccurate and
degrading representation of a people or identify with the obverse of that representation. She feels
pressured to write with a particular pronouncement in mind: we are not what you say we are, rather,
we are this. Hurston wants access to experience that can live beyond this epistemological trap, and
art is the tool she employs for opening a path to it.
Autumn Womack uses the term “overexposure” to designate the proliferation of subject
matter and perspectives in Hurston’s films as a particular stylistic choice and ethics of representation.
The fact that “frames are often overloaded with gestures and historical referents” and “figures come
in and out of focus”129 constructs a cinematographic point-of-view that “underscores film’s inability
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to ever completely capture and re-present (black) subjects.”130 Womack invokes the “brown bag of
miscellany” from “How It Feels to Be Coloured Me” as an image that echoes this strategy, depicting
an abundance of varied materials combined to form an assemblage that is uncategorizable and
undefinable. Adding to this, what I see in Hurston’s films—in the constantly shifting perspective, the
invocation of multiple genres, the flickering light, the confusion of faces, body parts and everyday
objects—is the depiction of sight itself without delineating between subject and object.
In calling Hurston a radical empiricist, I characterize her as a thinker concerned primarily
with forms of knowledge that arise from focused interaction with what is most local to the body: its
own sensations, its tools of communication (fingers, eyes, voice), the surfaces and phenomena that
touch it. This epistemology is also necessarily attentive to mediation because studying the
spontaneity of sensation will attune one to the elements that inform sensation: in noticing how I
feel I can’t help but try to figure out what makes me feel that way. The sensory information that a
body receives is filtered through shapes, words, and categories. Hurston is extremely sensitive to
these forms of mediation, doing what she can to aid their proliferation and thereby helping her
vision thrive without dependence on any one filter. And in working thus to maximize her own
experience of the world, she works for experience itself, as it’s accessed by all minds. Hurston’s essays
countering the views of Locke and Wright and the whole anthropological tradition (with “views”
meant literally, as she is countering a mode of vision) are not a reactionary lashing out but the
articulation of a philosophical and pragmatic position. In this writing, she fights a convention of
representation—one that deforms subjectivity through compulsive objectification— that tends to be
self-inflicted just as much as it’s inflicted by others. The mirror effect famously described by Fanon
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is to some degree an encounter that all humans undergo: we come to identify ourselves with an
external shape that is incongruent with the tumult of undifferentiated sensations that constitute our
experience of being a self. We grow up and become habituated to that shape, forgetting about its
inherent inaccuracy. To interrogate the validity of the forms that mediate one’s own mind at the
nexus of one’s relationship to an environment is the first step toward disarming the categories, types,
and labels that science and the state apply to people on a broad scale for purposes of containment
and labor extraction. This is the understanding that drove Hurston’s combined practice of
filmmaking as autobiography / fiction as autobiography / anthropology as autobiography. Without
a shred of positivistic interest in answers, her transdisciplinary fieldwork sifted through the “bits of
broken glass (and) lengths of string” held in her own “brown bag,” laying it all, piece by piece,
alongside the contents of other bags so that everything got jumbled together.
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Chapter III | “An Honorable and Important Profession”:
Jimmie Durham’s Indecorous Craft

A Paratextual Universe
This is a dried mushroom, that is to say, a fungus, from the Grunewald. Goedele
Nobels, Joen Vedel and I found it. We belive believe it to be a “destroying angel”
(amanita virosa) but it might be instead the “deceiver” (laccaria laccata) or possibly
leucorg leucoagaricus pudicus, or even cystolepiota adulterina. Maybe it is the
“earthstar” (geastrum fornicatum) which is inedible because of the texture. We
consulted the reference books and established that it is not “stinkhorn” (phallus
impudicus). After drying it I soaked it in a mixture of white glue, water and alcohol
(did you know that white glue is made from cow’s milk?) It is now completely
preserved, because after it dried a second time I applied acrylic gel. Yes, it does look
a bit strange; nevertheless, you are also a bit strange. Remember only about a month
ago when you overheard those friends talking about you? I think you did not hear
enough to catch on, luckily, maybe. But anyway I am on your side…if they knew more
about you (up to a certain point, of course) they would surely have more respect.
Please be assured (“assured”! “asurred”!) that this destroying angel or deceiver is
suitable for home use as well as for museums.

This text is contained within a 2006 piece by Jimmie Durham titled A Mushroom from the Grunewald
Forest.131 A diptych of sorts, the piece comprises two panels: one presenting an image and the other
its explanation. It toys with the question: just how capable is language in its role of explaining things?
The text interpolates the viewer into the position of the mushroom, both depicted as recipients of
roving, imprecise speculation. Explanatory language prattles away unable to grasp its subject in any
deep sense nor even get its name right. For, the data needed in order to thoroughly explain a thing—
the etymology of its name, its organic composition, historical derivation, external identificatory
markers, habits of interaction within an environment, and so on—are too complex, extensive and
intricately overlapping, and the entity is too changeable, to allow for identifying statements that
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come anywhere near conclusive. Yet we compulsively demand an armature of words about a thing to
qualify our relationship to it.132
During a three-year stint writing reviews for Art in America, I was asked more than once by
my editors to make space in my writing for recapping ideas from the criticism, catalog articles and
press releases that were being circulated by writers and curators about the exhibitions I was enlisted
to cover. Increasingly, convention demands that art be approached, discussed and critiqued always
with the help of paratextual snippets, which seem to displace the artwork as the primary object of
attention. Curatorial statements, press releases, wall labels and magazine reviews are the many forms
of paratext that orbit around contemporary works of art. The injunction to explain—which Durham
tinkers with and deflates in A Mushroom from the Grunewald Forest—does not simply draw from the
need for helpful information about an object that may otherwise be inscrutable to viewers, but, more
importantly, is a call to buttress the ideological architecture of an institution. Paratexts help reinforce
the shared knowledge systems that determine what is in and what is out or who is in and who is out.
They become a place to live, a blueprint for structuring the artist’s, the curator’s, the student’s or
the employee’s life according to a set of sociopolitical positions, a symbolic indication of cultural
identity.
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In the field of 21st century media studies, scholars are noticing a radical expansion of the
paratexts around film and television: the “buzzing swarms of trailers, teasers, bloopers, tweets, swag,
webisodes, podcasts, chat rooms, fanzines, geek conventions, DVD extras, synergistic tie-ins, and
branded merchandise.”133 Media critic Thomas Doherty writes in a 2014 piece for the Chronicle of
Higher Education:
For many paratextual critics […] the paratexts themselves are but connecting threads in the
larger fabric of the tele-world known as “branding,” a term in corporate and now critical
discourse that refers to the identifying imprint of the network. […] To stand out in the static,
a network needs to entice viewers not just with a show but a more nurturing, totalizing
experience. The net may be narrow (which is why it’s called narrowcasting), but the
experience needs to be deeply immersive and ever-reinforcing. 134
This totality in which the original text and the multiple paratexts around it hold equal status;
in which the viewer translates paratextual ideas into lifestyles and relates to characters as if they’re
personal friends; in which we are asked to dwell from morning until night, has become the shape of
both popular media and high art.
Under these conditions, the major role of the paratext is not to summarize an agreed upon
method of evaluating art and cultural objects, but rather, to itself become the desired possession,
strategically aligning with artworks in order to borrow their aura and thereby become beautiful,
transcendent. The primary object of consumption is an institutional ideology, made appealing
because its association with art lends it a captivating mystique. Viewers consume the museum or
gallery’s messaging about the personal background of an artist or the political implications of an
artwork as a story with which they can personally identify; and implicit in the messaging is a
suggestion that viewers should identify with it, because it represents an ideology certified as high
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culture and held by the class of people who are fluent in high culture. Institutional branding has
melded with the art of criticism in an overabundance of textual production emblazoned on museum
walls and broadcast via the reviews and think pieces flowing nonstop from online art magazines. It
is a deceptive market, and the deception is made possible by the fact that we operate under an ageold belief that language is fundamentally explanatory—that its function is to tell—furnishing the illusion
of a natural split between the art object in its ostensible mystery and the linguistic account in its
ostensible transparency. The opposition conceals that words, too, are mysterious; that the work they
do is more than simply saying what this or that thing is, assigning it an identity.

Orders, Coherence And Direction
Ludwig Wittgenstein wanted to cure the West of its notion that words are signs designated
to simply say what this or that thing is. For, the assumption that words should function as efficiently
as this puts the object world to work under labor conditions to which it hasn’t agreed. To stress
language’s telling function is to activate its coercive, dictatorial potential. Wittgenstein gave the
following example of the work we ask stones do for us:
A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass
the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language
consisting of the words ‘block’, ‘pillar’, ‘slab’, ‘beam’. A calls them out; B brings the stone
which he has learned to bring at such and such a call.135
If the basic function of language were a constative one—to invoke J.L. Austin’s term—this would
mean that the purpose of speech and writing would be to domesticate the world for our use.
Alternatively, Wittgenstein illuminated for us the intrinsic performativity of language: we
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understand words primarily because they are accompanied by acts; saying is acting in an environment
and writing is thinking in response to one. The site-specific liveliness of words can’t be sifted out;
meanings get lost when signs are pulled from their native contexts for the purpose of easy circulation.
The activity of thinking with and in an environment is inextricable from the language that seals that
relation just like the impact of a painting is embedded in its concreteness, its materials. The
constative word is like a promotional photograph of a work in the artist’s studio, passed off as the
work’s equivalent. “Slab,” “beam” and “stone” are only after-images of an intellectual-somatic
encounter with the hard edges of a material fact.
In the following excerpt from his essay “The Libertine and the Stone Guest,” Jimmie
Durham gives his own rendering—replacing the building stones with wood—of Wittgenstein’s
parable:
Wittgenstein imagined “primitive” languages, wherein Herr A would say to B, “plank,” and
it would mean, “Please bring me a plank of pine wood or I will fire you.” Surely, though, the
stuff of language is not objects but actions. Language begins not with names but with desires.
Language is made of verbs. Adam was not naming animals in the Garden of Eden, he was
walking around, observing them, speaking to them, instructing: “Eve, run! A bear is coming!”
Herr A would have said, instead of “plank,” “bring.” B could then know by previous
experience or by the action of a pointed finger that the boss wanted a plank. The question,
“What does the boss want?” really means, “What must I do to keep my job?”136
Durham’s version highlights not just the inaccuracy of the block-plank-slab-beam account of how
language works, but the injustice of it. When everyday language use conceals that there is often a
threat of deprivation or violence motivating acts of instrumental reason—acts undertaken in response
to such internal queries as “what does the boss want?”—language users become accustomed to
manufactured unjust conditions as if they’re natural or necessary.
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This is illustrated brilliantly in Franz Kafka’s 1917 short story, “A Report to an Academy,”
which comprises a speech delivered by Red Peter, an ape who has learned to be human. Red Peter
speaks before an audience of intellectuals about his transition to humanity. “Esteemed Gentlemen
of the Academy!” he begins, “You show me the honor of calling upon me to submit a report to the
Academy concerning my previous life as an ape.”137 Red Peter’s lecture is punctuated by the repeated
admission that he cannot say what he has given up. There are no words for it, and his memory fails
him. Standing at the podium, he enacts the comedy of speaking about things that lie outside of
language. It is about giving an account of himself, explaining how he has come to qualify as a member
of the gathered company. And in addressing the “esteemed gentlemen” in their own language,
appealing to their own knowledge systems, he points obliquely yet all the more forcefully to the
unnamed dimensions of planetary life that exist beyond the purview of words and knowledge
systems.
The report, the statement, the bio, the press release, the wall label comprise the wealth of
language that is required should one wish to introduce oneself or one’s work into the cultivated
spaces that define the highest expression of what is called “civilization.” Refinement must be
demonstrated: all materials must show evidence of the process by which they have evolved from their
previous existence as raw, wordless, stuff. In 1996 Jimmie Durham did a show at the Finland
museum of contemporary art where he brought in a truckload of fist-sized rocks and spread them
around the building; in the exhibition rooms, the lecture hall, the offices, the bathrooms, and even
the sidewalk outside and the street.138 The idea was that the stones would make it so that the different
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areas like the reception desk and offices wouldn’t look, in his words, “so serious and separate.” 139
There is a particular conception of outside that Durham imports into the gallery with his stones.
Having crossed the Atlantic from the eastern United States to settle in “Eurasia”—a term he uses to
indicate the “strange ambiguity” of the European continent140—Durham insists that space itself will
never cease to be wild, despite the tendency of humans to carve it up into proprietary parcels. The
stone is not a symbol but an emissary from, say, the Hiidenvuori cliffs or the Ozark mountains. Its
assignment is to smooth out space—to neutralize the jagged “architexture” of the museum—so that
demarcations between the ticketing counter, administrative office, stockroom and galleries are
softened and distributed,141 levelled to approximate something closer to stuff.
“Architexture” is a neologism Durham regularly uses in discussion of the particular
intervention that his work stages. Art critic Jean Fisher sheds light on the term:
Foremost among Durham’s targets for critical scrutiny have been the twin pillars of
European hubris: Text (scripture) and Architecture, or ‘Architexture.’ […] Architexture
becomes indicative of a belief structure that organises language into value-laden categories
and time-space into privatized enclosures that are ultimately ‘inhuman’ in separating human
from human, and the human from the natural world. […] Architexture, and all that has
ensued from it, from anthropocentrism to neoliberal capitalism, is what renders the world
‘unhomely.’142
Durham regards textuality as a European construction—ultimately imported to the Americas—that is
shaped by the model of scripture. Because it is fundamentally scriptural, the text will always be a
reserve of authoritative beliefs that supersede empirical intelligence. Working in tandem with
architecture, the text is a cultural form that insinuates itself between the person and her physical
environment, always demanding that she pay attention to it before she attends to the facts she
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receives from time-space in the present. Yet Durham is a writer, and the warmth, the playfulness,
the fun that characterizes his essays and poems admits a love for text. Are the written word and active,
empirical insight irreparably at odds? What capacities does the art of writing hold that free it from
the kind of textuality that brandishes restrictive forms of reason as dogma?
Phenomenologist Alphonso Lingis terms the sensory purview of bodily experience as “the
elemental that faces”143: the swath of the world that one can grasp in any given event of seeing and
feeling, an expanse made clear and available by the sensation in one’s feet as one stands on the
ground and of the sunlight shining on the things in one’s field of vision. 144 The elemental is always
there, no matter where one goes. It can’t be owned, enclosed, barricaded or expropriated. For Lingis,
the experience of the elemental and the experience of language are related. The presence of a
speaking body helps orient us within the elemental. On the other hand, the presence of what he
calls “common discourse” alienates us from the elemental.145
Like Durham, Lingis believes that textuality tends to influence us in a manner that is
detrimental to the empirical mind. In the face of this, he expounds a pre- or extratextual conception
of language—the saying—that counters the damage done by textuality—the said. Perceiving an act of
saying helps me to feel held by the elemental. When another person speaks to me, the auditory
sensation I have of their voice accompanied by the visual sensation I have of their facial expression
makes me feel seen and acknowledged, ensuring me that I exist in this moment in this space. It doesn’t
matter what is said, it only matters that there is a saying. I may look to the other person in search of
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information or instructions, but in my appeal there is always also a request for pure responsiveness.146
While seeking “orders, coherence and direction” I also seek the interruptive “hesitations, redundancies
and silences” that characterize the voice and differentiate it from the smooth functioning of text. 147
The interruptions to the content of the said that the embodied act of saying will always manifest,
affirm the experience I am at present having of my own body; I sense my breath, throat and mouth
while I perceive the other using hers. It is a connectedness that is more than just the sharing of a
language and an exchange of information. It affirms my only certifiable commonality with the other
person: that we are both bodies and are fallible because we are bodies, as our words and intentions
will inevitably be disrupted by our need for breath.
When language is regarded only as a vehicle for delivering an intended content, it becomes the
ideal environment in which “common discourse” can mushroom into the dominant form of discourse.
Language in this sense is the symbolic medium through which immediate experience gets translated
into second-hand concepts and images that then get passed along from the “here-now-index of the
one who first formulated them”148 to be reified and circulated by others. Common discourse is the set
of terms that a group of people have agreed to share based on the belief that all participants understand
the terms in the same way. Using the terms of common discourse helps a person affirm their belonging
in a group and qualifies them to be counted as a member of cultural institutions, which grant expert
status to those who have the greatest command of the shared language.
Red Peter, in gradually discarding the expressive habits of his animal past and acquiring the
tools he needs in order to address and be understood by a human audience of scholars, has learned to
become serious. We seek from experts evidence of their seriousness, which they have achieved through
a mastery of and commitment to the common discourse. If they are serious enough, experts will be
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able to clearly, thoroughly, and convincingly articulate the beliefs that constitute the shared system of
knowledge to which they subscribe, affirming that it is indeed universally shared and respected. This
is all part of a linguistic economy that is substantiated not in the vocal chords but in institutional
disciplines, spaces and texts:
Speaking as a representative of the common discourse of rational culture is what we call serious
speech. The seriousness in it is the weight of the rational imperative that determines what is
to be said. Students demand of their teachers that they formulate, without eccentricities, the
state of the art of their particular disciplines; one expects that what one learns in the sciences,
in the humanities, and in the technologies will implicate the universal principles of the rational
integration of knowledge. The vocalization of what has to be said in this particular voice, by
this particular speaker, is inessential; the very saying is inessential, since what has to be said
exists in the literature in the public libraries, or if not, is implicated already in the governing
categories, theories, and methods of rational discourse.149

Beyond Seriousness
The multitude of artworks that Jimmie Durham has made that ironize, deflate and
deconstruct the art world’s requisite expressions of common discourse—its paratexts—use nonsense,
word play, spontaneity and repeated self-interruption to expose by contrast the way that seriousness
functions in the spaces where his works are displayed. If, as he believes, it is the combination of
textual convention and architectural enclosure that makes institutions alienating, in using art as a
platform to play with language and space, he hints at the avenues that might lead the viewer out of
her alienating conditions: doing away with seriousness will be an important step in the journey.
Always happy to play the role of the ape in a necktie, Durham finds numerous ways to poke
holes in the seriousness of a thing. Neckties—for him a satirical symbol of the respectable man in a
respectable profession—figure repeatedly in his works across mediums. In a 2004 film titled Smashing,
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Durham sits behind an executive desk wearing a tie and ill-fitting suit, his shaggy hair smoothed
back, as person after person approaches the desk bearing objects for him to smash with a rock.150 He
lifts the rock high in the air with two hands, evoking a cartoon cave man, and smashes a succession
of things: a bag of flour, a porcelain figurine, a can of shaving cream, a banana. After each, he
retrieves a rubber stamp and clipboard from a drawer in the desk, stamps a receipt, signs it, hands
the signed and stamped sheet to the person before him, and puts everything back in the desk. In a
1989 assemblage titled Articles 2 & 3 from the 1986 Pinkerton’s Agency Manual, a long red-painted
arrow resembling the iconic “power tie” rests on the ground pointing up toward a white plaque that
reads “I will always regard myself as a member of an honorable and important profession (I shall
keep myself in the best possible condition so that I can efficiently perform my duties).”151 The plaque
is signed at the bottom with an ostentatious, swirling scribble. The tie and the signature are symbols
that mirror each other: they are both devoid of any direct utility (the tie as an article of clothing with
no warming or covering function, the ornate signature as a word that can’t be read) and function as
markers of authority (the tie indicating who is boss, and the signature asserting ownership of an
object or transaction).
Seriousness, as the plaque suggests, means displaying a faith in the value of what you do.
Imagine a bank: a building that is all 90 degree angles and grey tones housing an array of people
assuming an array of roles. Everyone sits or stands where convention demands, the tellers in blue
button-down shirts sitting in glass-encased booths, the loan officers in dark suits perched behind big
desks, the security guards in navy blue uniforms standing sentinel by the door, the clients in
streetwear (colors contrasting with the neutral motif of the room) standing disengaged and mostly
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silent, looking at their phones, as they wait for service. For the bank to preserve its illusion of
institutional importance, everyone must act according to their roles as well as use each element of
the space only for its intended purpose. It would be disruptive for a client to stand facing the wrong
direction while waiting in line at the bank, or for a teller to twirl around in her swivel chair while
waiting for a receipt to print. These roles and intended uses are like invisible walls whose existence
we acknowledge and whose limitations we submit to—perhaps for good reason—even though they
aren’t expressed. Acknowledgement and submission are ways of performing our belief in the
importance of the institution. Everyone must believe in the importance of their own role or else the
institution falls apart.
The same goes for art. What does “serious performance” mean? The term conjures an image
of an audience seated in rows of cushioned chairs that are bolted to the ground, all voices abruptly
hushing when the performer comes out on stage dressed in black, silent until he reaches his place.
The performer’s silence and attire show that he respects the position that the institution has granted
him and the regard that the audience shows him. The audience’s regard is performed by way of their
conforming to behavioral expectations: when to clap, when to be silent, how to sit, when to rise and
when to exit. If one does not respect one’s own role, then one also disrespects the corresponding
roles of others. The general human preference for some degree of concord and mutual respect—a
preference that allows us to live alongside each other without constantly pronouncing the terms of
the particular social contract under which we operate—thus compels a collective reinforcement of
the institution’s importance.
This unspoken yet smoothly functioning hierarchical network of roles is exactly what
Durham’s spatial and linguistic games shed light on: he reveals the conventions of occupational
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seriousness by choosing not to adopt them. In 1998 Durham was enlisted to write a book
accompanying his exhibition in Berlin, both titled Between the Furniture and the Building (Between a
Rock and a Hard Place). The book begins with the chapter heading “A Brief Litter of Introduction,
or Apology” and proceeds as follows:
I am not sure what this is attempting to introduce because not a single word of it has yet
been written. Of course, as you read these lines they will necessarily be part of an alreadywritten belletristic sort of book—otherwise they wouldn’t be available to you at all.
You might well think that therefore there’s hardly a point to this a-lateral brief; it is
mostly just an exercise in getting myself started. Maybe it’s not an apology for the general
public; maybe this is an intelligent and sincere book you are holding. If so, may I take this
opportunity to urge you to go ahead and buy it?
No, the apology is possibly only to Theresa Georgen, Dirk Snauwert and others whose
lives I’ve made less comfortable by my procrastination these past few months.152
This passage both sets into motion a system of interlocking social roles (the writer/artist (Durham),
the editors/curators (Georgen and Snauwert) and the reader) and throws a wrench into their smooth
functioning. And in eschewing the stock function of an introduction—to hint at the content to
come—with text that is largely contentless in that its main activity is to trace the fact of its own
existence, Durham lets us know that if we’re reading this introduction in hopes of getting what the
catalogue essay is about, and if we’re reading the catalogue essay in hopes of getting what the
exhibition is about, we should expect to leave empty-handed. His apology to the curators Georgen
and Snauwert for his non-productivity is thus an articulation of the apology that his artwork and
writing generally, implicitly make: that they do not revolve around or aim toward the products and
statements that the experienced contemporary art-viewer is prone to seek. They are not projections
or projects, but encounters with concrete things where the improvised interaction between artist
and material gradually shape the course of the work.
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Durham regularly ironizes the term “project,” viewing its prevalence in the art world as
indicative of the compulsory business sense with which art practice has become infused. MFA
culture, which is inextricable from the world of private and nonprofit arts funding, has shaped a
landscape in which artists are expected to know and articulate what they are going to make before
they make it: the work should be preconceived or projected before the process begins. The overlap
between educational and grantmaking institutions means that the outcomes-oriented language of
grant applications has become integrated into how we conceive the creation of an artwork. Being a
serious artist requires having a particular vision, while the word “vision” has separated from the body
and, in accordance with corporate jargon, altered to mean “plan.” Marketing oneself as a serious
artist requires the ability to articulate the vision, explaining what a forthcoming artwork will look
like and what it will mean.
Durham’s reluctance to cramp the unruliness of artistic research within the confines of a
project proposal is something he articulates repeatedly in his writing. When, in 1994, he relocated
from the US to Europe, Durham began referring to the move as his “Eurasia Project,” the project of
“becoming Eurasian”:
For me, there is a simple fact that the continent of Eurasia is almost impossibly large […]. To
say “Eurasian Project’ is absurd. As absurd as the idea ‘Prepare for the Future.’ […] It is not
that my attempt to become Eurasian is artificial or useless, but it is the ‘best I can do’ in the
context of making a pretence of a pretence. And, as you see, my work does not consist of
‘efforts to understand’ or ‘reports on what I have discovered so far’ or ‘demonstrations to
prove my point’ or ‘explain.’153
It will be impossible to project what the process of becoming Eurasian will entail, because the term
“Eurasia” is being used as a geographical denomination, not a political one. For Durham, the project
of citizenship will require an unmediated bodily interaction with every inch of the continent. From
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the 90s until now he has visited places all over the map searching for the “center of the world,” 154
studying the materials of each different landscape, meeting people, learning about their lives, making
art with them. It is a task that is far too extensive ever to reach completion, because “at any point
there is the possibility of something new, something different.”155 Becoming a citizen of Eurasia, a
massive continent with the “strangest and most fluctuating boundaries”156 would require the settling
of language’s confusion between geography and politics: does one inhabit a nation or a place?157 It
will be Durham’s naturalization process, the impossible undertaking of acclimating to local resources
and materials in every location he visits so as to flourish like a native organism, as opposed to political
naturalization, the acquisition of an institutionally conferred right to identify with a place.

Enclosure
The project of identity—whether national, ethnic or racial—represents a particular
curtailment of exploratory thinking that, according to Durham, often benefits state power.158 The
ravages of colonialism were only possible with the willingness of people to objectify unfamiliar others
into fixed identities and labels.
Labelling as a method of containment is an all-too-familiar state practice. In February of
2016, the French government began attempts to relocate the inhabitants of the Calais refugee camp,
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who were living in homemade shacks and tents, to a new facility composed of converted storage
containers. A photograph taken of the new construction project presents a perfect illustration of the
particular violence implied by the state’s investment in “architexture.”159 It depicts a man standing
in something like a clearing, let’s call it a commons, right in the middle of the alleged disorder of
the old, makeshift section of the camp. The various multicolored tents and improvised shelters carry
no names or addresses, and it’s hard to tell where one dwelling ends and the next begins, so in some
sense the whole place is a commons. White, neatly stacked container homes are visible in the
background, behind a fence. According to a 2016 Reuters article, the inhabitants of the tent city say
they prefer not to move because in the new complex there is no common space and because they
will be required to enter their family names into a database in order to be allowed to live there. 160
They’re afraid that once they’re named and identified in this way, it will limit where they’re able to
go in their new lives, which they are hoping to begin soon. Alternatively, the commons is where
new paths and dwellings are thought of, named and talked about. People talk, and the jabber of
their voices in conversation competes with the construction noise. But with the new facility and its
registry of names, that commingling of families in the open air is now suppressed by the rule of the
proper noun.
In the summer of 2017, when a sweeping retrospective of Durham’s work opened at the
Walker Art Center in Minneapolis, ten Cherokee artists, curators and academics co-wrote an open
letter asserting that Durham does not come from a Cherokee family and has no Indian blood on

159

See Figure 3.6.
Matthias Blamont, “Migrant shelter made of shipping containers opens in France's Calais,” Reuters, January 11,
2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-calais/migrant-shelter-made-of-shipping-containersopens-in-frances-calais-idUSKCN0UP23R20160111.
160

94

record.161 The letter goes on to state that Durham has been faking his heritage in order to win artworld renown, using his alleged insider perspective on indigenous issues to achieve the respect of
institutions that have historically excluded real Native American artists and continue to do so to this
day. This marked the re-ignition of a controversy from 1990, when the passage of the Indian Arts
and Crafts Act—a law forbidding artists to market their work as Indian art unless they were enrolled
members of a state-recognized tribe—threw Native American artist communities into a tangle of
arguments.162 Some saw the IACA as a much-needed safeguard against profitable ethnic fraud, while
others viewed it as an assault on artistic freedom amounting to ethnic cleansing.163 Durham was
among a number of non-enrolled artists whose careers were affected by the new law; planned
exhibitions of his work in Santa Fe and San Francisco were canceled by galleries fearing citations.164
Now, thirty years later, the debate over whether or not Native American art needs state and
institutional protection remains blazing hot and unresolved among communities of Native artists
and intellectuals. Durham’s recognition by prestigious institutions—the retrospective was hosted first
by the Walker, then the Hammer and then the Whitney—sparked a media showdown about
representation, power and exclusion following the release of the co-authored open letter. The letter
contended that the issue with Durham was not solely one of tribal enrollment, it was about the
absence of any hard evidence proving his Cherokee ancestry, and his lack of engagement with the
everyday struggles of Cherokee communities since he emigrated from the US in 1994. For the
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signatories this meant that “Jimmie Durham is not a Cherokee in any legal or cultural sense.” 165
Elsewhere among the scores of articles published in the wake of the call-out, indigenous artists
emphasized that Durham’s fame throws into relief the longstanding disregard for their perspectives
in mainstream institutions. They recriminated arts administrators and curators for consistently,
carelessly framing Durham as a native artist, proving that the institutions had little knowledge about
how native identity is determined on the reservations.166
In a lecture delivered at the Walker by writer/curator Paul Chaat Smith, a long-time friend
of Durham, Smith readily agreed that art institutions have a long way to go before adequately
incorporating Native American ways of thinking and making into the aesthetic discourses they
safeguard.167 At the same time, he sees a glaring contradiction in the idea that Durham’s lack of
tribally-recognized credentials should be the grounds upon which he is discredited in the name of
institutional reform.
In the following statement, Smith meditates on the accusation that Durham is in fact a
White man masquerading as Cherokee; the statement unfolds as an implicit objection-throughcounterexample to the abstracted modes of knowledge production in which institutions, by
definition, engage:
[If the accusations were true] it would mean that for decade after decade I’ve been the victim of a
carefully orchestrated ethnic fraud […] It would mean all those casual stories about Arkansas, the
family anecdotes , the pictures he showed me, his adventures in Houston and Austin, everything he
said about his earlier life were lies. I’m sure that’s not true. But here’s the thing. I’m not wired for
absolute certainty. I love doubt. I love confusion. Sometimes I even love being wrong. Anything’s
possible, right? If Jimmie Durham is a fraud, it would rank somewhere between two poles for me.
The first would be finding out my parents were actually KGB officers. The second would be a
165
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colleague who you’ve known for decades, whose house you’ve visited, who’s shared stories of their
childhood and their siblings, you’ve met their spouse and have friends in common. Then you find
one day, every single thing they’ve told you about their past was a lie. Hard to imagine what that
would feel like. But I’m sure it would make me feel dumber than a box of rocks. Which in a way
would be deeply interesting.168

Smith shows himself to be grappling with the dissonance of feeling convinced of a thing in his bones
while accepting that “anything’s possible.” He states what he believes to be true while allowing that
his belief makes no universal claim.
From my position as a casual reader of art websites and magazines, Smith’s belief looks
reasonable, as the media has produced a nearly equal balance of evidence contesting and supporting
Durham’s claim to Cherokee heritage. In the face of this, those like myself who do not know
Durham personally must accept the fact that we’re probably never going to be certain about what he
is.
Tribal governments share a common trait with contemporary museum culture in that both
traffic in information about what a person is. As diversity by-laws are established across US cultural
institutions in an attempt to solve the longstanding problem of White bias, the art world has widely
adopted demography as a curatorial criterion.169 Thus “Native American” and “Cherokee” are
among the many ethnic terms by which art is institutionally framed for viewers. In knowing an artist
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such as Jimmie Durham only from a distance, these terms are intended to help me arrive at a
particular what: a prefab formulation of the artist’s complex personhood. But the qualifier
“Cherokee” will necessarily function differently for those who have lived Durham’s life with him,
made art and formed political movements with him.
AIM leader Russell Means, who organized alongside Durham throughout the 70s and 80s,
has said: “I’ve known Jimmie Durham for more than 20 years. He’s personally never been anything
but stone Indian the whole time, and I mean that in the fullest possible way [emphasis added].”170
When long-time friends like Paul Chaat Smith, Kay Walkingstick or Russell Means insist that
Durham is indeed Cherokee, they use the term to denote a who, not a what. The who is determined
reciprocally, through friendship, which facilitates a gradual, dynamic involvement with the actions
and decisions of the person in question, while the what is an external observation based upon a set
of recognizable descriptors that construes the person observed as abstract information. Demography
is a static paratextual summation of a life, an institutional replacement for the infinitely self-revising
experience of extended intimacy with a person or object.
Chaat-Smith and Durham share a gut aversion to bureaucratic census-taking processes, a
textual practice that directly correlates with the architextuality of the cubicle or government office.
To Chaat-Smith, Native artists are at heart a band of “malcontents, rebels, known weirdos, dark
dreamers and troublemakers” who ought to recoil from any demand to participate in the racial
arithmetic of such things as census databases and tribal rolls.
In the following passage, Durham invokes a very different band of malcontents:
…to Ludwig Wittgenstein and his beautiful house in Vienna, and to Robert Musil of Vienna
and Prague. And Schönberg, which I imagine means “pretty mountain,” or “pretty stone,”
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and must be the same as Monteverdi if a “green mountain” means a “pretty mountain.” And
to Heisenberg and to Einstein. What kind of a stein is a Wittgenstein?171
Here Durham breaks down the etymological components of names belonging to early 20 th century
German and Austrian intellectuals. The text appeared in a book accompanying an iteration of his
stone project that was installed in the Vienna house designed by Wittgenstein, to whom the word
play pays tribute. Durham demonstrates Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblance,” which
conceives of words as signifying meaning in a nebulous, meandering, overlapping manner rather
than within organized conceptual categories. Beyond the etymological resonances that Durham
reveals here, there is an unspoken larger resemblance between the names above: each one designates
someone who faced xenophobic violence with the advent of fascism and the great wars. 172
Wittgenstein’s story is especially resonant: according to the Nuremberg Racial Laws passed by the
Nazi regime in 1935, he was officially considered a Jew because he had three Jewish grandparents.
The Wittgensteins essentially bribed the regime to grant them “mixed blood” status—which would
save them from the death camps—by claiming that their paternal grandfather was the bastard son of
a German prince and then handing over 1700 kg of gold to the government.173 Incidentally, the
surname “Wittgenstein” was originally assumed as a result of a different state intervention, when in
1808 Napoleon ordered Ludwig’s ancestors to take on the name of their employers.174 Family names
and place names exemplify the terrain of language that is most informed by institutional efforts at
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containment—Lingis’ “common discourse” with its “coherence and direction”—truncating the
person, the world and the person in the world.

Waiting to be Interrupted
The evolving adventure of knowing a person over time and the incommensurability of this
experience with the generalizing police sketch that racial and ethnic categories impose; the sensation
of wonder at the world that is the starting point of empirical science quickly mutating into the need
to name a mushroom; the searching, receptive and intensely present state of consciousness that is
activated during art-making faced with the institutionally on-brand promotional copy exhibited
around the work; all demonstrate the overriding species-wide impulse to determine, delineate and
explain, and the resulting misconception that written language fundamentally exists to fulfill those
functions.
Durham’s hybrid essay-poems and essay-sculptures invite us into a textual universe where the
impulse to define is always aroused and yet all definitions fail. His prose is a parody of the need to
finally know, enacted as obsessive note-taking, where every note begets another note that is both
related and unrelated to it. It traces thoughts, the experience of thinking, the experience of writing
thinking, the immediate experience of the place and time where the writing of thinking is
happening, as well as the historical place and time of the things thought and written.
The essay is not a concrete thing—though we generally treat it as such—outside of time,
written for posterity, always remaining itself and the same no matter where or when it is read, a
preserved address by an unchanging voice that calls a particular, fixed audience into being. For
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Durham the essay is in time. It has no topic or subject. Its function is not to convey information
about or around a thing; for, when writing becomes overdetermined by the proposed presence of a
central topic, when all of the caprices, emotional investments, biological/geographical exigencies
and anxieties of the where, when, why, and how of an act of writing are overshadowed by the what,
that’s when it starts to lie. The conditions and materials get concealed.
When precision limits us, we choose words which lie for us. 175 Writing that purports solely to
explain or reveal a thing is to a certain degree always a lie. The masquerade of explanation invokes
Red Peter’s plight, where the determination—under pressure—to give words to where he has come
from covers up the reasons why he is being put to this test in the first place. This concealment is an
impulse that underlies expository and argumentative writing. The heightened understanding—the
grasp—of a thing that this writing promises becomes a blinding light that illuminates a single path
for the reader to follow. It appeals to our basic drive to get, grasp, master, apprehend. Our pursuit
of the thing distracts us from seeing that our need for it, wonder at it, lust for it, is conditioned and
directed by the writing itself which produces a wealth of reasons for our attraction. The very fact that
a thing is presented as something to be written about compels a desire for it. The expository or
argumentative paper is the very currency that makes its topic appear “serious and separate.” No
topics are separate.
You might think that the concept, “Waiting to be interrupted,” is an oxymoron; that one
cannot be interrupted if one is doing nothing but waiting. It is not, simply because it is not
possible to do nothing but waiting.176
Writing is a process of intense waiting. An empty time that is full of anticipation, anxiety, memory,
thinking, organs shifting, movement of air on skin. It is always a gratifying activity because the
175
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awaited interruption will inevitably come, the empty time leading up to it taking shape as a concrete
and transmissible past event, grasped by the as-yet-ungraspable presentness of the interruption.
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Chapter IV | Seeing and Hearing with Lyn Hejinian and Leslie Scalapino

Prologue
In the chapters preceding this one, I have given various examples of writing that unsettles
the distinction between art and analysis, image and text, experience and reflection, action and
observation. Yet I’ve largely confined my own writing to the latter fields in those pairings. So I’d like
to conclude this act of scholarship with an experiment. I’ll take cues from two poets, Lyn Hejinian
and Leslie Scalapino, who collaborated on two books, Sight (1999) and Hearing (2021). In their
separate oeuvres and in their collaborations, Hejinian and Scalapino have evolved a poetics in which
analytical poetry and poetic analysis are regular and alternating activities, such that the distinction
between art and criticism all but disappears. Sight and Hearing speak directly to the dynamic
relationship between action and observation, in that both books assume the simple constraint of
writing about what one perceives; visually in the first case and auditorily in the second. As I read
these two poets writing about what they perceive, I’ll write about what I perceive, shaped and guided
by what they think and do, invoking meta-dimensions of interaction. I view this as a procedure in
the tradition of Charles Bernstein’s Wreading Experiments,177 which are based in a belief that one
must write with, in and through a text in order to comprehend it. The purpose of my experiment
will be to test through my own writing what avenues are available in the act of criticism that diverge
from the expected explanatory mode—the habitual assumption of a position about and around a
topic—and instead commingle with and move alongside the subject of critique. I’m motivated by the
wish to arrive at a critical writing that doesn’t exist to be believed in, agreed with or identified with,
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but to incite other acts of thinking that arise and fork off from it. With Hejinian and Scalapino’s
words as my starting point, I’ll read and write with them, documenting my responses, tracing
receptivity in the moment; conditional, ambling, rambling. Inspired by the “autoethnography in real
time” practiced by the artists I’ve examined thus far, I will use footnotes as an external space—an
outside looking in—where I can reflect upon the character and tendencies of my reading/writing as
it happens. But before that, a brief interlude. I’d like to say a bit about the attitudes that Hejinian
and Scalapino hold toward perception in poetry, as poetry, and as indistinguishable from critical
discourse; a small introduction to the two books that will serve as point of focus for my investigation
of what it means to focus on a point.
To Scalapino, “experience is scrutiny,”178 meaning that one is always dislocated from oneself,
and that to feel things is to also feel oneself feeling things; moreover, it is to feel how others feel one
feeling things. Sight and Hearing use a dialogic structure that suggests how an individual’s perception
of the world is co-formed by other individuals in the world. The perceiver, Hejinian writes, is always
“under the pressure of abutment, contingency, and contiguity and hence constantly susceptible to
change.”179 This reciprocity between all perceiving bodies also throws into relief the experience of
utter separateness. Dialogue relies on linguistic tools which are also walls that experience butts up
against. Take the example of a moment in which seeing a particular landscape or feeling a particular
quality of air on the skin stirs a mixed set of personal memories, and the whole complex of sensation
and intellection invoked in this moment, shooting backward in time and accumulating a multitude
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of messages in the present, of course defies words; in writing, the expression of the effort to gather
in the whole complex will always contain a hint of loneliness.
The walls that the writer butts up against never cease to exist but they do change: one finds
a crack in the system through which to escape, only to then discover new walls and new cracks.
Hejinian wants to “write a poem which [is] to its language what a person is to its landscape,” 180 a
poem that perceives its own limitations, moving through grammar, syntax and vocabulary with open
eyes and ears, like an animal moving through its environment, sensing the rules of nature and
noticing how they can best be engaged toward fulfilling one’s needs. This resourceful perceiver is as
complicated and porous as the poem is, ingesting the materials around it—an evolving and composite
being.
Sight and Hearing are structured as a call-and-response, or a poetic epistolary, and thus they
amplify the Socratic character of critical discourse as such: the fact that criticism is fundamentally
an interjection into a particular time and place by a particular speaker, on the one hand, whose
audience and setting determine what it is that needs to be said, and a particular listener, on the
other hand, whose historical and cultural specificity will condition a particular set of responses and
resistances. Moreover, this dialogue between speaker and listener necessarily engages with the larger
context of the public (or republic), as the urgency of getting one’s point across will always arise from
the feeling that something in the greater world is lacking. Yet, while critical discourse always has the
appearance of being around or about the point to be made—this something lacking—criticism that
truly breaks through the surface of what is already known and said, cannot be about its topic or point,
rather, it is constantly producing it, and the more words spoken, the more points apprehended.
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Perhaps in the end, the absent thing that criticism most wants to grasp and share with the world, is
the desperate persistence of the self’s own dislocation, the very structuring principle of language.
Writing is an indication of separation, it is thinking a degree removed from experience, and the
quality in it that separates ourselves from ourselves and from our embeddedness in the world, is “a
shadow (evocation) of that which is ‘exterior,’ the public.”181 When, through writing, we look on our
thinking, we’re assuming the role of the public. Writing is an act of making oneself seen, and
therefore, perhaps a substantial component of the writing’s content will be an expression of what it
feels like to be seen, and of why one wants to be seen.
On that note, I will shift my gaze to Hejinian and Scalapino’s Sight, a point-of-focus for my
own reading and writing, and a landing place along the way to re-thinking how and why critical
writing happens.

Experiment
The sky’s watchfulness is fluid, remembering
nothing, therefore a bipolar separation is in nature, has no relation
to one’s own mind, isn’t in the mind as if it’s not nature.
Then one could rest, as if one didn’t have to, aware
of faculty of resting which only is it
Not being that only one will die, when that isn’t
what's groundless, they’re doing so is groundless
(LS) 182[Sight]
The dying are included—this has to be implied by living
In the focus between (an open parkland in the background,
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blurred trees) there’s interference, a muting of light achieved,
ghostly heat like that drifting down the beach
Disparity and asymmetry develop as ethical categories
Justice is inconclusive
a startling sound—merely
the whap of a flailing kid cannonballing
—creates a completely different picture
[…]
(LH) [Sight]183
I remember something Bob Hullot-Kentor said when I was studying with him, perhaps
referencing Walter Benjamin, that “nature doesn’t care about us.” I think about how the word
“nature,” as in “the material world surrounding humankind” or “natural scenery,” has had an
aesthetic connotation ever since industry began making its technological leaps and bounds and we
started to see we would soon no longer be relating to the land as something immediately useful, thus
inaugurating the nostalgic visions of romanticism. And the imprint this left has been
overwhelmingly visual (to what extent does Cole pre-fashion the way the Hudson strikes my sight?).
This nature, the romantic one “surrounding humankind” does care about us. It is for us, the attentive
love object, Margaret in the ruined cottage, ready with refreshments to please my palate no matter
how long has passed since my last visit. What is memory’s role in one’s capacity for caring? When
does the aphasiac stop caring about words? The sky’s watchfulness is fluid, remembering nothing. I imagine
that watching without remembering would feel like swimming, my aquatic ancestry still alive in my
muscles, a carefree, unpanicked gliding (panic comes from projected memory,184 LH). The old nature
watches but doesn’t care. It’s watching moves.185
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therefore a bipolar separation is in nature. The task is to use sensation in order to move the oldnature part of my mind (move, not locate, because the solution/conclusion impulse belongs to the
not-nature which the new nature surrounds). But the bipolar I and it (I vs. it?) scenario is, perhaps,
in nature: the ethical categories of disparity and asymmetry in rapidly shifting relations of domination
and resistance—mosh pit of things—are a part of it, whereas the I alone is not.
When you meet something utterly new (sudden death by oncoming machine-in-the-garden),
your carefree, unpanicked mind is, for a brief moment, overwhelmed, subdued, and perhaps the
utterly new something is also so, though one can never know. A greeting, conversation in the
mountains, judgeless justice, inconclusive. LS: there is a conflation in leftist thought with conservative
thought in devaluing writing/experience as demonstration/process… “procedure” or formalism as modes of
writing are embraced by both.186 The maps written by internal and societal memory—recording what
combination of color and shape signifies what object, or what combination of facial features,
demeanor, speech habits and place of origin signifies what type of person—dictate the dominant
human procedure for seeing. Minds that move only in accordance with the shape of what they’ve
established as right, mapping it, have eyes that leave out liminality, unpanicked gliding, the sky’s
fluid watchfulness.
Procedure is to some degree unavoidable—we’d be inert without the guidance of habit—but
we don’t need to be carted off by the doctrine of it like logs on a freight train. Procedures and
projects have purposes and conclusions. Formalism (where the object displaces the person) says what
a work does, outside of time (but it was made in time). The appeal of precision, the drive to identify
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and specify, directs our way to some degree but we can always pause to inspect the atonalities and
asymmetries of the language of direction. Words that identify and specify—“is,” “is in,” “isn’t in,” “as
if it’s not,” “which only is it”187—don’t ever hit their mark, but do a good job of tracing an act of
trying, making us “aware of [language’s] faculty of” trying “which only is it.”
But is it only it. LS seems to enjoy the copula, and various constructions of it. Following the
lines of dialogue, my eyes become trained to recognize who is who without needing to look at the
signatures. The characteristic language of each speaker emerges via a consistency of appearance
particularized through the repetition of material elements (what kinds of words and spaces are used
(or sounds and pauses)) as well as my remembering earlier iterations of those elements. If for all of
my life I’ve suffered from postnasal drip and, thanks to repetition and memory, my friends come to
view Miriam as “a throat-clearing person,” has this designation originated from them or me? A poem
formed as an answer to another poem shows what-one-is to be inescapably, mutually composed.
What a freedom there is in acknowledging that you co-construct how I seem, so that I can pick up
the knowledge and play with it.188
But none of this is fluid or rhythmic. There are manifestations of language (primarily forms
of musical language) in which we can be caught up together and carried away—rhyme and rhythm
help—the mind fully inside of it, cradled, as in a warm house, forgetting the outside, only emerging
when the family steps back collectively into the cold air of the practical profane. But there is also a
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plane of language that’s free of this polarity. The startling sound, the whap of a flailing kid cannonballing,
the gust of cold when you suddenly see yourself and can’t form words to depict it, is so much an
experienced part of experience that it’s no longer so displacing that it makes you forget what the
warmth felt like. Meaning-making still works when it’s not contained tidily in a certified envelope.
The shock is a valve that releases new forms and you can always count on it to return.

It races in that it has no spoken occurrence or being,
though it is language (your poem Happily). It flies, maybe
slowly in that it has no time ('having no spoken sound'—
which implies one). One has the impression of hearing it
when it's not spoken, as not a shape, sound or movement
though it is language, is a sensation of being free? —though
in more than one faculty of sensation at once or between
some? So, though flying, it could be slow free. In fast and
slow time even at once. Not in time. Spoken sound means
there is gravity? If Happily is spoken— (when we spoke it) it
has time, it was thinking about different things so that it
moves from one to another. Or several there at a time—the
sound of a voice speaking it is 'there being several things at
once in its content' thought there. It occurs inside one.
(LS) [Hearing]
Everything that is has time. The sound of anything is a
release of the time that has flowed into it. Sound is time
flowing. The reading aloud of Happily produced temporal
spiraling—circling going somewhere making something (the
occurrence flowing). Is that flowing free? —of us? Of time's
limitations (the finitude of duration)? of fortune, fate,
occasion, necessity? I think nothing is free but maybe
everything (at least at the moment of its incipience) is
accidental (occurring in "free space," i.e., in whatever space
happens to be available at the moment it happens to
happen). Freedom would be "outside one" but accident
(happenstance, happiness) is outside one too. I would say
this of love, too—it is outside one in the occasion (of
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friendship in listening reading). Your poem Deer Night is
in itself, from within, listening.
(LH) [Hearing]189

The whap of the cannonballing kid—a moment when sight and sound were mixed together—
seemed a good moment to bring Hearing in. A silent video of a cannonballing kid would still produce
a sound felt in the viewer’s body: crisp and palpable. When you know the sound a thing makes, the
hearing will derive its character from the thing: hearing (knowing) that the bowing of the cello will
inevitably produce the sound, the event that one might call "celloing" (LH)190 this opposed to the
unidentified wail, hum or screech (sounds named after sounds).
I’ve begun not with hearing but with considering hearing. Here-ing. What sight is so bright
that it disrupts my thinking just as a loud sound does? 191 While trying to make words, any external
cacophony will prevent me from hearing them. What sight prevents me from seeing them? Sight
mainly serves the spatial (rather than the temporal), allowing us to have a sense of what surrounds
us. But the illusion of stillness will be shaken by movement: crescendo, trajectory, arc, mounting
tension, plot. Sound is already story. A sight is while a sound happens (at least, in ordinary, unstudied
experience; analysis brings a different conclusion). Sight will disrupt my thinking/writing only when
the seen moves too much, crescendos, has a sweeping arc.
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190
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On the state route at night R began to sing Bowie’s “I’m Deranged” and I knew it was because
we were watching the dotted yellow lines rush toward us as in Lost Highway, which used the song as
its theme. Disarranged. A too-easy example of sight becoming temporal, the reverse of watching an
airplane slowly draw its arc in the sky. though flying, it could be slow free. The yellow lines rush toward
us and the sound we hear isn’t rushing wind or the whir of tires but a song with which it has been
paired, in memory. Is the sound of rushing yellow lines now called “I’m Deranged”?192
But reading the poem has led me to leave it behind. I relate to it via my departure. I
correspond with the poems and the poems correspond with each other. (of friendship in listening
reading). The love between this particular pair of stanzas is largely expressed through intellectual
dialogue—the collaborative examination of ideas. So the energy of this bit is less in playing—
mimicking, riffing, chains of sonic association— with the materials of two texts made of letters, words
and sounds; it is more in the manipulation of concepts. I do think this is partly the reason why I’ve
been led so far away from it: concepts are already not here. But concepts’ abstraction is not necessarily
indicative of a poetic relationship that denies its own tender feelings (e.g. two emotionally/erotically
repressed scholars feverishly sparring); here there is at once the tenderness of sisters and the
unflagging respect of allied colleagues. it could be slow free / Is that flowing free?—amid dialogue
pointed/directed toward concepts, there is still a substrate of unconscious momentum (how the
movement of the unconscious produces synchronicities of sound and meaning: the sound of a word
invokes a similar-sounding word which miraculously bears the exact meaning one has needed all
along (the unconscious thus naturally reveals how etymology works; over the course of history, words
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I alternate between 1) reading: responding directly to the words and meanings of the text, 2) trying to work out
the concepts that I think are presented therein, 3) reflecting on my own reading habits, 4) spiraling away from the
text into my own theorization of things because it’s stressing to try to understand and more fun to try to create. It
is very difficult to stay in the text and I believe this is because I’m intimidated by the erudition of it.
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morph into similar-sounding and similar-meaning words)). This is the intelligence of happenstance193
(we are moved toward the things that we need).
The mind of each poet catches its own sonic/conceptual resonances just as it catches the
other’s. When a certain degree of automatism is achieved, the emanations of my mind can become
indistinguishable from that of the other mind.194 That relationship of melding is distinct from the
relationship of exchange: both are present here. “Happily”195 is answered by “Deer Night.”196 Each
poet gives a nod to the other’s oeuvre. The exchange throughout is conducted in a remarkably
conscientious fashion: both know that love must simultaneously be an emanation and a directed
deed.197
These sentences are less propulsive than pointed inward to a thing inside and self-ward,
making sure to say what they mean. The hearing doesn’t race. Though the book began quite
propulsively:

In blackness whooing of two owls close to the ear loudly
on bothsides, one's hearing is not an action on one's part
and there is clear, black, soft. After the rain—the entire rungs
—plateaux flooded—the cattle floating on the green rises, that
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Here I land on someone else’s term, in this case, “happenstance,” as one of many forms that emerge in
Hejinian’s investigation of the root word “hap” (fortune, chance) in her long poem Happily. I haven’t happened
upon it, but navigated toward it. In doing this, demonstrating good scholarship, I seek anxiety relief. It’s a way of
showing that I derive my ideas from somewhere reputable. And at times it feels like a bit of a cop out. I’m
threatened by the challenge of figuring something out on my own and so I bring in someone else’s words. This
reveals a dilemma that’s inherent to the essay in general: the work of analysis and understanding is endless, so any
essay that is faithful to the project of essaying would be endless. The recourse to terminology (even the freshest,
most experimental version of it) always indicates a door being shut on a particular line of inquiry.
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Pleased by this discovery. Helps me feel the mechanism behind the phenomenon of accidentally mistaking
someone else’s memories for your own.
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I would say that being forced to practice this conscientiousness is excellent for shaking oneself out of one’s
impulse to dominate through reason (i.e. the tendency to let one’s vision attenuate in one path toward one
anticipated logical conclusion (the conclusion you want which your essay materializes as a fight to achieve) at the
expense of all other paths. The voice of an interlocutor forces open other paths for you.
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were beside one—the rises horizontally were in-stilled by
frogs, croaks as singing separate from evening light yet the
rises existing as that… (LS)198
A moment when I’m caught up and carried away. Any action on my part is evened out to a drone
as all things are stilled by rain (the rainy day viewed from a porch is a good example of sound and
sight melting together in scene—movement and time but without event) and the sounds move me (it
races) without halting to look at itself. There are poets who try to keep a rushing pace going until
drawing a breath at the end, in which case we readers won’t end up looking at ourselves during the
time of being caught up and carried. After we emerge, it is time to converge around a table and talk
about what we’ve just experienced. But isn’t that a bit death-denying? Too much an anticipation of
heaven?

A disconcerting, as(:) rage of wind in that wind, as 'no
emotion,' 'jumps' 'only' while trees fly; and trees flying (slowly
in hurricanes at once—all of them) converse—that is their
'emotion'—flying with roots convulsed (they 'convulsed' is
only past tense but trees are only present there) as each is
'bush aching green' herd they're in bliss (as 'aching green
bushes' in sky that are at present flying, they haven't 'inner
life' as if similar to no people, as Ponge knew, their terms, in
time) that in each is a burst, a rapid fire in them in very long
periods of time ('over' time) so these are not heard by us,
while wind is—is being heard (by ships or ports) and is not
'emotional,' is fast outside, by itself
(LS) [Hearing]
The emotions could guide one to one's own goodness
(via several slow movements fast beside communicating
moments) —an interval, the music stops—it must have been,
but only for a day. The sound struck me as strangely
displaced, as if, having been intended for a ghetto blaster it
was coming from a violin. There is no rage of wind melody
198
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from which one couldn't make a fine violin welcome to the
hearing of one's goodness (bliss) stammering. The audible
middle of one's end-of-life is known for the brevity of its
echoes (stammering on the open sea through the speeding
trees very little invective, no apples in the grass, no silenced
(squashed) bees, no images of crimson brains, and no proof
or dogma—they usually want to interfere with us and get us
to believe something "for our own good").
(LH) [Hearing]199

The trees appear as flying bushes because the directional arrow of the trunk points up to the image
of gathering together that we more regularly see in the gathered leaves of a bush as when we’re
walking to the car,200 on the way to work, without surveying, studying or looking up. Walking to the
car is time for inner life (as, for humans, all time is time for inner life, so we think) even if we’re just
pondering whether the keys are in the bag or the pocket. But trees are unemotional and fast outside.
Is it simply a question of not being aware of their own deaths? LH is afraid of death with intensified
fear (which is love)201 and nature doesn’t care about us.
At this point, Hearing is propulsive, though punctuated by intervals and audible middles. The
interval when the music stops is the silence of inner life looking, the sound of consideration. But it
isn’t always exactly a

because the consideration itself is carried by language. The engine of

propulsion is words and the tool for attending to it is also words. I believe it is rather hard in the
process of producing words on paper to catch oneself up and be carried away, though it must be to
some degree possible. If experiencing and understanding do not relate in a call-and-response but a
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Hearing, 49-50.
It is a very typical experience for me, that while reading, the physical context I am in folds into the physical
moment of reading, where things in my world and things in the world of the book seem to describe one another
and there’s all this synchronicity. A kind of hypnotic hyper-identification. Is this a failure to actually encounter the
not-me?
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braided procession is there a chance we might quit needing God to call us back after leaving a
message? Are all silences pregnant? Is death sound or silence? I was walking on the road below the
cliffside watching the sparrows flitting around on long icicles dripping from the rocks above, icicles
pointing down at a half-eaten deer sound asleep in the snow with wide black eyes and a frozen
tongue.
Wet, not seeming so, maybe it is not, perhaps Dante. The
pale white face tunneling runs through the bright air, with the
enflamed trees, that having shot up ‘before’ early, can burn as only
color in the thin cobalt whereas the hole-eyed rat-face tunneling as
if face on a heavy barrel is of a ‘younger nature’ rather than a white
paste no-corpse in the cobalt but which has aged outside (in which
you can see it having aged before but it is in the present).
The rat-face white sweating its limbs not even visible
tunnels in the flaming cool air, toward one.
It has no place or interior life. There is no reflection in the
place. But there appears to be a boundless reflection in that around
or along with it.
(LS) [Sight]
The notion “going to be dead” is very pure—no image
should be attached to it.
Mammals, meanwhile, appear when one is relaxed
When one is relaxed “there” is neither “that” nor “this
(LH) [Sight]202
Tunneling through bright air, we see that visual sensation can be propulsive, too, though rushing is not
immediately native to it as it is native to auditory sensation. Sound just rushes. But then, the visual
progression of an aging body is a rushing sight, aging into decomposition, pale white face tunneling.
The propulsion of the bright air, enflamed trees, corpse in the cobalt, flaming cool air, is not a forward
movement flowing line to line, not the precision of a runner, but a vision that plunges deeper and
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deeper into the composition of things (the ingredients, not the structure). Looking hard is propulsive
because it never stops. Thus, the work of description can catch you up and carry you away.
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Conclusion | Critical Byways

Parataxis and Poetic Thinking
Sight and Hearing are both works of literary science—to once again bring in Hurston’s term—
modeling an ethic of criticism which sees the critic’s primary obligation to be the bodily and sitespecific activity of looking and listening, where observation doesn’t crystallize in reportable results.
Hejinian and Scalapino do regularly spiral away from the sensory—like the impulse to light a cigarette
during a moment of intense interaction—into pages-long analytical dialogue about the nature of
perception, but these digressions from literally the matter at hand become informational fodder for
further sensory investigation, as the two poets turn their attention to the visual and aural ingredients
of their own thoughts and words. My writing in response to their writing amounted to a field trip
that mirrored theirs. I wanted to carefully record what my senses told me about the work as I moved
through it; what kinds of colors, tones, sounds, lines, words, symbols, shapes, pauses it uses, and
how these elements interact with each other. I wanted my writing and reading to look more like acts
of description than acts of interpretation. But I found that I wasn’t able to maintain such focused
immersion. Even with the freedom I had granted myself from the demand for linearity and
resolution to which the critic normally must answer, I could not hold fast to the material elements
of the text because I was continually drawn away by the appeal of my ideas.
Perhaps the fact that I had framed my experiment as an exercise in critical prose is what
prevented me from thoroughly fulfilling my aim of “commingling with and moving alongside the
subject of critique.” Do Hejinian and Scalapino, conversing poetically, have a degree of intimacy
with the tangible components of their environment which I, in my role of critical writer, don’t have
to mine? Deprived of poetry’s inherent liberties, is the critic/essayist irreparably blocked from the
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world by concepts? I find an answer to this in Theodor Adorno’s formulation of the relationship
between poetry and investigative prose. For Adorno—whose best known philosophical works use
notoriously never-ending sentences to articulate dizzyingly self-negating propositions—the essay lives
between science and art, containing the scientific drive toward explanation and resolution yet
preserving the artistic capacity for a heightened intensity of form and material. In “Parataxis: On
Holderlin's Late Poetry” he elaborates the concept of “poetic thinking” (Gedichtete),203 the ability to
grasp at once a number of disparate elements which signify an unspoken something exceeding any
unifying intention. This form of thinking is proper only to poetry, as the poem’s very structuring
principle. He contrasts it with the “the logic of tightly bounded periods, each moving rigorously on
to the next,” that is inherent to the prose essay. Poetic thinking is a visible though ever-receding
horizon for the essay, whose perspective is plagued by “syntactic periodicity,” the overwhelming
impulse to synthesize, to unify. All language is fundamentally plagued by that impulse, but we might
define poetry as the maximum threshold of language’s ability to not be what it fundamentally is. The
essay trails behind, and yet, it is in its attachment to synthesis where its very power lies. To Adorno,
the essay has the capacity to reach “a synthesis of a different kind, language's critical self-reflection,”
a form of unity in which “not only is multiplicity reflected in it…but in addition the unity indicates
that it knows itself to be inconclusive.”204 This potential goes unacknowledged in the critical essay
that presents a carefully plotted logic, proceeding smoothly from introduction to conclusion, as a
way of convincing one’s audience of the soundness of one’s position. Such a work falls short of
achieving deep criticality, as the performance of certainty and the legibility of the plot testifies to the
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writer’s use of linguistic trails that have already been blazed. On the other hand, when the essay
displays its own striving toward unity as a necessary failure, the failure becomes a locus of truth, and
this is where the most revelatory critical activity happens.
Parataxis is a key principle to Adorno’s conception and practice of the essay. To him,
paratactical prose will naturally resonate an indelible striving toward conclusiveness, but, unlike
hypotaxis—the grammatical mode in which phrases and clauses are subordinated to each other—it
will not have to signify any belief in its conclusions. Proceeding through ideas paratactically will
reflect both the disjointed agglomeration of physical things in the world that sparks the will to think,
and the live act of thinking that is always impelled toward resolving the disjunction. Poetry inclines
heavily toward multiplicity, criticism inclines heavily toward resolution, and the paratactical essay
inclines toward both.
The most extreme example of paratactical writing from Adorno’s own oeuvre is his book
Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, which, more than any of his other books, is a work of
critical prose that verges on poetry. This text comprises a series of micro-essays, ranging from one
paragraph to three pages long, which read like field observations taken from daily life. The overall
composition of the book is paratactical in the tradition of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations:
it is a collection of meditations that do not coalesce under a unifying thesis or signal an obvious
organizing principle in how they proceed one to the next. There are three sections in the book that
break down the essay form even farther, comprised of discrete sentences or groups of sentences with
line breaks between them, such that hypotaxis is almost completely abandoned at the level of the
paragraph. I will excerpt one of those sections, titled “Dwarf fruit:
In the recollection of emigration each German venison roast tastes as if it had been felled
with the charmed bullets of the Freischütz.
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In psycho-analysis nothing is true except the exaggerations.
We can tell whether we are happy by the sound of the wind. It warns the unhappy man of
the fragility of his house, hounding him from shallow sleep and violent dreams. To the
happy man it is the song of his protectedness: its furious howling concedes that it has
power over him no longer.
The noiseless din that we have long known in dreams, booms at us in waking hours from
newspaper headlines.
The mythical messenger of doom relives in radio. Important events announced
peremptorily are always disasters. In English solemn means both ceremonious and
menacing. The power of society behind the speaker turns of its own accord against the
listeners.
The recent past always presents itself as if destroyed by catastrophes.205
It isn’t pertinent for me to delve into an investigation of what the above passage is saying (though
Adorno’s earnest investment in the possibility of a better world coupled with his happy embrace of
the role of perennial spoilsport is as charming as always here, and beckons me); rather, I bring in
this example as a way to demonstrate the permission the writer gives himself to shift abruptly
between topics as varied as venison roast, romantic opera, psychoanalysis, the sound of wind,
newspaper headlines, and the nature of history. What lends such writing its unity is not the promise
of a particular philosophical position toward which an accumulation of textual evidence will
progress, but the fact that it is being thought by a thinker and written by a writer. This reflects the
centrality of psychological self-attention to the Frankfurt School project, which formed the social
context of Adorno’s work, and whose urgent aim was to figure out why human beings cannot help
but participate in the development of totalitarian systems. The texts that emerged from the Frankfurt
School constitute what we now know as “Critical Theory,” representing a group of writers for whom
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practicing relentless criticality—treated as a balanced combination of psychological and social
analysis, drawing from Freud and Marx—was the most important concern in philosophy.
Adorno’s experimentation with parataxis as a stylistic possibility for critical writing was an
attempt to achieve the most concentrated and unwavering critical self-reflection possible. My own
foray into paratactical prose which formed the preceding chapter of this dissertation provoked an
interesting set of psychological responses in me as I attempted to write alongside the poetry of Sight
and Hearing. In my role as respondent—rather than poet—the influence of “syntactic periodicity,” the
pressure to resolve, to say something, did disrupt my reception of the dense and heterogeneous sensory
materials that the book offered up to me. This facilitated a revealing tension that is unique to the
essay as form: in the succession of fragmented and overlapping observations and analyses that
unfolded in my writing, the pressure of the periodic was and is a physically felt thing. For both the
reader and the writer, the jolt that occurs between thoughts that do not proceed smoothly and
logically from one to the next is a moment of self-reflection, of looking forward and looking back,
that the masterfully composed argumentative essay will eliminate. In the process of writing an essay
or a sentence (both of which are expected to have some detectable organization of beginning, middle
and end) this moment occurs for me when I’ve progressed just past the beginning: when I am
compelled to feel accountable for whatever I’ve just said. When I pause to look back at the period
preceding my sentence, or the awkward first step I have made into the course of thinking that
constitutes my in-process essay, it feels similar to waking up with a hangover, knowing I have to take
responsibility for whatever I have just done.
To identify the feeling of pressure imposed by the period—a signal behind me that I have
begun to make a case, or a blinking reminder, always just ahead, compelling me to deliver a neatly
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tied package—is to recognize the act of writing as inherently a disquieting experience. Deborah
Britzman has written about the anxiety that essay-writing tends to trigger.206 The stressing demand
to say something—something smart, cogent, convincing, memorable and new—is built into this role.
As anxiety is a reliable tool for evading vulnerability, the anxious essay may contain clues about the
specific vulnerabilities it diverts.207 One of the ego’s defenses against anxiety is what she calls
“isolation,” quoting Freud.208 A major component of the isolation defense is the compulsion to
perceive the writing as cut off from the emotional situation it reflects. But that compulsion is
palpable. Through writing’s performance of what it wants to signify, we can detect what it actually
does signify. Writing is always at heart an attempt to makes oneself heard and recognized, and
therefore it tends to get stuck in the expression of egoic demands before it can achieve much
engagement with the external world, which it perceives only in brief flickers. Yet, built into the very
nature of the essay, is the power to achieve, in Adorno’s words, “a synthesis of another kind, ” as the
anxious, emotional substrate will join the disjointed flickers. I see Jimmie Durham’s writing as an
excellent illustration of this: his work exemplifies a revelatory dialectic between ego and world, and
is structurally paratactical. Durham’s multimedia “essays” undertake an intense focus on materials
(such as his Mushroom from the Grunewald Forest)—looking closely at what a thing in the world is made
of—while consistently being disrupted by compulsive pronouncements from and about the writing
“I” who is hypersensitive to the feeling of being read or looked at. Durham’s writing (and his art
practice overall) maintains a paratactical organization, incorporating a diversity of contiguous styles
and mediums, where any hint of a teleological, hypotactical train of thought will quickly undercut
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itself through some self-reflexive joke or an abrupt change of tune. The pressure to serve a purpose
and resolve in a statement is a feeling that he always makes palpable in his farcically exaggerated
moves to decisively resist it.

Anxiety as Critique
“While writing this paper, I lost my interest, felt no one cared, was sure someone
else had already written it, and gave up hope that the disparate pieces of thought
would take me any further than a description of what everyone already knows.
Draft upon draft drove me into more muddles. I lost my train of thought and felt
out of focus. Suddenly, I needed to read more. Then I began to hate writing. It was
making me suffer.”
—Deborah Britzman, “The Untold Story of the Writer’s Block”
The constellation of pressures that permeate the situation of writing are starkly obvious when
it comes to the writer embedded in academia at any level: one’s direct audience of superiors,
publishers committed or potential, and peers vying for jobs in a depleted market, wield the power
to make or break one, all of this within a system whose respectability depends upon an air of
exclusivity and high standards. Yet the fear Britzman illustrates above is something that is native to
the act of writing in general: “words arouse anxiety and libido.”209 The dislocation, the performance
anxiety, the tender pride, the competitiveness, are all part of the rich emotional complex that is
activated by the task of presenting one’s ideas in a written document with all its unalterable finality.
As poet-professors, both Hejinian and Scalapino contend in and through writing with the
problem of creative autonomy in the face of institutional disciplining. If writing is the activity of self
invention—of becoming sharply cognizant of who, what and where one is in order to better achieve
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who, what and where one wants to be—it’s a process that may be stymied when where one writes is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative hierarchy whose terms of assessment must be learned,
accepted and reproduced in order to continue receiving its benefits. Writing in the late 90s,
Scalapino remarked on a tendency in certain “poets accommodating the university setting” 210 who
were aligned with avant-garde “procedural” practices, to disavow experience as a valid basis for
writing: “In order to be called ‘avant garde,’ the gesture would have to be devoid of its specificity per
se (generalized as—or as if—modes or operations without entity)—and without the practice or the
perception’s urgency or disturbance.”211 While the “procedural,” “avant garde” or L-A-N-G-U-A-G-E
poets to which Scalapino refers were, by definition, excellent at challenging norms of
communication—academic or otherwise—through a radically particularized reconfiguration of the
English language, she views them as still reproducing the institutional criterion of disembodied
objectivity.212
What is implied by the preeminence of subjectivity and “perception’s urgency” in literary
experiments like Hejinian and Scalapino’s collaborations, Durham’s textual-visual essays and
assemblages, Hurston’s multidisciplinary autoethnography, Kocik’s choreoprosodic research,
Stecopoulos’s holistic criticism, Olson’s projective verse and Thoreau’s hybridized journal-writing
practice, is the wish for a heightened sensitivity to the stakes of being geographically, culturally and
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125

politically embedded. Such work redresses the particular oversight that Scalapino observed to be
prevalent among her peers: underlying their valorization of objectivity was the view that embodied
experience is not a valid means to understanding political reality because subjectivity is culturally
determined at the most primary level; it is never fully one’s own. The diverse array of works listed
above pose an implicit challenge to the belief that the pursuit of objectivity is a path to clearer
knowledge; they recognize that the muddying of vision that is caused by emotional investment is a
part of the picture that is both unavoidable and instructive, as it is a means to perceiving how one is
embedded. To experience my irrevocable cultural conditioning (or, to put it in a less dystopian light,
the fact that I am co-constituted by all beings and things in my environment) reflectively, is the only
way to develop a conscious relationship to power: both in how it suppresses me and how I use it to
suppress others. Whether through Kocik’s “commoning”—a “de-centralized” and “inefficient” form
of whole-bodied conversation in which “people help each other speak”—or Hurston’s “literary
science”—a way of seeing herself “like somebody else” to “stand off and look at [her] garment”—or
the many other modes of textual listening in which the artists documented in these chapters engage,
writing can give up the doctrine of objectivity and still commit rigorously to exposing sociopolitical
realities. But ambitious transdisciplinary undertakings are not the only way to achieve this sort of
far-reaching reflective vision; it is built into the very nature of the essay.
In American colleges, one of the first rules student writers learn is that they are not to use
first-person pronouns: the performance of objectivity is key. The overriding requirement to articulate
a good argument or persuasive research results means that the subjectivity of the writer becomes
unnecessary and invisible. But the emotional impact on the writer of the demands that the
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educational situation makes will always manifest in the writing, where the voice of the subject
inevitably persists.
The educational situation, Britzman argues, is inherently traumatic. 213 First the young child
is removed from the only social environment she or he knows—that of the home and family—to be
placed in a world of strangers and presented with a new, disembodied form of knowledge acquisition
with its own system of reward and punishment. In this context, the child relives the wish to please
the parents, but now that need has been displaced onto the teacher. The earliest attempts at
institutional learning are thus motivated by an ego-ideal: the wish to please in order to win love. It
is only later that the genuine love of learning happens, which manifests at the developmental stage
when the child becomes fixated on collecting things, an expression of visceral excitement for
amassing knowledge. These different motivations for learning—the desire to please and the sheer
love of intellectual activity—stick around for a long time. The writing of the college student will still
be energized by them, “the force of her or his emotional situation”214 visible in the desperate wish to
please a judging audience of professors or peers, and the “wish to risk that fate and create something
new from more than what has already happened”215 in the manic spiraling of the paper that can’t
find its “main point.” The particular kind of effort that the writing makes will always reveal a layer
of meaning—much deeper than what that words purport to say—about the writer and the writer’s
world. Britzman brings in the example of Roland Barthes’ The Preparation of the Novel, a book about
“that which captures the writer and holds her back”—the anxiety that attends the work of preparing
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to write. He recommends addressing this feeling through embracing and representing it. Britzman
quotes his “neurotic solution”:
It’s possible to imagine, as a solution, a sort of neurotic stratagem or plasticity: depending
on the nature of the problem or of the breakdown, you exploit the different neuroses within
yourself; for example, breakdowns at the outset: defeating the page, coming up with ideas,
provoking the spurt, etc.=hysterical activity ≠ the phase of Style, of Making Corrections, of
Protection=obsessional activity.216
Such an approach, Britzman believes, will have the effect of illuminating the network of connections
between the lonely, anxious, self-doubting writer and her sociopolitical universe:
Whether anxiety opts for the paragraph, sentence, or word, a story is being written and it is
in writing that one may transform the writing phantasy into a commentary on problems in
the wider world.217
The notion that one’s own cultural and psychological motivations that are articulated in any
act of writing—including both culturally determined habits of thought and the idiosyncratic
omissions and proclivities that the ego develops in order to defend itself—ought to be listened to
rather than sidestepped, is the core of Adorno’s vision for an education whose primary purpose is
to prevent large-scale political violence. In his essay “Education after Auschwitz,” he advocates a
“turn to the subject”218 through a pedagogy that emphasizes critical self-reflection above all else,
because he sees the disaster of fascism to have arisen from people’s readiness to strike outward against
perceived transgressions in others while being unable to encounter what was malfunctioning within
themselves. “The willingness to treat others as an amorphous mass” arises from a blindness toward
oneself, where the inattention to one’s own motivations, habits and biases result in a subjectivity
that is itself nothing more than an amorphous mass. Adorno observes that mastery of the work that
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is asked of us within our institutional roles regularly requires the acceptance upon ourselves of pain
and humiliation, which is achieved through great feats of repression in order to win the ultimate
prize of power. Practicing toughness toward one’s own suffering will earn one the right to be cold
toward the suffering of other people, and even to inflict pain on them; for, with the achievement of
self-mastery comes a license to avenge oneself for “the pain whose manifestations (one) was not
allowed to show.”219
I propose that the essay is positioned to function as an antidote to ruthlessness. Its very name
implies effort, struggle, and failure, and the willingness to essay in the face of language’s many
limitations will aid in the practice of empathy. Adorno writes: “The essay mirrors what is loved and
hated instead of presenting the intellect, on the model of a boundless work ethic, as creation ex
nihilo.”220 The intellect is shaped and propelled by forces of love and hate that have evolved in tandem
with the thinker’s particular history and placement on this planet. At the core of the intellect is an
emotionally reactive engine driving the thoughts one has and the cognitive habits by which one
comes to them. The pretense to tell or teach one’s ideas as if they’ve been built ex nihilo by an author
whose education, linguistic command and persuasive ability lend written content the gloss of a
precious metal, will be inherently deceptive because the writer’s sensory and emotional situation
always plays a significant role in informing what ideas end up on the page. I believe that the writing
we most need will be sprawling, unruly, alien, and not even necessarily writing, because it has flown
away from the categories of form and meaning that regiment thought as agreement and structure
the cultural contexts through which we normally receive our texts. Such an approach would treat
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the essay as a stage on which the mind moves in response to cues from all elements of its
environment—including, perhaps most importantly, other minds—thus forgoing the sadomasochistic
dream of victory which will only be won through learning the ropes, speaking right, and stopping
one’s ears to the world inside and outside that asks for something different.
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Illustrations

Figure 1. Gowing’s Swamp. From Thoreau's February 3, 1860 journal entry. The Writings of Henry David Thoreau
Vol. XIV, ed. Bradford Torrey (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906)

Figure 2. Great Waiters. From Thoreau's February 3, 1860 journal entry. The Writings of Henry David Thoreau Vol.
XIV, ed. Bradford Torrey (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906)
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Figure 1.1. Kocik, Robert, Physiology for Poets, drawing on paper, Artspace, https://www. artspace.com/robert_
kocik/physiology_for_poets.

Figure 1.2. Page scan of libretto from E-V-E-R-Y-O-N-E, performed by the Commons Choir in 2013. In Supple
Science: A Robert Kocik Primer (Berkeley: Contemporary Practice, 2013), 244.
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Figure 2.1. Still from Zora Neale Hurston’s 1940 field work footage, South Carolina. Viewed at the Library of
Congress, Moving Image Section. Title # 47193.

Figure 2.2. Still from Zora Neale Hurston’s 1928 field work footage, Florida. Viewed at the Library of Congress,
Moving Image Section. Title # 1160554.
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Figure 2.3. Still from Zora Neale Hurston’s 1928 field work footage, Florida. Viewed at the Library of Congress,
Moving Image Section. Title # 1160554.

Figure 2.4. Still from Zora Neale Hurston’s 1928 field work footage, Florida. Viewed at the Library of Congress,
Moving Image Section. Title # 1160543.
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Figure 2.5. Taussig, Michael, drawing, ink on paper, in I Swear I Saw This: Drawings in Fieldwork Notebooks,
Namely My Own (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 2.
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Figure 2.6. Goya, Francisco, Los desastres, plate 44, Yo lo vi, 1810-20, etching and aquatint. In Hughes, Robert,
Goya (New York: Random House), 274.

Figure 2.7. Goya, Francisco, Los desastres, plate 69, Nada. (Ello dira), 1863, etching and aquatint. In Hughes,
Robert, Goya (New York: Random House), 302.
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Figure 2.8. Whitten, Jack, Black Monolith II (For Ralph Ellison), acrylic, molasses, copper, salt, coal, ash, chocolate,
onion, herbs, rust, eggshell, razor blade on canvas, 1994, Brooklyn Museum, New York City, https://www.brooklyn
museum.org/opencollection/objects/216671.
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Figure 2.9. Whitten, Jack, Black Monolith, X (The Birth of Muhammad Ali), acrylic on canvas, 2016, Metropolitan
Museum of Art, New York City, https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/768445.
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Figure 2.10. Still from Margaret Meade’s 1953-1954 fieldwork footage, Admiralty Islands. Viewed at the Library of
Congress, Moving Image Section. Title # 1160554.title #2018406.

Figure 2.11. Still from Zora Neale Hurston’s 1928 field work footage, Florida. Viewed at the Library of Congress,
Moving Image Section. Title # 1160795.
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Figure 2.12. Stills from Zora Neale Hurston’s 1928 field work footage, Florida. Viewed at the Library of Congress,
Moving Image Section. Title #1160543.
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Figure 3.1. Durham, Jimmie, Mushroom from the Grunewald Forest, mushroom, acrylic paint, ink on two wood
boards, 2006, in Jimmie Durham: At the Center of the World, edited by Anne Ellegood, 235, New York: Prestel,
2017.
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Figure 3.2. Durham, Jimmie, “The Center of the World or How to get at Chalma,” installation view, 1997, The
Museum of Contemporary Art, Pori, Finland, http://www.ensembles.org/items/3687/assets/6985.

Figure 3.3. Durham, Jimmie, “The Center of the World or How to get at Chalma,” installation view, 1997, The
Museum of Contemporary Art, Pori, Finland, http://www.ensembles.org/items/3687/assets/6983.
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Figure 3.4. Still from video. Ilesmarkart, “Smashing, by Jimmie Durham @ Parasol Unit,” YouTube Video, 4:10, Jun
30, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5SOj9vumZOY.

Figure 3.5. Durham, Jimmie, Articles 2 & 3 from the 1986 Pinkerton’s Agency Manual, mahogany, ink on wood
panel, 1986, in Jimmie Durham: At the Center of the World, edited by Anne Ellegood, 86, New York: Prestel, 2017.
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Figure 3.6. European Press Photo Agency, digital image, The Daily Mail, January 11, 2016,
https://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2016/01/12/00/3000079C00000578-0-image-a-48_1452559326336.jpg.

144

Bibliography
Adorno, Theodor. “Education After Auschwitz.” In Critical Models, translated by Henry W.
Pickford, 191-204. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.
---. “The Essay as Form.” In Notes to Literature Volume One, translated Shierry Weber Nicholsen, 323. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.
---. Minima Moralia, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (New York: Verso, 2005).
---. “Parataxis: On Hölderlin's Late Poetry.” In Notes to Literature Volume Two, translated by Shierry
Weber Nicholsen, 109-149. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Penguin, 1992.
---. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.
Barthes, Roland. “The Third Meaning: Research notes on some Eisenstein stills.” In Image / Music
/ Text, translated by Stephen Heath, 52-68. London: HarperCollins, 1977.
Blamont, Matthias. “Migrant shelter made of shipping containers opens in France's Calais.”
Reuters, January 11, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrantscalais/migrant-shelter-made-of-shipping-containers-opens-in-frances-calaisidUSKCN0UP23R20160111.
Boas, Franz. “The Instability of Human Types.” In Papers on Interracial Problems Communicated to the
First Universal Races Congress Held at the University of London, July 26–29, 1911, edited by
Gustav Spiller, 99–103. Boston: Ginn and Co., 1912.
Boyd, Valerie. Wrapped in Rainbows: The Life of Zora Neale Hurston. New York: Scribner, 2003.

145

Britton-Purdy, Jedediah. “A Radical for All Seasons.” The Nation, June 1, 2017,
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/thoreau-radical-seasons/.
Britzman, Deborah. “The Untold Story of the Writer’s Block.” Academia. August 11, 2019.
https://www.academia.edu/17224732/The_Untold_Story_of_the_writing_block
Brooklyn Museum. “Black Monolith II (For Ralph Ellison).” Accessed July 17, 2019.
https://www.brooklynmuseum.org/opencollection/objects/216671.
Charnov, Elaine. “The Performative Visual Anthropology Films of Zora Neale Hurston.” Film
Criticism 23, no. 1 (1998): 38-47
Churchill, Ward. From a Native Son: Selected Essays in Indigenism, 1985-1995. New York: Southend
Press, 1999.
Clare, Eli. Brilliant Imperfection: Grappling with Cure. Durham: Duke University Press, 2017.
Deleuze, Gilles. Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life. Translated by Anne Boyman. New York: Zone
Books, 2005.
Doherty, Thomas. “The Paratext’s the Thing.” The Chronicle of Higher Education, January 6, 2014.
https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Paratexts-the-Thing/143761 .
Durham, Jimmie. “Between the Furniture and the Building.” In Waiting to Be Interrupted: Selected
Writings 1993-2012, edited by Jean Fisher, 121-170. Milan: Mousse Publishing, 2014.
---.“Eurasia.” In Waiting to Be Interrupted: Selected Writings 1993-2012. Edited by Jean Fisher, 221236. Milan: Mousse Publishing, 2014.
---. “The Libertine and the Stone Guest.” In Waiting to Be Interrupted: Selected Writings 1993-2012,
edited by Jean Fisher, 73-94. Milan: Mousse Publishing, 2014.
---. Poems That Do Not Go Together. Berlin: Wiens Verlag, 2012.
146

Fain, Daria. Website. “The Commons Choir.” Accessed May 1, 2018.
http://www.dariafain.net/commons-choir
Fanon, Franz. Black Skin White Masks, translated by Charles Lam Markmann. New York: Grove
Press, 1967.
Firth, Rhiannon and Andrew Robinson. “From the Unlearned Un-man to a Pedagogy without
Moulding: Stirner, Consciousness-Raising, and the Production of Difference.” In Out of the
Ruins: The Emergence of Radical Informal Learning Spaces, edited by Robert H. Haworth and
John M. Elmore, 56-73. Oakland: PM Press, 2017.
Fredman, Stephen. The Grounding of American Poetry: Charles Olson and the Emersonian Tradition.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Furtado, Will. “Jack Whitten: A Painter’s Painter Gets His Long-Overdue Recognition.”
Contemporary And, June 4, 2019. https://contemporaryand.com/magazines/jack-whitten-apainters-painter-gets-his-long-overdue-recognition/.
Gottlieb, Anthony. “A Nervous Splendor.” New Yorker, March 30, 2009.
https://www.newyorker.com/ magazine/2009/04/06/a-nervous-splendor#
Hejinian, Lyn and Leslie Scalapino. Hearing. New York: Litmus Press, 2021.
---. Sight. Washington, DC: Edge Books, 1999.
Hejinian, Lyn. “A Thought is the Bride of What Thinking.” In The Language of Inquiry, 7-21.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
---. . Happily. Berkeley: The Post-Apollo Press, 2000.
---.“The Person and Description.” In The Language of Inquiry, 199-208.

147

Hughes, Robert. Goya. New York: Random House.
Hurston, Zora Neale. “Art and Such.” From “Hurston, Zora Neale, 1938-1939,” Digital Public
Library of America, http://dp.la/item/a8371e22c3eaa79f84383e80b40ee311.
---. “The Characteristics of Negro Expression.” In Within the Circle: An Anthology of African American
Literary Criticism from the Harlem Renaissance to the Present, edited by Angelyn Mitchell, 7990. United Kingdom: Duke University Press, 1994.
---. Dust Tracks on a Road. New York: HarperCollins, 2006.
---. “How it Feels to Be Colored Me.” In The Norton Anthology of African American Literature, edited
Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Nellie McKay, 1020-1033. New York: Norton, 2004.
---. Mules and Men. New York: HarperCollins, 2008.
---. Their Eyes Were Watching God. New York: HarperCollins, 2006.
---. “What White Publishers Won’t Print.” In Within the Circle: An Anthology of African American
Literary Criticism from the Harlem Renaissance to the Present, edited by Angelyn Mitchell, 117121. United Kingdom: Duke University Press, 1994.
James, William. “Does Consciousness Exist.” In Essays in Radical Empiricism, edited by Ralph Baron
Perry, 1-38. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996.
---. The Principles of Psychology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983.
---. “World of Pure Experience.” In Essays in Radical Empiricism, edited by Ralph Baron Perry, 39-91.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996.
Kafka, Franz. “A Report to an Academy.” In Franz Kafka: The Complete Stories, edited by Nahum N.
Glatzer. New York: Schocken Books, 1983.
Kocik, Robert. Supple Science: A Robert Kocik Primer. Berkeley: Contemporary Practice, 2013.

148

Lingis, Alphonso. The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1994.
Locke, Alain. Review of Their Eyes Were Watching God, by Zora Neale Hurston. In Zora Neale
Hurston: Critical Perspectives Past and Present, edited Henry Louis Gates Jr. and K.A. Appiah,
18. New York: Amistad, 1993.
Olson, Charles. The Maximus Poems, edited by George F. Butterick. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1984.
---. “Projective Verse.” In Collected Prose, edited Donald Allen and Benjamin Friedlander, 240-246.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Open letter. “Dear Unsuspecting Public, Jimmie Durham Is a Trickster.” Indian Country Today,
June 26, 2017. https://indiancountrytoday.com/archive/dear-unsuspecting-public-jimmiedurham-trickster
Reagan, Sheila. “Jimmie Durham Retrospective Reignites Debate Over His Claim of Native
Ancestry.” Hyperallergic, June 28, 2017. https://hyperallergic.com/387970/jimmie-durhamretrospective-reignites-debate-over-his-claim-of-native-ancestry/.
Scalapino, Leslie. “As: All Occurrence in Structure, Unseen—(Deer Night).” In The Public World /
Syntactically Impermanence, 88-133. Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1999.
---. “The Cannon.” In The Public World, 15-28.
---. “The Recovery of the Public World,” in The Public World, 53-62.
Shulz, Kathryn. “The Moral Judgments of Henry David Thoreau.” The New Yorker, October 12,
2015. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/10/19/pond-scum.
Stecopoulos, Eleni. Visceral Poetics. Berkeley: On Contemporary Practice, 2016.

149

Taussig, Michael. I Swear I Saw This: Drawings in Fieldwork Notebooks, Namely My Own. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2011.
Thoreau, Henry David. Walden and Resistance to Civil Government, edited by William Rossi. New
York: Norton, 1992.
---. The Writings of Henry David Thoreau, edited by Bradford Torrey. Cambridge: The Riverside Press,
1906.
Tilove, Jonathan. “Under Arts and Crafts Act, only card-carrying Indians can create Indian Art.”
Newshouse News Service, May 16, 1993. https://jonathantilove.com/indian-ar/.
Timreck, Theodor William, dir. Franz Boas, 1858-1942. 1980; Watertown, MA : Documentary
Educational Resources.
Walker Art Center. “Indians Everywhere: Paul Chaat Smith on ‘Americans’.” Uploaded on
September 20, 2017. YouTube Video. 58:51 min.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FxHtaebT0bQ.
Waugh, Alexander. The House of Wittgenstein: A Family at War. New York: Anchor Books, 2008.
Whitten, Jack. Jack Whitten: Notes from the Woodshed, edited by Katy Siegel. New York: Hauser &
Wirth Publishers, 2018.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker
and Joachim Schulte. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1953.
Womack, Autumn. “‘The Brown Bag of Miscellany’: Zora Neale Hurston and the Practice of
Overexposure.” Black Camera 7, no. 1 (2015): 115-133. JSTOR.

150

YorkUEducation,.“Teacher's Emotional World and Mental Health—Deborah Britzman.”
Uploaded on May 3, 2016. YouTube Video. 37:07 min.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxsLyPE_66Y&t=158s.
Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth and Jerome Kohn. “What and How We Learned from Hannah Arendt:
An Exchange of Letters.” In Hannah Arendt and Education, edited by Mordechai Gordon,
225-256. Boulder: Westview Press, 2001.

151

